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Abstract
Public policies are an important determinant of the welfare of individuals and the society
at large. Careful evaluation of the impact of public policies on welfare is therefore imperative
for our understanding of the positive and normative implications for these institutions. The
three chapters of this thesis examine the welfare consequences of specific economic and political
institutions.
Chapters 1 and 2 study two distinct channels through which social housing, a common
feature of developed countries, may impact the neighborhoods in which they are built and the
labor market outcomes of their low income tenants. Chapter 1 is concerned with the effect of the
provision of social housing on neighboring private flats. It assesses the spillovers of low-income
tenants and the change in the composition of the housing stock that are to be expected from
the provision of new social housing units. In particular, it uses the direct conversion of private
rental flats into social units without any accompanying rehabilitation to identify the impact of
the inflow into the neighborhood of low income tenants, separately from the effects of social
housing on the quality of the existing housing stock.
Chapter 2 shows that social housing influences the location of low income tenants, and that
the neighborhood of social housing units may improve the labor market outcomes of the poorest
tenants. I observe the relocation of welfare recipients through the selection process of social
housing applicants in the city of Paris from 2001 to 2007. The institutional process acts as
a conditional randomization device across residential areas in Paris. The empirical estimates
outline that neighborhoods have weak short- and medium-run effects on the economic self-
suffiency of poor households.
Chapter 3, by contrast, focuses on how regional migrations of unemployed workers may affect
their job search prospect in Europe. Using a longitudinal sample of French unemployment spells,
the empirical estimates outline positive migration effects on transitions from unemployment to
employment that depends on the previous duration of the unemployment spells.
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Preface
Economic and political institutions are of fundamental importance for the formation of pub-
lic policies. Careful evaluation of the impact of public policies on welfare is therefore imperative
for our understanding of the positive and normative implications for these institutions. Each
of the three chapters of this thesis examines the welfare consequences of specific economic and
political institutions.
In a broad sense, my research contributes to the related fields of Public Finance (Chapter 1
and 2) and Labor Economics (Chapter 3). Chapters 1 and 2 study two distinct channels through
which social housing, a common feature of developed countries, may impact the neighborhoods
in which they are built and the labor market outcomes of their low income tenants. Chapter 1
is concerned with the effect of the provision of social housing on neighboring private flats. It
assesses the spillovers of low-income tenants and the change in the composition of the housing
stock that are to be expected from the provision of new social housing units. While Chapter
1 argues that social housing units induce spillovers on neighboring private flats by shifting the
social composition of neighborhoods, Chapter 2 shows that social housing influences the loca-
tion of low income tenants and that the neighborhood of social housing units may improve the
labor market outcomes of the poorest tenants. Chapter 3, by contrast, focuses on how regional
migrations of unemployed workers may affect their job search prospect.
Chapter 1 investigates the impact of social housing on the sales price of neighboring flats
in Paris. I construct a unique dataset including flat sales and social housing projects at the
building level. To account for endogenous placement of social housing projects, I use a difference-
in-differences strategy that includes fine geographical controls and trending unobservables. In
my preferred specifications which control for building fixed effects, a particular spatial pattern
emerges: a 10 percentage points increase in the social housing share implies a 1.2% increase in
housing value within a radius of 50 meters. However, private properties located farther away
from the social projects within a 350 to 500 meter belt experience price decrease by 5.5%. The
positive effects appear more important for small dwellings and for properties located in poor
neighborhoods while negative impacts dominate in high income neighborhoods and for family
dwellings. Further estimates exploit the unexpected win of a left-wing mayor in Paris, which
was followed by a sharp increase in social housing units driven by the direct conversion of private
rental flats into social units without any accompanying rehabilitation. This natural experiment
allows to identify the impact of the inflow into the neighborhood of low income tenants, sepa-
rately from the effects of social housing on the quality of the existing housing stock. I do not
5
find evidence of a positive impact of the conversion projects on housing prices.
Chapter 2 investigates the effects of neighborhood on the labor market outcomes of poor
households. I construct a longitudinal data set from the administrative records of welfare recipi-
ents in the city of Paris from 2001 to 2007. I observe the relocation of welfare recipients through
the selection process of social housing applicants. The institutional process acts as a conditional
randomization device across residential areas in Paris. I measure the impact of location charac-
teristics on future labor market outcomes. I find that -(i) successful applicants tend to relocate
in the vicinity of their initial neighborhoods; -(ii) the quality of neighborhood matters for the
job finding rate of poor households; -(iii) such effect is stronger for households with children
and single women; -(iv) most of the positive effect is driven by unstable jobs that do not allow
the individuals to exit the welfare program. These estimates outline that neighborhoods have
weak short- and medium-run effects on the economic self-sufficiency of poor households.
Chapter 3 investigates the effect of residential mobility on unemployment using a longitudi-
nal sample of French unemployment spells. I evaluate the impact of migration on unemployment
duration at the individual level. Using matching estimators and repeated unemployment spells,
the empirical results suggest the existence of significant positive effects on transitions from un-
employment to employment, which can be predicted by job search theory. These effects depend
on both previously elapsed unemployment duration and the time spent in the new region of
residence.
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Chapter 1
The externalities from social housing
Evidence from housing prices
1 Introduction
Neighborhood effects and externalities are key issues in the social sciences and in the design
of social policy. A large existing literature investigates the causes and impacts of neighborhood
and peer effects in a range of scenarios such as education, labor markets, health and crime1.
Social housing is an important and growing component of social policy. Various countries have
seen an increasing Government involvement in this area at least partly motivated by the inten-
tion to create or maintain mixed neighborhoods (see Currie, 2006, for the USA, Cheshire et al.,
2008, for the UK and Laferre`re and le Blanc, 2006, for France). However, there is little evidence
on the impacts of low-income housing developments on the neighborhoods in which they are
built.
While economists’ knowledge of the effects of social housing in local neighborhoods is still
relatively thin (recent exceptions include Baum-Snow and Marion, 2009, and Schwartz et al.,
2006), assessing such effects is crucial to compare the benefits of social housing for low-income
tenants to the costs (if any) of creating and maintaining mixed neighborhoods. The overall ef-
fect of social housing on nearby private housing is potentially ambiguous. On the one hand, by
bringing in an inflow of relatively low-income residents, social housing affects the socio-economic
mix of a neighborhood and may lower the value of the neighborhood to existing residents. On
the other hand, project-based assistance that complements social housing projects may provide
an offset to the above effects, and more generally to urban decay. Rosen (1985) argues that so-
cial housing units may be justified to replace distressed properties in low-income neighborhoods
where social units may be better maintained than private rental units. Thus the effect of social
housing concentration on local housing prices is ultimately an empirical question.
This chapter estimates the impact of social housing on the private housing market, using
information on new housing developments and property sales at the building level for the city
1See among recent examples: Oreopoulos, 2003, Kling et al., 2007, Currie et al., 2010, Linden and Rockoff,
2008, the review of Oreopoulos, 2008, and references therein.
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of Paris between 1995 and 2005. I ask how proximity to social housing units affect the housing
prices of nearby private flats and what are the underlying mechanisms. Paris provides a com-
pelling setting to study the externalities of social housing for three main reasons. First, recent
social housing policies in 2001 lead to a rapid expansion of the social dwelling stock with 18
thousands social units, provided between 2000 and 2005. Social units accounted for 23.8% of
the occupied rental housing stock at the end 1995 and nearly 27.3% at the end of 2005. Second,
Paris is by far the most densely populated city in Europe, and as a result new social housing
units potentially affect a large number of private sales. I will be able to exploit the underlying
variation using information on private sales at the building level. Finally, by comparing sales
affected by new constructions, rehabilitation of existing housing developments, or conversion
of private housing, I can obtain a precise picture of the mechanisms driving the externalities
stemming from social housing developments.
To analyze the effects of new social housing projects on neighboring private flats, I exploit
two complementary research designs. The first identification strategy builds on a difference-
in-differences specification. An important contribution here is the introduction of a rich set of
local controls. Both developers and housing authorities have some control on the location of
new social units and it is therefore important to control for unobserved determinants of project
location. In my difference-in-differences estimates, I can control for local unobservables down
to the building level. Using the share of social housing within different neighborhoods as an
explanatory variable, I examine whether private flats located near social housing projects expe-
rience different price changes once the social housing projects are created.
My difference-in-differences estimation strategy delivers two main results. First, without
fine local controls the estimated impacts of social housing on housing prices is mainly negative.
This mostly stems from the endogenous location of social housing in declining or deprived parts
of small neighborhoods. When building fixed effects and local linear trends are included, the
private housing stock located within 50 meters of the social housing projects experience positive
price growth. Specifically, a new social housing project of typical size (35 units) raises local
housing prices by around 2.6% and a 10 percentage points increase of the social housing share
raises housing prices by about 1.2%. The timing of these effects is consistent with a causal im-
pact and the estimates are robust to the inclusion of local linear trends. This result challenges
the belief that the potential inflows of low-income tenants could offset the benefits of the reha-
bilitations and new constructions associated with social housing projects. Second, the impacts
of social housing projects appear either close to zero or negative for private flats located farther
away from the projects. For neighborhoods located 350 to 500 meters away from the social
projects, a 10 percentage points increase in the social housing share (corresponding to about
one standard-deviation change) would imply a 5.5% decrease in housing values. These average
effects are the result of important heterogeneity with respect to neighborhood’s characteristics
and dwelling size. The positive impacts measured within 50 meter of the projects are driven
by small flats in low-income neighborhoods, while the negative externalities measured within
the outer belt from 350 to 500 meters are mainly driven by family dwellings and high income
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neighborhoods.
To investigate the mechanisms driving these externalities, I exploit the election of the cur-
rent mayor, Bertrand Delanoe¨, in March 2001. The Delanoe¨ administration marked a sharp
increase in the number of social units and a change in their usual channel of provision from
new constructions and rehabilitations of distressed private properties towards the conversion of
private rental properties into social units. As these direct conversions (acquisition sans travaux )
do not involve new buildings or rehabilitations, they allow me to identify the effect of the inflow
into the neighborhood of low income tenants, separately from the effect of social housing on
the quality of the existing housing stock. This policy experiment points towards zero effects of
low-income tenants inflows.
This chapter builds on the research assessing externalities of housing policies in the private
housing market. A first stream of this literature is based on difference-in-differences estimation
strategies controlling for census tract or block unobservables. Schwartz et al. (2006) investi-
gate the effects of subsidized housing projects in New York between 1987 and 2000. Using
a difference-in-differences hedonic regression at the census tract level, they define the houses
located within 600 meters of a project as treated. They find that both rental and owner oc-
cupied subsidized housing projects tend to have large positive externalities, mainly due to the
construction of new buildings and the removals of disamenities in distressed neighborhoods.
Santiago et al. (2001) find similar results for the dispersed housing subsidy program in Denver
which led to an increase in small scale rental projects over the period 1987 to 1997. Autor et al.
(2009) analyze the effects of the elimination of rent control in Cambridge (USA) during 1995-
1997 and document negative externalities of rent controlled properties on neighboring houses,
having controlled for detailed property characteristics. Hartley (2008) finds that the timing of
closures and demolitions of high rise public housing buildings in Chicago is associated with an
increase in housing prices in the vicinity of the past projects, consistent with the removal of
disamenities.
Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) tackle more directly the issue of the endogenous location of
the new social housing projects. They exploit a discontinuity in the formula for the eligibility
for Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) subsidies, which creates quasi random variations
in the number of new buildings between census tracts. Their regression discontinuity design
shows that additional new projects and LIHTC tenants stimulate home-ownership turn-over,
housing prices in declining areas and lower median income in poor gentrifying areas.
My identification strategy differs from both the usual difference-in-differences strategies and
Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) in three important dimensions that are likely to explain the dif-
ference in my findings. First, most papers have used aggregate census data at the tract level2,
while my data gives me the exact location of each sale and each new social housing unit. This
spatial richness allows me to get a more detailed picture of spatial spillovers and to control for
building unobservables. This is important when the effects considered are extremely localized
2For example, Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) use US census data at the tract level and define neighborhood
as a 1-km circle around the census tract’s center. Chay and Greenstone (2005) and Greenstone and Gallagher
(2008) use comparable data.
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and if the location of new projects is endogenous within census tracts. Second, the regression
discontinuity design adopted by Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) focuses their analysis on the
impacts of social housing in poor neighborhoods, while Paris is one the wealthiest city in Eu-
rope, the median pre-tax household income ranging from 13, 985 euros in the poorest census
tract to 61, 783 euros in the highest in 2001. This allows me to uncover heterogeneous effects of
social housing on housing prices. Third, most of the point estimates provided by the existing lit-
erature reflect the combined impact of the revitalization effects of new housing projects and the
inflows of low-income tenants into a neighborhood. The Parisian set-up allows me to distinguish
between the impact of new social housing created via new constructions and rehabilitations of
existing dwellings and that of straight conversions of private rental units into social housing and
therefore more closely isolate the impact of additional poor households on neighborhoods.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the features of Parisian
social housing that are relevant for my analysis, describes data construction and some sum-
mary statistics. Section 3 describes my identification strategies. Section 4 describes my main
empirical findings on the externalities of social housing on private housing prices. Section 5
investigates further the mechanisms driving these externalities. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional background and summary statistics
2.1 Institutional background
The Parisian social housing system is based on rental units subsidized by low interests loans
and tax deductions. Housing units are owned by private local companies, HLM 3. Despite their
private status, these companies are closely monitored by the central government and the mu-
nicipality, that sometimes contribute to rehabilitation, maintenance or demolition of buildings.
Moreover, in Paris, the municipality is the main joint owner of the largest HLM companies.
Project-based assistance is used by HLM companies to create new social units either through
subsidized construction, rehabilitation or conversion of private buildings4. Once a social hous-
ing unit is created, it remains in the social sector forever5. Figure 1.1 breaks down the number
of new units created in Paris from 1970 by year of completion and type of creation. The timing
and types of the new units match closely the city mayoral elections that took place every six
years from 1977 to 2001 and in 2008. The overall production of social dwellings is lower after the
change of mayor in 1995 and increases significantly after the first election of a left-wing mayor
in 2001. Until 2001, the main method to create new social housing units was new buildings.
During the 1980s the rehabilitations of existing distressed properties increased significantly. At
the same time, figure 1.1 reveals a sharp decline in the number of social units created through
3Habitations a` loyer mode´re´.
4HLM companies were allowed to buy a minority of dwellings of private new projects before their completions
(VEFA) by the de´cret 2001-104 (08/02/2000).
5The French government created incentives for HLM companies to sell social units to their low-income tenants.
The main HLM companies in Paris do not apply this policy.
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new buildings during the 1990s, from an average of approximately 2, 700 annual new dwellings
at the end of the 1980s, to an average of 900 new dwellings between 2000 and 2010. The pur-
chase of 20 year old buildings without any rehabilitation was only authorized by a change in
law in 20016. From 2001, rehabilitation of existing properties and conversions of private rental
flats were the main methods used to increase the stock of social dwellings.
The French Government has designed several incentives for each municipality to develop a
comparable stock of social dwellings. A law adopted in 2000 imposes a minimum share of 20%
of social housing units among the occupied housing stock in each municipality and therefore
Paris, with a social housing share of 13.1% in 2001, is directly concerned7. However, the spatial
distribution of social housing inside Paris is a joint decision of the HLM developers and the
municipality. The municipality intervenes through the selling of public land and buildings to
developers, the authorization of new buildings and the design of the subsidies that add non-
trivial monetary and non-monetary incentives to the location of new social units. The main
objective since 2001 has been to reach a better spatial distribution of the social housing stock.
The municipality decided to apply the 20% limit to all the arrondissements in Paris and created
an inclusionary zoning which stipulates that any large private project located in central Paris
should incorporate at least 25% of social dwellings. Figure 1.2 plots the location of the new
units over time. Small dots represent social housing projects created before 2001 and larger
dots the projects created after 2001. The conversion projects created after 2001 are represented
by large squares. The underlying map presents the median housing price (per square meter)
in 1995. Overall a negative correlation appears between the number of projects and housing
prices. Interestingly, recent projects are spread throughout the city while older social housing
units are located in fewer neighborhoods. The unequal distribution of the variation in the so-
cial housing share across the city would pose problems in the presence of localized shocks (e.g.
renewal programs, industrial clean-ups etc.). The widespread distribution of the new social
housing units mitigate the influence of these local shocks.
The expected impacts of social units on surrounding properties depend crucially on the
characteristics of the social dwellings. Each dwelling is subject to some level of rent control
according to the subsidies used to finance the project. HLM companies have a restricted choice
over the eligible tenants who are determined mainly through income, number of children and
previous housing (Laferre`re and le Blanc, 2006). As a priority is given to households in finan-
cial difficulties, the income of the successful applicants appears far below the maximum income
levels. Allocation of the two main types of social housing published by the municipality in 2005
shows that the income of the new tenants was below 60% of the usual income threshold in 90%
of the cases (APUR, 2006). Hence, new social tenants are typically below the 20th percentile of
income by consumption unit8.
Table 1.1 summarizes the characteristics of the HLM dwellings and tenants with respect
6De´cret 2001-336 (18/04/2001) for the financing of PLUS dwellings and Pre´fecture de Paris (2004). The
purchase of existing buildings for PLA-I was authorized earlier by the De´cret 1990-151 (16/02/1990).
7Recently, Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) advocate the use of subsidized housing in the USA to increase the
supply of affordable housing in highly productive areas.
8Eurostat consumption unit. There are large variation of eligibility level by household size.
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to the private accommodation sector according to the French Housing Survey in 2002. The
first column shows the characteristics of the stock of social housing dwellings, the second shows
the characteristics of the social dwellings with new tenants9 while the last two columns show
the characteristics of private rental dwellings and owner occupied dwellings. Panel A provides
information about the structural characteristics of the units. Social dwellings are located in
larger and more recent buildings: 19% were built after 1982 against 7% in the private rental
sector or 4% for owner occupied units. They are also larger than private rental units by around
25% or 0.6 rooms and located in larger buildings. The average rent by square meters in the
social sector is less than half the rent in the private sector. As a result of this rent difference
and the scarcity of the social offer, the duration of tenancy in the social sector is greater than
in the private sector by 5 years.
Panel B of table 1.1 displays the main characteristics of the social tenants. The income
by consumption unit of the social tenants is one third, approximately one standard-deviation,
below the corresponding average in the private rental sector. This lower level of income is re-
lated to larger shares of non qualified, unemployed and inactive individuals. Social tenants are
also older and less likely to be born in France than households in private accommodation. The
shares of families and single parents are also significantly higher.
Finally, panel C of table 1.1 reports the opinion of the households on the neighborhood
and maintenance of social dwellings. Flooding appears less of a concern in the social sector
as the buildings are more recent. However, 38% social tenants report that the building has
been degraded last year while this number is only of 18% in the private sector. The number
of households that declares being victims of robberies (or attempts) is also substantially higher
than in the private sector. While the average social tenant thinks that his neighborhood is less
safe than the average private tenant, new social housing tenants have a more positive view of
the neighborhoods of their social units.
Due to the difference in households’ income and the characteristics of the social buildings,
investments in low-income housing could have different externalities according to both construc-
tion types, level of income of the tenants and initial neighborhoods. Depending on the projects,
the main spillover effects could be through the low-income tenants living in social housing, the
upgrade of existing buildings or through complementary investments. For example, social hous-
ing units are often created through urban renewal operations and associated with new public
facilities such as new roads, additional playgrounds or schools’ investments.
2.2 Data and summary statistics
The definition of social housing adopted in this article is restrictive, it closely follows the
French law of 2000 (SRU ). Social units belong to an HLM landlord and receive an agreement
from the state which give rights to construction and rent subsidies in exchange for some level
9I define as new tenants the households who moved in during the last four years.
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of control on the rents and the choices of the tenants10. The only exception are the dwellings
which belong to the HLM companies since 1977 or before. As formal rental agreement (conven-
tionement) did not exist before 1977, all these HLM rental dwellings are considered as social
housing. Furthermore I restrict the sample of projects to the family dwellings excluding the few
students’ residences, collective accommodation for the elderly and temporary accommodation
for the homeless11. These restrictions are motivated by the fact that these social housing units
represent a very small fraction of the inflows and are not considered as social housing in the
available surveys or in the existing literature.
The public housing stock and its evolution is constructed from seven yearly exhaustive sur-
veys completed by the regional planning agency (DREIF ). These surveys are mandatory and
were carried out in 1998, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. Each year the planning agency
asks the HLM landlords to update a description of their social housing dwellings. The results
are used to compute tax transfers to municipalities and as planning instruments for the public
housing policy at national and local levels. I have complemented these surveys by administra-
tive records from the City of Paris which contain the same information on a more recent period.
This dataset tracks the new and planed social housing units from 2001 to 2012 as of June 2007.
In the two data-sets, projects are defined by an address, a subsidy type and a year of comple-
tion12. Information on each project include: the completion year13, the year of agreement, the
address and the number of dwellings by level of subsidy. The completion and agreement of the
projects are only known up to the year level. The completion year corresponds to the year of the
first occupancy of the building by a social tenant. The agreement year is the signing year of the
formal subsidy agreement between the State and the HLM company (conventionnement). The
amount of time between these two dates depends crucially on the mode of provision of social
housing units, from less than a year for the conversion of existing private rental properties into
social units up to an average of three years for new buildings or rehabilitations. The created
dataset is then matched to the geographical location using the addresses of the buildings to
leave me with an address-year panel of the social housing stock.
Data on property sales are from the Commission of Parisian Notaries, BIEN dataset14. The
data has been used to produce official statistics, evaluate the impact of school quality (Fack and
Grenet, 2010) and the efficiency of urban renewal projects (Barthe´le´my et al., 2007). In France,
each property sale has to be registered by a Notary who is in charge of setting up the contract
and collecting taxes for the State. The sample is restricted to arm’s-length sales of Parisian
10There is no unique definition of the social housing stock. The French census, housing surveys and adminis-
trative records use different definitions (see data appendix, CNIS, 2001 and Briant et al., 2010).
11In the French 2000 law, these types of housing are considered as social housing. Each bed or room has a
weight that is a fraction of a family dwelling.
12The same address or building may contain units financed by different subsidies. This represents several
projects in my data.
13I corrected two obvious mistakes. First, there were two main mergers between HLM companies and some
of the buildings were recorded at the merger year in the following surveys. Second, early HLM, HBM buildings,
were described as completed at the time of a public renovation. I recoded them at the time of construction. Some
of the projects started in 2007 were not completed. I used the estimated completion year provided by the City
of Paris in 2007.
14Base d’Informations Economiques Notariales.
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flats without occupant owner. The transactions data set is almost comprehensive from 1995 to
2005 and contains 333, 590 flats transactions inside Paris. The INSEE evaluated the coverage
rate of all housing transactions in Paris at 90% in 2004 (Gourie´roux and Laferre`re, 2006)15. As
my outcome variable is the log price, the quality of the information on prices is a main issue.
The reported prices may be biased by tax evasion and money laundering. The French National
Assembly notes that the permissive regulation of French property-owning companies is the main
source of fraudulent transactions in the real estate market (Assemble´e Nationale, 2002). This
issue is less tangible for the sales between private households. In 95% of these sales, a false
price record would require collusion between four parties: the buyer, the seller, the real estate
agent and the notary (OECD, 2008). As a result, I restrict my sample to the sales between pri-
vate households. The sales between private households represent 231, 803 transactions (69.5%
of the initial sample). This restricted sample avoids the problem of sales to and from HLM
companies and other administrative bodies. However these restrictions discard the sales from
developers to private households occurring in new buildings that may be located close to social
housing projects in urban renewal programs. In the empirical section, I present evidence that
these restrictions do not imply sample selection issues. The sales located close to social housing
projects are not more likely to have private buyers before or after the projects’ completion.
Furthermore, the number of sales at the building level does not depend on the local evolution
of the social housing share.
The control variables include the characteristics of the flats and the sales, namely: size,
number of bedrooms and bathrooms, date of construction of the building, day of the sale and
the address. Each address was located in Lambert grid coordinates (Lambert 1 North) by
matching on its exact name16. Table 1.2 provides broad descriptive features of the flats sold
in Paris in 1995 and 2005: for the whole sample, for the flats sold between private households
and repeated sales within the same building. Panel A shows the characteristics of the flats.
There was first no independent check on the accuracy of the dwellings attributes17. This is
particularly striking for the dwellings’ size, as nearly half the information was missing in 1995.
As data quality control increases, there was less than 10% missing values for the same attribute
in 2005. During the sample period the average price per square meter in 2005 euros increases
by 100% between 1995 and 2005, while the number of sales also increases twofold from 1995 to
2000 and remains stable afterwards. The main characteristics of the sales remain homogeneous
over the sample period. The average flat is around 51 square meters, 60% of the sold properties
have one or two rooms and 90% of them were built before 1992. Interestingly, 90.1% of the
15This number is for the whole universe of housing transactions and does not distinguish private households
from firms or public bodies.
16Incorrect spellings were manually corrected. The main remaining mistakes were corrected using local tax lots
(parcelles cadastrales) and additional location information (comple´ments d’adresses). The spatial location has a
precision of the order of five meters. The addresses were matched to the census blocks (Ilots) and tracts (IRIS)
that are clusters of blocks using the French statistical office coding file. In Paris, census tracts represent small
areas of around 2, 500 inhabitants and census blocks have an average of less than 500 inhabitants.
17The French statistical office now produces quarterly housing prices using these data.
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sales between private households (208, 918) occur within buildings18 having at least two sales
(between private households). Consequently, it is reassuring that my results based on controls
at the building level will not be driven by a small subsample.
Panel B of table 1.2 presents the main explanatory variable of my analysis. It was con-
structed by combining the precise geographic coordinates of sales and the mapping of new
social housing projects. To describe the relative intensity of social housing in the vicinity of a
sale i at time t, I define different neighborhoods by distance d. Sit(d) represents the share of
social housing in the neighborhood of sale i with respect to the number of flats in the same
circle according to the last comprehensive census in 1999:
Sit(d) =
Hit(d)
Ni(d)
, (1.1)
where Hit(d) is the number of social housing units completed at or before time t within a circle
of radius d around the flat and Ni(d) is the estimated number of occupied flats in the circle of
radius d according to the census in 1999. The break-down of the number of flats at the tract
level is the smallest publicly available data from the 1999 census. Thus it is not possible to get
a direct estimate of Ni(d). Figure 1.3 illustrates the process used to compute the social housing
share. It shows a map of the 13th arrondissement in Paris. Plain lines represent census blocks
and dots the social housing buildings in 2010. Three circles of 50, 250 and 500 meter radii are
centered around a particular sale. For each circle, Ni(d) is the sum of the occupied dwellings
over all intersected census tracts, each tract being weighted by the fraction of its area located
within the circle19.
In Panel B of table 1.2, the average transacted flat in 1995 has 10% of social housing units
within 500 meters. This number decreases slightly once smaller circles of 350, 250, 150 and
50 meter radii are considered. Within the smallest geography of 50 meters, the social housing
share in 1995 is 7%. This pattern is very similar in the cross-sections in 1995 and 2005. It
corresponds to the spatial bunching of social housing units in a few neighborhoods observed
in figure 1.2. The circles are centered around private properties and the smallest radius of 50
meters takes only into account immediate neighbors which are less likely to be social housing
units. Furthermore, the standard-deviations of the radial measures of the social housing share
are increasing when I consider smaller radii. In 1995, the standard-deviation of the 500 meter
measure (0.10) is nearly five times lower than the standard-deviation for the 50 meter measure
(0.46). However, all the radial measures display a similar evolution from 1995 to 2005. Over
the sample period 1995 to 2005, the share of social housing in the housing stock increases by
27, 773 units or 2.5% of the occupied housing stock in 1999.
18I define a building as the intersection of an address and a period of construction. According to this definition,
69.6% of the addresses have a unique building (89.5% for the repeated sales sub-sample). Using building rather
than address as the unit of analysis has the advantage of not considering demolition and new construction on
the same address as an upgrade of an existing entity. In practice, the results are not sensitive to using building
or address fixed effects once I control for the period of construction of the buildings.
19The implicit assumption that the density is constant within census tract is likely to approximately hold in
Paris. The regulation of building height, e´pannelage, is strictly applied.
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The last row of table 1.2 gives the evolution of an alternative measure of the social housing
share. This measure uses a parametric definition of neighborhood: the census tract of the 1999
census. I consider the total number of social units located in each tract. The denominator of
the census tract measure, Ni, is known without uncertainty. The descriptive statistics for this
measure are close to those obtained for a circle of radius 150 meters. The median size of a census
tract is indeed equivalent to a circle of radius 146 meters. However, from figure 1.3, the radial
measures of the social housing share have two main advantages. First, they can be computed
at different geographical levels. Second, the census tract boundaries follow the middle of the
streets. Thus the crossing of a street implies a partly artificial discontinuity in the measured
social housing share.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Main specifications
Exposure to social housing varies across time and location. This paper seeks to identify
a traditional hedonic equation where the log-price of a flat sale is related to the flat’s various
characteristics:
ln(pibgt) = xibgtβ + γSbt(d) + αgt + εibgt , (1.2)
where i is an index for flats, b for buildings, g for various geography levels and t for time. xibgt is
a row vector of observable dwelling characteristics that may affect housing prices. Specifically,
xibgt includes number of rooms; size in square meters; floor; age of the building; and dummy
variables if the flat has a bathroom, a parking lot, a cellar or a lift. Sbt(d) is the share of
social housing dwellings in the neighborhood of the building within a given radius d and αgt
represents geographical unobservable characteristics. My main specifications correspond to a
difference-in-differences set-up where αgt = δg + αt.
OLS estimates of the impact of public housing on housing prices are unlikely to identify γ,
the parameter of interest, because Sbt(d) may be correlated to unobserved neighborhood char-
acteristics or unobserved characteristics of the dwelling through αgt or εibgt. This identification
problem is difficult to circumvent for three main reasons.
First, the location of social housing projects is a joint decision between the HLM developers
and the municipality. As the rent of social units is fixed at the city level, landlords have incen-
tives to target distressed properties and neighborhoods with low or declining housing values20.
Similarly, the municipality may value the removal of slums and their replacement by public
housing. Thus, the specific unobservables of the private properties surrounding social housing
projects may differ from the characteristics of properties not affected by the projects.
Second, the timing of the effects of new social housing dwellings is ambiguous. Changes in
20Anecdotal evidence suggests that most HLM companies do not take into account the potential residual
market value of social properties when they compute the expected returns of social housing projects (Inspection
Ge´ne´rale des Finances and Conseil Ge´ne´ral des Ponts et Chausse´es, 2002).
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neighborhood composition could be anticipated by buyers and sellers. Social housing buildings
take an average of three to four years to be completed after the initial agreement and, in the
case of new buildings, public hearings are mandatory. Furthermore, there is a time lag between
the flat buying decisions and the recorded time of the sales.
Third, the local public housing stock may evolve jointly with other factors having direct
impacts on dwellings’ values. For example, new public housing projects may be accompanied by
better transportation links, infrastructure investments and new commercial or public services.
These complementary investments could be planed by the municipality or the result of a politi-
cal process. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the affected populations may organize themselves
to lobby local governments and HLM companies in order to obtain various forms of compen-
sation or amendments to the initial projects (Paris, 2006). Developers may also target new
social buildings according to adverse neighborhood shocks such as fire or lack of maintenance of
nearby buildings. Mean reversion could also bias upwards the measure of the impacts of social
housing on nearby private properties. Even in the same census tract, the characteristics of the
sales before and after the creation of social housing units may differ in a systematic manner
which would bias difference-in-differences estimates. Finally, the observed changes in price may
be driven by changes in the own characteristics of the dwellings such as buildings’ upgrades, or
by changes in the valuation of observable dwelling’s characteristics.
To circumvent the endogeneity of location problem, I take advantage of the high population
density in Paris to control for local unobservables. Most previous papers have considered the
geographical unit of interest g as a census aggregate (tracts, blocks or counties)21. I extend
these geographical controls by defining my smallest geographical unit at the building level. Pre-
cisely, I define a building as the interaction between an address and a period of construction.
This allows me to control for numerous time invariant characteristics of the dwellings. For
example, Parisian school catchment boundaries do not follow census tract definition (Fack and
Grenet, 2010) and most of the major investments that could impact sales prices take place at the
building level (e.g. water provision, sanitation, lift maintenance etc.). Moreover, building fixed
effects mitigate a main source of time varying unobservables that may be correlated with the
social housing share. The replacement of distressed private buildings by new private buildings
is not confounded as a neighborhood upgrade.
A first test of the causality of the estimates is to generalize regression (2) by allowing the
externalities of social housing to decay with the distance to the projects. In this case, the effects
of the social housing projects are measured by a vector (γr) corresponding to the impact of the
social housing share in different rings (r) around a sale:
ln(pibgt) = xibgtβ +
∑
r
γrSbt(r) + αgt + εibgt (1.3)
where the ring variables Sbt(r) are mutually exclusive and define concentric belts with different
treatment intensities. I would expect to see larger effects for private properties located closer to
21In most set-ups, repeated sale specifications imply some issues of sample selection.
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the social projects because they have a more direct exposure to the potential buildings’ upgrades
and inflows of low income tenants.
I address the problem of the timing of the impacts by allowing the effects of interest to
depend on the completion date of the projects. As the same transaction can be affected by
several housing projects occurring at different points in time, I need to consider the inflows of
social housing units over time and not pre and post treatment dummy variables. Specifically, I
introduce lead and lag flows of social housing divided by the number of flats in the neighborhood
in 1999. Fb,t+2c(d) represents the additional share of social housing due to projects completed
between 2(c− 1) and 2c after the time of the sale, t, within a circle of radius d. I use two year
changes to ensure sufficient variation even within small neighborhoods. These new variables
can be expressed in terms of the share of social housing within a circle of d meter radius at time
t, Sb,t(d):
Fb,t+2c(d) = Sb,t+2c(d)− Sb,t+2(c−1)(d) . (1.4)
For example, Fb,t−2(d) takes into account all projects completed two and three years prior to
the sale at time t and Fb,t(d) measures the inflows of social housing units during years t and
t− 1. The final regression corresponds to:
ln(pibgt) = xibgtβ + γiSb,t−14(d) +
3∑
c=−6
γcFb,t+2c(d) + αgt + εibgt . (1.5)
This specification assumes that projects built more than 14 years before the time of the sales
have a constant impact on housing prices (γi) and that projects that will be built more than
6 years after the sale can not be anticipated by the housing market. Under the assumption
that flats and neighborhoods unobservable characteristics do not evolve systematically with so-
cial housing inflows, the γc’s measure the differential impact of the closeness to social housing
dwellings with respect to the year of completion of the projects. Specification (5) can be ex-
tended as specification (3) to incorporate heterogenous impacts on housing values by distance
belts.
I test the robustness to potential time varying unobservables correlated with the social hous-
ing share by including local linear trends at different geographical levels. In my most flexible
specification, this heterogenous growth model includes controls for building unobservables and
census tract linear trends.
To get an idea of the precision of my local controls, it is useful to compare the geography
of Paris to the one used by Schwartz et al. (2006) to evaluate the externalities of subsidized
housing in New-York. The smallest level of the French census is the block for which no public
data are available. French census tracts are small clusters of blocks that are designed for the
release of statistical information. The French census tracts match the main political units. Each
of the twenty arrondissements of Paris are divided into four administrative quartiers which are
subdivided into census tracts. A direct comparison of the 2000 US census and the 1999 French
census show that the typical Parisian tract is much smaller than the average New-York tract:
the population is on average one third below and the area five times smaller. In terms of area,
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the average Parisian census tract is also between the Chicago census block groups and census
blocks considered by Autor et al. (2009).
3.2 Isolating the effects of low-income tenants
The previous specifications have two remaining shortcomings. First, they estimate an ag-
gregate impact: the creation of new social units through rehabilitation and new buildings and
the inflow of low income tenants. Second, even after controlling for local trends, disentangling
social housing effects from local complementary investments is not straightforward. In order
to obtain a more precise idea of the effects of low income tenants on housing prices, I exploit
variation in the stock of social housing units following the election of the current mayor in 2001.
The current mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoe¨, was virtually unknown before his electoral win
in 2001. This electoral poll was close and uncertain: at the second round of the election, the
left-wing alliance received 49.6% of the votes against 50.4% for the divided right wing.
Following this electoral win, a sharp increase in the provision of social housing units was
achieved through the conversion of existing buildings into social housing units (Figures 1.1
and 1.2) or acquisition sans travaux 22. There were no conversion projects before 2001. These
projects were not accompanied by new construction or rehabilitation and thus one can infer
that their effects on housing prices were limited to the inflow of low income tenants into the
neighborhoods and the consequent changes in their socio-economic compositions. Bacquet et al.
(2010) describe the new process for two projects in Paris based on interviews with the tenants.
The HLM company or the municipality buys an existing rental building from private landlords
using social housing subsidies. The vacant flats are allocated to HLM applicants and the re-
maining private tenants are slowly replaced by HLM households when they leave the building
or their tenancy expires. This process was particularly controversial as it was judged costly in
respect to the other ways to provide social housing. Moreover, it was mainly used in wealthy
neighborhoods to create dwellings for very low income households. The APUR (2010)23 pro-
vides descriptive statistics from a survey of the HLM landlords of converted buildings in April
2009. During the first two years after the mayoral election, 3, 933 social dwellings, more than
60% of the total number of agreed dwellings, were created using this financing scheme. At the
time of the survey, 80% of these dwellings were occupied by social tenants. From 2001 to 2005,
6, 913 private dwellings were converted into social housing units.
I use this policy shock to isolate the impact of the share of social tenants in the neighborhood
of the sales. This policy has two main advantages. It was arguably unpredictable by home-
buyers of nearby sales and it is not systematically associated with other public investments in
the neighborhood of the sales. From the data provided by the City of Paris, I construct the
evolution of the share of the converted social housing in the occupied housing stock in 1999
from 2001 to 2005 as in equation (1).
22This process is also known as acquisition conventionnement.
23Atelier Parisien d’URbanisme.
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Cross-sectional estimates and parametric neighborhood definition
Table 1.3 shows how the log price of sales (in 2005 euros) changes with existing and future
social housing projects from 1995 to 2005. The sample is restricted to the sales occurring within
building with repeated sales to ease the comparison with the estimates controlling for building
unobservables. I use my two alternative measures of the social housing shares: by radii from
500 meters to 50 meters in columns (1) to (4) and within census tract in column (5)24.
The regressions in panel A control only for the time of the sales. These cross-sectional esti-
mates reveal that housing values are negatively correlated with the share of social housing in the
vicinity of the sales. This conclusion is robust to the neighborhoods I consider. The magnitude
of the cross-sectional estimate at 500 meters indicates that an increase in the share of social
housing by 10 percentage points (approximately one standard-deviation) is correlated with a
decrease of 14% in housing prices. The negative impact of social housing on housing prices is
decreasing with the closeness to the sales even if the standard-errors remain low. When the
social housing share is measured only within 50 meters to the sales, the cross-sectional point
estimate is divided by 21. However a one standard-deviation increase of the share of social
housing within 50 meters would still imply a significant decrease in housing price by 2.6%. A
simple computation can help to get a better sense of the size of the measured effect. As the av-
erage property has 161 surrounding flats within 50 meters, an average project of 35 flats would
decrease the property value by 1.4%. The census tract measure of the social housing share
does not provide a different picture from the radial measures. As expected from the descriptive
statistics, the point estimates and standard-errors match closely the results obtained for the
150 meter radius.
The second and third rows of panel A investigate further the causality of these point es-
timates. In row 2, the negative point estimates are stronger when the social housing includes
only the projects created within the past 10 years. The point estimate for the 500 meter radius
is multiplied by 7 and the one for the 50 meter radius by nearly 2. New social housing projects
appear to have more negative externalities than existing low income housing. This could be
consistent with more negative externalities. New social tenants are poorer than established ten-
ants and new social housing dwellings have more stringent income eligibility requirements than
HLM created before 1977 (table 1.1). However, no causal interpretation can be given to this
phenomenon. New social housing projects may also be located close to private housing having
worse observable and unobservable characteristics than older projects. In row 3, housing prices
are also correlated with future social housing units which will be built in the next five years.
Interestingly, the magnitude of the point estimates in columns (2) and (3) are close. Within
24As the pattern of the point estimates is smooth over radii, table 3 does not report the estimates for the 350
meter measure to save some space. The appendix Table 1.D presents descriptive statistics for the social housing
share measures by circles and belts around the sales.
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the 50 meter radius, the effect of the future social units is more than twice as high as that of
the current units. Flats located in neighborhoods where the share of social units will increase
by 10 percentage points in the next five years have 2.6% lower values. On the one hand, the
time pattern of the point estimates could be consistent with the fact that social dwellings are
located in large deprived neighborhoods and tend to replace distressed properties at the local
level. On the other hand, the same pattern could also be consistent with rational expectations
of the home buyers if they are able to predict future social housing developments.
In panel B, I introduce an extensive set of controls for flats characteristics25. The esti-
mated coefficients decrease slightly in absolute value but are also more precisely estimated. The
smallest estimate at 50 meters still implies that a new social housing project would decrease
housing values by 1.1% and it remains significant at the 1% significance level. In summary, the
linear covariate adjustment leads to similar results as the specification without these controls.
Although the set of controls is large, it may not be adequate to solve the endogeneity of the
new projects’ location. To isolate the causal impact of social housing on housing prices more
precise local controls may be needed.
4.2 Geography fixed effects
Table 1.4 presents the results of the difference-in-differences specifications (2) to (4) at var-
ious geographical levels: 80 quartiers, 902 census tracts and 36, 274 buildings26. The idea is to
control for the particular local characteristics around social housing projects. All regressions
include an extensive set of controls for the flat characteristics and the time of the sales. I use
my main measure of the social housing share: by radii from 500 meters to 50 meters. Columns
(1) to (3) introduce the share of social housing within 500 meters of the sales, columns (4) to
(6) within 250 meters, columns (7) to (9) within 150 meters and columns (10) to (12) within
50 meters.
Panel A of table 1.4 does not control for different house price trends around the social
housing projects. While using quartier or census tract controls, the estimates appear consis-
tently negative, their sign changes once the fixed unobserved characteristics of the buildings
are controlled for. Column (1), the point estimate using quartier fixed effects indicates that an
increase of 10 percentage points of the share of social housing within 500 meters would decrease
housing value by 6.0%. This estimate is divided by two, a 2.8% decrease, when I control for
census tract fixed effects in column (2). However, once I control for building unobservables,
column (3), I observe a different story in Paris. The same change would imply a 3% increase
in housing value. The price increase estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level. At
the same time, the R-squared rise from 0.871 to 0.911 when building rather than census tract
controls are included. This means that building and precise location characteristics play a key
role to determine both housing prices and social projects’ location. The change in the values
25Appendix Table 1.E presents the specification and the summary statistics for all the control variables included.
26For all specifications, the sample is restricted to the sales between private households occurring within
buildings with repeated sales. Controlling for building fixed effects or address fixed effects does not affect
significantly the point estimates.
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of the point estimates and R-squared across fixed effects from quartier to building is consistent
over the different radii.
Focusing on the specification controlling for building unobservables and variation within the
50 meter circle, column (12), the positive impact of the share of social housing within 50 meters
of the sale is statistically significant at the 1% level. A new social project of 35 flats would
imply an increase in housing value by 1.4%. As projects are associated with new buildings
and rehabilitations, positive estimates could correspond to disamenity removals and buildings’
upgrades at a small spatial scale. Based on census tract controls, the estimates for the impact
of the share of social housing on housing price seem to be biased by omitted variables and
have a negative sign. The social housing share is proxying for buildings having worse unobserv-
able characteristics. However, the positive estimates are consistent with another story related
to time varying unobservables. The creation of social housing units could be associated with
complementary investments in small neighborhoods, such that additional playgrounds or new
public services. Even controlling for building fixed effects, the estimates of the impact of the
social housing share could be confounded by mean reversion and the selection of locations with
particular underlying price trends.
Panel B of table 1.4 presents the results of the same specifications as panel A but including
80 quartier linear trends27. In all the fixed effect specifications the overall impact of social
housing appears similar to the estimates reported in panel A. At the same time, the R-squared
for all the regressions are not affected by the inclusion of these trends. The quartier trends
explain neither the location of social housing nor the evolution of the log housing price.
Table 1.5 presents the results of the difference-in-differences specification (3) that investi-
gates further the causality of the relationships of table 1.4 by introducing the share of social
housing within different belts around the flats. As the share of social housing in the different
belts are mutually exclusive, each coefficient represents the effect of the social housing share in
a given belt. Estimates in columns (1) to (3) condition on flat controls, time of the sales and
geographic fixed-effects, while the specifications in columns (4) to (6) also include 80 quartier
linear trends. In columns (1) and (2), with geographical controls at the quartier or tract levels,
the spatial pattern of the point estimates is not consistent with a negative externality centered
around the projects. The estimate for the 350 to 500 meter social housing share in column (1)
is nearly 20 times higher than the point estimate for the 50 meter circle. The pattern of the
standard-errors is also informative. Given that the 350 to 500 meter ring is much larger than the
50 meter circle, one possible concern is that the observed spatial difference in point estimates
may be driven by measurement error. However, the near zero point estimate for the share of
social housing within 50 meters in column (1) is very precisely estimated and still significant
at the 1% level. Thus it is unlikely that the results are generated by some kind of attenuation
bias. Once building fixed effects are included in columns (3) and (6) the estimates are consis-
tent with positive externalities decreasing with distance from social projects. In my preferred
specification including both building fixed effects and linear trends by quartiers in column (6),
27The linear trends are measured as the number of days between the sale and the 31st December 1994.
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the point estimate for the 50 meter circle remains similar to the one obtained in table 1.4 panel
B specification (12). The estimates for the impact of the social housing share within the 50 to
150 meters, 150 to 250 meters and 250 to 350 meter belts appear consistent with some positive
externalities and decline with distance. In this specification, properties located within 50 meters
of a new social housing project experience a 1.2% increase in housing prices once the project is
completed.
Finally, figure 1.4 plots the difference-in-differences estimates of the social housing projects
impacts over time as in specification (5) for the circles from 500 meters (panel a) to 50 meters
(panel d). These specifications introduce leads and lags flows of social housing and control for
building fixed effects and linear trends by quartiers. On the solid lines, each point corresponds
to the estimate of γc, the time-varying impact of the social housing share on the log of housing
prices28. The last point, 15 years after the projects completion, is the estimate for γi, the
long-run impact of social housing on the log of housing prices. The vertical bars represent the
95 confidence interval and the dashed lines represent the 90% confidence interval.
In figure 1.4 panel a, the long run estimates of the effects of the share of social housing within
500 meters on housing prices appear negative. The timing of the impacts matches closely the
completion of the social housing buildings. Estimates are slightly increasing over time before
the projects completion but insignificant and close to zero three years and one year before the
project completion. They become slightly positive just after the completion of the projects and
start to decline five years later. They display constant magnitude after nine years. Based on
these estimates, an increase of 10 percentage point of the social housing share would imply on
the long-run a 6.2% decrease of private property values located in the vicinity of the projects.
In figure 1.4, panels b to d replicate the estimates of panel a using circles of 250 meters,
150 meters and 50 meters around the private properties. No clear time pattern emerge from
these figures. Panel b, the estimates using the 250 meter share of social housing decrease after
the completion of the projects as in figure 4 panel a but they are insignificant at the 10% level.
Figure 1.4 panel c reports the estimates for the impact of social housing within 150 meters.
Housing values appear to rise slightly after the completion of the projects. However, the es-
timates can not be statistically distinguished from zero at the 10% significance level. Finally,
figure 1.4 panel d plots the estimates for the impact of the share of social housing on housing
values within 50 meters. The estimates have a clear time pattern. They can not be statistically
distinguished from zero before the completion of the social projects and start rising just after.
They remain positive and stable three year after the projects’ completion. Private properties
located within 50 meters of a new social project of 35 units experience in the long run a 2.6%
price increase.
Figure 1.5 shows the results of the extension of specification (5) that allows the impact of
social housing to vary with both time and distance for the outer belt from 350 to 500 meters,
panel a, and the circle of 50 meters, panel b. The specification includes sales’ controls, building
fixed effects and linear quartier trends. Panel a display only the point estimates over time for
28The γ̂cs are displayed at the middle of the two year intervals (−2c+ 1).
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the house price impacts of the social housing share within the 350 to 500 meter belt. In the
outer belt, housing prices decrease after the completion of the social projects. The estimated
impacts become significant at the 5% level seven years after the projects’ completion and re-
main stable afterwards. A 10 percentage points higher social housing intensity leads to a 5.5%
decrease housing prices 15 years after the projects’ completion.
On the contrary, panel b, in the 50 meter circles around the projects, if the social housing
share increases by 10 percentage points, housing prices would increase by 1.2%. This last point
estimate is very close to the one obtained in figure 1.4 panel d where I only introduced the
social housing share within 50 meters. The estimates for the other distance belts have more
mixed patterns insignificant at the 10% significance level.
4.3 Sample selection issues
As previously mentioned, a possible concern for measuring the externalities of social housing
on housing values is that I restricted my sample to the sales between private households and
that my sample is restricted to the properties that transact. If the flats that transact after or
before the projects’ completion become harder or easier to sell to private buyers or if they have
different unobservable characteristics, this would likely bias my point estimates. I estimate a
linear probability model where my dependent variable is a dummy variable if the flat is sold to
a private buyer as in specifications (2) and (5). In this specification, my sample includes the
whole universe of transactions from private sellers, administrative bodies and firms29.
I also investigate if there is any relationship between the number of sales and the timing of
the social housing projects at the building level. To do this, I modify my specification to capture
the fact that the sales of flats within a building are irregular events but that the number of sales
each year is a continuously updated outcome. I construct a panel of building-year observations.
I treat a building constructed before 1995 as if it contributed for 11 building-year observations30.
The new dependent variable is coded as the total number of sales if there are some observed
sales in the current year and 0 in all other periods. My specification includes building fixed
effects, dummy variables by years and linear trends for the 80 quartiers. I then estimate a linear
count data model similar to specifications (2) and (5) for the whole sample of buildings and for
the balanced panel of buildings constructed before 1992.
Table 1.6 panel A reports the marginal effects of the social housing share at 500 and 50
meters on the probability to sell a property to a private buyer for the whole universe of sales.
The estimated marginal effects are small both for the whole sample, columns (1) and (2), and
the sales of private properties within buildings constructed before 1992, columns (3) and (4).
In columns (1) and (3), a 10 percentage points increase in the social housing share within
29A limitation of this analysis is that I only observe the realized sales. All my estimates are conditional on the
properties being sold.
30As the observation of the year of construction is censored by intervals, I consider that the buildings constructed
before 2000 contribute to the sample after 2001 for 5 years and discard the buildings constructed after 2001. I do
not observe buildings leaving the sample because they are closed or demolished. My dependent variable is coded
as 0 in these cases.
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500 meters would decrease the probability that a flat is sold to a private buyer by 0.7 to 1
percentage point31. These estimates are not statistically significant at the 10% significance
level. In columns (2) and (4) the marginal effect of a 10 percentage points increase of the share
of social housing within 50 meters on the likelihood to sell to a private buyer is between 0.06
and 0.02%. The standard-errors are precise but the point estimates remain not statistically
significant at the 10% level. The pattern of the point estimates of specification (5) over time
do not reveal any irregularities with respect to the timing of the projects (not reported).
Panel B of table 1.6 shows the estimates of the linear count data model for the yearly number
of sales at the building level. In columns (2) and (4), the point estimates for the impact of the
social housing share within 500 meters are imprecisely estimated but small. A 10 percentage
points increase of the social housing share within 500 meters would imply a decrease of almost
0.03 sales by year32. This figure is consistent with a weak association between social housing
projects and urban renewal programs. However, this relationship does not hold for the share
of social housing within 50 meters. A 10 percentage points increase of the social housing share
would have no distinguishable effects on the number of transactions at the building level.
Overall the estimates in table 1.6 suggest that my main estimates are unlikely to be biased
by the selection of the flats that are transacted and sold to private households. A 10 percentage
points increase in the social housing share at 50 meters was generating an increase of 1.2% on
housing prices. For the average sale in my sample, this represents 2, 125 euros. The lower bound
of the 95% confidence interval in Panel B column (4) implies that an increase of 10 percentage
points of the social housing share could reduce the number of transactions by 0.01 × (0.015 +
1.96× 0.019) = 0.005 sales. The prices of the non-transacted flats after the projects completion
would have to be as low as 1.3% of the average price of the transacted flats in order to generate
the observed positive effects on housing prices.
4.4 Discussion
Compared to the existing literature, the estimate for the outer belt from 350 meters to 500
meters have of the same sign and magnitude as the estimates of Autor et al. (2009) for rent
control housing, where a one standard-deviation increase in rent control intensity implies a 3%
to 7% decrease in non-controlled property values within 0.25 miles (400 meters). They interpret
their point estimates as the result of investment complementarities in the housing market. Rent
controlled properties are less well maintained than non-controlled properties and imply lower
level of housing investments in their vicinity. This story does not fit well the Parisian context
where most of the new social projects are associated with rehabilitations and new buildings.
Other mechanisms include inflows of low-income private tenants, local increase in crime rates
and deterioration of public and private schools quality within the school zones of the projects.
These mechanisms can not be tested directly due to the lack of available data for Paris. Baum-
31The mean of the dependent variable is 0.855 in columns (1) and (2) and 0.861 in columns (3) and (4).
32For the whole sample of buildings, the average number of sales by year is 0.435 with standard-deviation
1.083. For the buildings created before 1992, the mean and standard-deviation of the yearly sales are both
slightly higher: 0.473 and 1.129.
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Snow and Marion (2009) find that LIHTC programs in Chicago were associated with inflows of
low income tenants in the private housing market. Hartley (2008) reports that the demolition
of high rise social housing buildings is associated with a decrease in crime rate but that small
projects do not have significant impacts on local crimes.
Another stream of the literature has found positive impacts of social housing developments
on housing values in line with the estimate of the impact of the evolution of the social housing
share within the 50 meter circle. Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) estimate positive impacts of
new LITHC developments on housing values. However, their estimates are difficult to compare
with the ones obtained here as the geographies of Paris and the US metropolitan areas are
quite different. They use neighborhoods of one kilometer radius and their explanatory variable
is the total number of projects, not the share of social housing units in the occupied housing
stock. In New-York city, Schwartz et al. (2006) find a positive impact of subsidized housing
on surrounding properties values. They define 150 meter neighborhoods and, in the case of
fully rental multifamily projects, a new project leads to an average increase in housing prices
by 3.5%, while in the Parisian case within 50 meters of a new project I observe a 2.6% increase
in housing value. But their average project is much larger, 250 units, than the typical Parisian
development of 35 units.
The overall pattern of the point estimates is difficult to reconcile with a theory based on
complementary investments. This would need a public infrastructure making better off the close
neighbors and worse off the private owners located farther away from the social housing projects.
A first explanation is that if new social projects replace distressed properties the benefits may
be extremely localized while other negative externalities (e.g. crime, school performance, etc.)
may operate at larger spatial scales. Another story consistent with this evidence would be based
on initial taste sorting within small neighborhoods. As social housing projects are located in
the distressed parts of neighborhoods, the close neighbors may have lower aversion against low-
income tenants than neighbors located farther away in initially better located properties.
Compared to the other determinants of housing prices, the magnitude of my estimates is
sizeable and plausible. Fack and Grenet (2010) found that a one standard-deviation increase
in middle school quality tends to increase property value by 1.4% to 2.4% in Paris. This
estimate is slightly smaller than the first estimate of Black (1999) and in the middle range of
the empirical literature on housing prices and school quality reviewed by Gibbons and Machin
(2008). The literature on the impact of local crime on property values displays estimates
of similar magnitude. Linden and Rockoff (2008) estimate that the average price of a home
declines by around 4% once a sex-offender arrives in a neighborhood. Gibbons (2004) reports
that a one standard-deviation decrease in the local density of domestic property crime adds
10% to the price of an average London property. Concerning the clean-up of hazardous waste
sites, Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) report a maximum positive impact on housing prices of
2.3% once the clean-up is completed through the US Superfund program. Finally, Chay and
Greenstone (2005) and Bajari et al. (2010) use quasi-experimental and structural estimation
methods and find that a 10% increase in air quality tends to increase property values by 2% to
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8%33.
5 Disentangling different mechanisms
5.1 Heterogeneity by neighborhoods and sales’ observables
In the absence of available data to directly test the mechanisms leading to positive social
housing externalities in small neighborhoods and negative externalities further away from the
projects34, I investigate the heterogeneity of the treatment effects. So far the results use the
full sample of sales in Paris between private households, but the heterogeneity of the effects by
neighborhoods and sales’ characteristics is potentially important.
Table 1.7 reports the estimates by neighborhood characteristics. I focus on the impact
of the social housing share within 50 meters on housing prices for my preferred specification
with building fixed effects and quartier linear trends. Panel A shows the estimates of four
sub-samples by quartile of housing price in 1995. The quartiles correspond to the median hous-
ing price per square meter computed from the 1995 sample of sales with information on flats
size. The median prices are computed for each of the 80 quartiers of Paris35. A clear pattern
emerges by neighborhoods’ initial housing prices. Most of the positive impact of social housing
is driven by neighborhoods with low housing prices (lowest quartile) while the second and third
quartile of initial housing prices display smaller point estimates. Interestingly, the estimates
are virtually identical if I estimate a constrained specification where the quartiles of housing
prices are only interacted with the social housing share and for the sake of brevity I do not
report them36. Thus my estimation is robust to the implicit assumption that the return to
private flats characteristics are homogeneous over space. Overall, the positive estimates de-
creasing with neighborhood initial wealth are consistent with the view that the renewal effects
and the improvement of the quality of the housing stock should dominate any externalities of
low-income tenants when the income differential between the current neighborhood population
and the social tenants is small.
Panel B of table 1.7 shows the estimates of an identical specification but using the quartiles
of the social housing shares in 1995 by quartiers37. For comparison with panel A, the quartiles
are displayed in reverse order. The externalities of new social housing appears clearly positive
in neighborhoods with high initial social housing shares, while they are close to zero otherwise.
Finally, figure 1.8, panels a and b plot the impact of the 50 meter social housing share on
housing prices over time for the lowest and highest quartiles of housing price in 1995. The
33These estimates are long-run effects. Currie and Walker (2009) find no immediate effects of the sharp
reduction in emissions from motor vehicles induced by electronic toll collection technology on housing prices
34French police forces record crime at a geographically localized level. However, it is not possible to obtain
this data at the present time for research purposes. Fouge`re et al. (2009) use the most geographically detailed
French data. Paris is one of their data points.
35At this level, the spatial distribution of prices is stable over time. Figure A1 plots the quartile of housing
prices in 1995.
36Estimates using this alternative specification are available upon request.
37Appendix Figure 1.B plots the corresponding quartiles. They are almost perfectly negatively correlated with
the quartiles of figure 1.C.
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estimates correspond to specification (5). Panel a, before the completion of the projects, the
estimates can not be distinguished from zero at the 10% significance level and raise after the
completion of the projects to become stable five years later. The long-run point estimate is
higher than for the average Parisian flat: 0.179 against 0.120 log points. An addition of 35
social units would imply an increase of private housing prices by 3.9%. On the contrary, in high
income neighborhoods, the social housing share has no statistically significant impact and the
point estimates are close to zero or negative (−0.065 log points) in the long-run38.
Table 1.8 and figure 1.7 replicate the results of table 7 and figure 6 using the 500 meter
measure of the social housing share. Most of the estimates are not significant at the 10% sig-
nificance level. In panel A of table 8 and figure 7, the basic finding that any positive impact
of social housing decreases with the level of initial housing price holds true. The negative esti-
mates for the effects of the social housing share within 500 meters are driven by high income
neighborhoods. The estimates of table 8 panel B, which divides the sample by social housing
share in 1995, are less clear-cut.
I now study the heterogeneity of the effects with respect to flat size. Table 1.9 presents the
estimates for the effects of the social housing share within 500 and 50 meters by different number
of rooms. As my preferred specification includes building fixed effects, in columns (1) and (3),
I introduce the heterogeneity with respect to flat size by interacting the share of social housing
with dummy variables for flats of one or two rooms, three or four rooms and more than four
rooms. Columns (2) and (4) report the estimates of a more parsimonious specification where
the local share of social housing is linearly interacted with the number of rooms of the private
flats. In both specifications, all the positive impact of the social housing share on housing prices
are measured for small flats of one or two rooms which are mainly made up of single households
and couples without children. On the contrary, estimates for the effects of the 500 meter share
of social housing becomes negative for flats of more than four rooms and estimates for the effects
of the 50 meter share of social housing can not be distinguished from zero for family dwellings.
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 plot the point estimates over time for the flats of less than two rooms and
more than four rooms for the 50 and 500 meter measures of the social housing share. The time
pattern of the point estimates is consistent with a causal effect on housing prices for one or two
room flats and the 50 meter share and for family dwellings and the 500 meter share of social
housing.
5.2 Conversion projects after 2001
In this subsection, I report the estimates based on acquisition sans travaux projects (con-
version projects). Table 1.10 presents the estimates of the effects of the share of social housing
units created by conversion of existing private buildings between 2001 and 2005 on housing
prices within neighborhoods of 500 to 50 meters around the sales. I restrict my sample to the
38The pattern observed for the 2nd and 3rd quartiles of housing prices in 1995 is the same. The time pattern
obtained when pooling the 2nd to 4th quartiles of housing prices is the same but more precisely estimated.
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flats transacted after 2001. All the specifications include building fixed effects and quartier
linear trends.
Panel A reports the estimates using the full sample of flats sold after 2001. The point esti-
mates for the share of social housing units created by conversion of private buildings within 500
meters is negative. In column (1), a 10% increase in share of the flats rented to social tenants
would imply a housing price decrease by 3.1%. However, this estimate is not significant at the
10% significance level. The concentration of social tenants within smaller circles of 250 meters,
column (2), to 50 meters, column (4) are also imprecise. They become economically close to
zero. The last two point estimates for the share of social housing within 150 and 50 meters are
positive but more than twice below the corresponding point estimates reported for the share of
all social housing units and the same specification in table 1.4 panel B columns (11) and (12).
These positive point estimates raise concerns that conversion projects may be associated
with larger social housing developments and proxy for rehabilitations of distressed buildings and
new constructions. This will be the case if HLM developers buy buildings located close to each
other and decide to convert part them into social housing or to rehabilitate them according to
the occupation and maintenance status of the properties. Panel B examines this assumption by
controlling for the evolution of the share of other social housing projects within the same neigh-
borhoods. The estimate in column (4) for the share of the conversion projects within 50 meters
is divided by two and remains insignificant at the 10% significance level. For wider radii, the
estimates for the impact of the share of converted private properties on housing prices become
more negative than the corresponding estimates in panel A but they are all insignificant at the
10% level. Overall the conversion projects provide evidence that social housing not associated
with new buildings and other public investments does not have a positive impact on private
properties located in the vicinity of the new social housing tenants. The estimates for the effects
of the share of new social tenants within 500 meters on housing prices are sizeable and negative,
but there is not enough variation to provide a definite answer.
6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the indirect effects of social housing on private property values in
Paris. I find that social housing projects tend to have a positive average impact on housing
prices in small neighborhoods of 50 meters around the social projects while the estimated impact
become negative farther away from the projects.
The analysis is based on a unique dataset which combines the whole universe of social
housing projects and flat transactions during eleven years at the building level. I exploit the
high population density of Paris to identify the impacts of social projects on housing values. I
rely on a difference-in-differences identification strategy within small neighborhoods controlling
for building unobservables and local linear trends. The timing of the effects provides additional
support for a causal interpretation of my results.
I show that a sharp increase of the social housing stock of 10 percentage points, as planned
by the French 2000 law, would account for an average increase of around 1.2% of neighboring
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houses’ prices within 50 meters of the projects. However, the measured impacts on housing
prices become negative if the share of social housing units is measured at wider radii where
private properties are less exposed to the renewal effects of the projects. Within an outer belt
from 350 to 500 meters around the projects, the average housing value would decrease by 5.5%.
The empirical results are consistent with the idea that social housing projects associated
with new buildings or rehabilitations of distressed properties have two distinct impacts. They
improve the quality of the existing housing stock but they lead to an inflow of social tenants into
the neighborhood. First, the positive effects of new social housing units are entirely concentrated
in small neighborhoods around the projects. Private properties located between 350 and 500
meters experience price decrease. Second, the increase in property value is concentrated in low-
income neighborhoods, while high income neighborhoods would not experience housing price
increase. The price increase is also entirely driven by small flats of one or two rooms while
family dwellings of more than four rooms would not benefit from social housing developments.
Third, when I isolate the inflows of low income tenants using the direct conversion of private
rental units into social housing without any rehabilitation, the point estimates show that social
housing projects that are not associated with an improvement of the quality of the existing
housing stock do not have positive effects.
My results suggest that policies intended to create or maintain mixed communities through
social housing have significant impacts on the neighborhoods in which they are located and
that these externalities depend on neighborhoods and flats’ characteristics. The goal of future
work would be to evaluate the whole welfare effect of social housing policies. This raises several
challenges. First, the subsidized supply of housing is costly and the potential long-run benefits
for the social tenants are unclear. Second, the misallocation of the rent controlled dwellings due
to the allocation through a queuing mechanism rather than to the households who value them
the most is an important concern (Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003).
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Figure 1.1: Yearly social housing inflows by provision methods in Paris 1970-
2010 
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Note: Family dwellings subject to rent regulation: PLA-I, PLUS and PLS. Projects completed or to be 
completed before 2010. 
Source: EPLS surveys 1998 to 2007 and City of Paris/APUR 2007.  
 
Figure 1.2. Location of the social housing inflows in Paris up to 2010 
 
Note: Family dwellings subject to rent regulation: PLA-I, PLUS and PLS. Thick lines are boundaries 
between arrondissements, small lines are boundaries between quartiers. Projects completed or to be 
completed before 2010.  
Source: EPLS surveys 1998 to 2007 and City of Paris/APUR 2007  
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Figure 1.3. Estimation of the share of social housing in the neighbourhood of a 
sale 
 
 
Note: 3 circles (50, 250 and 500 meters), grey dots represent social housing buildings created before 
2010. Small lines are IRIS boundaries and the thick line is the boundary between the 13th and 14th 
arrondissements. 
Source: EPLS surveys 1998 to 2007 and City of Paris/APUR 2007. Family dwellings subject to rent 
regulation: PLA-I, PLUS and PLS.  
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Figure 1.4. Impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time 
controlling for building unobservables  
4.a. Social housing share at 500 meters 
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4.b. Social housing share at 250 meters 
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Note: The figure represents the impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time 
including confidence intervals at the 95% level. The zero value on the horizontal axis defines the year 
in which the first social tenants moved in.  
The sample includes only the sales between private households occurring within building with repeated 
sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers of rooms 
interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift interacted with 
the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly dummies for each 
quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 and quartier linear trends (see appendix table A2).  
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Figure 1.4. Impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time 
controlling for building unobservables  
4.c. Social housing share at 150 meters 
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4.d. Social housing share at 50 meters 
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Note: The figure represents the impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time 
including confidence intervals at the 95% level. The zero value on the horizontal axis defines the year 
in which the first social tenants moved in.  
The sample includes only the sales between private households occurring within building with repeated 
sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers of rooms 
interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift interacted with 
the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly dummies for each 
quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 and quartier linear trends (see appendix table A2).  
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Figure 1.5. Impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time and by 
distance belts  
5.a. Controlling for building unobservables (350-500 meter belt) 
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5.b. Controlling for building unobservables (50 meter circle) 
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Note: The figure represents the impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time 
including confidence intervals at the 95% level. The zero value on the horizontal axis defines the year 
in which the first social tenants moved in.  
The sample includes only the sales between private households occurring within building with repeated 
sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers of rooms 
interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift interacted with 
the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly dummies for each 
quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 and quartier linear trends (see appendix table A2).  
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Figure 1.6. Impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time by 
neighborhood initial housing prices (50 meters) 
6.a. In low-income neighborhoods (1st quartile of housing price in 1995) 
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6.b. In high-income neighborhoods (4th quartile of housing price in 1995) 
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Note: The figure represents the impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time 
including confidence intervals at the 95% level. The zero value on the horizontal axis defines the year 
in which the first social tenants moved in.  
The sample includes only the sales between private households occurring within building with repeated 
sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers of rooms 
interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift interacted with 
the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly dummies for each 
quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 and quartier linear trends (see appendix table A2).  
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Figure 1.7. Impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time by 
neighborhood initial housing prices (500 meters) 
7.a. In low-income neighborhoods (1st quartile of housing price in 1995) 
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7.b. In high-income neighborhoods (4th quartile of housing price in 1995) 
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Note: The figure represents the impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time 
including confidence intervals at the 95% level. The zero value on the horizontal axis defines the year 
in which the first social tenants moved in.  
The sample includes only the sales between private households occurring within building with repeated 
sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers of rooms 
interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift interacted with 
the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly dummies for each 
quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 and quartier linear trends (see appendix table A2).  
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Figure 1.8. Impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time by 
neighborhood initial housing prices (50 meters) 
8.a. For small flats (one or two rooms) 
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8.b. For large flats (five rooms or more) 
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Note: The figure represents the impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time 
including confidence intervals at the 95% level. The zero value on the horizontal axis defines the year 
in which the first social tenants moved in.  
The sample includes only the sales between private households occurring within building with repeated 
sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers of rooms 
interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift interacted with 
the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly dummies for each 
quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 and quartier linear trends (see appendix table A2).  
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Figure 1.9. Impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time by 
neighborhood initial housing prices (500 meters) 
9.a. For small flats (one or two rooms) 
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9.b. For large flats (five rooms or more) 
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Note: The figure represents the impact of the social housing share on housing prices over time 
including confidence intervals at the 95% level. The zero value on the horizontal axis defines the year 
in which the first social tenants moved in.  
The sample includes only the sales between private households occurring within building with repeated 
sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers of rooms 
interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift interacted with 
the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly dummies for each 
quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 and quartier linear trends (see appendix table A2).  
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Table 1.1. Public and Private dwellings and tenants in Paris in 2002 
 
 
Social tenants New Social tenants (1) Private tenants Home owners 
Panel A. Dwelling’s characteristics Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. 
Flat size (in m2) 61.80 23.79 58.48 23.41 49.04 32.35 71.19 37.86 
Number of rooms 2.90 1.22 2.73 1.20 2.27 1.30 3.22 1.60 
Number of dwellings in the building 66.51 81.73 52.25 50.04 32.05 61.35 53.99 113.79 
Built before 1914 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.56 0.50 0.53 0.50 
Between 1914 and 49 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.40 
Between 1949 and 81 0.33 0.47 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.23 0.42 
Between 1982 and 90 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.12 
After 1991 0.09 0.29 0.20 0.40 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18 
Monthly rent (euros per m2) 6.17 2.37 6.84 2.48 13.88 6.26   
Years of tenancy/ownership 14.28 12.18 2.24 1.13 9.00 12.65 16.82 15.21 
Panel B. Household’s characteristics (2) 
        
Age 51.81 17.28 39.59 12.52 40.94 16.40 57.05 16.75 
Foreign born 0.28 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.27 0.45 0.18 0.38 
Couple without children 0.18 0.38 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.28 0.45 
Couple with children 0.21 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 
Single parents 0.15 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.18 
Number of children 0.71 1.21 0.91 1.18 0.35 0.81 0.34 0.79 
Without High School dipl. 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 
Unemployed (if 18/55 yo) 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.25 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14 
Inactive (if 18/55 yo) 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 
Income (euros by Eurostat UC) 16731 8768 15767 8591 24240 20173 32666 23161 
Panel C. Building’s maintenance and safety 
      
Flood damage last year (flat) 0.19 0.40 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 
Degradation of common space (building) 0.38 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 
Flat's robbery (or attempt of) 0.22 0.41 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 
Think that neighborhood is not safe 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36 
 
Note: (1) New tenants moved in during the last 4 years. (2) For the head of the household. All statistics are weighted using the households’ survey weights.  
Source: French Housing Survey (ENL) in 2002, Paris. 
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Table 1.2. Summary statistics. Features of sales and social housing shares in 1995 
and 2005 by selected samples  
 
Sample: All buyers and 
sellers 
Buyers and sellers are 
private households 
Buyers and sellers are 
private households 
 All sales All sales Repeated sales Within building 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sold in year: 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
 (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) 
Panel A. Individual Flat characteristics    
Price (euros 2005) 153702 303099 142917 279375 140389 270321 
 (168283) (301588) (142331) (241548) (133931) (228837) 
Log price 11.6 12.33 11.56 12.29 11.56 12.27 
 (0.8) (0.74) (0.75) (0.69) (0.74) (0.68) 
Price per m2 (euros 2005) 2573.9 5241.3 2520.2 5207.5 2516.4 5165.0 
 (1043) (1504.5) (859.4) (1340.9) (844) (1308.8) 
Flat size (in m2) 52.92 54.18 50.95 51.34 50.67 50.22 
 (34.52) (39.09) (32.06) (34.27) (31.20) (32.77) 
Missing size 0.48 0.09 0.45 0.08 0.46 0.09 
Previous ownership (years) 9.62 9.74 10.61 10.43 10.62 10.44 
 (9.10) (9.70) (8.80) (9.45) (8.79) (9.45) 
Number of rooms      
One 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
Two 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.36 
Three 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 
Four or more 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.17 
Unknown 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Building age       
Before 1914 0.50 0.42 0.53 0.43 0.54 0.46 
Between 1914 and 92 0.40 0.46 0.42 0.48 0.42 0.47 
After 1992 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Unknown 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 
Having at least 1 bathroom 0.77 0.88 0.77 0.88 0.77 0.88 
# bathrooms unknown 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 
Having at least 1 parking lot 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.14 
# parking lots unknown 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 
Panel B. Share of social housing at the time of the sale (by vicinity, circles)   
Within 500 meters 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) 
Within 350 meters 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) 
Within 250 meters  0.09 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
Within 150 meters 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) 
Within 50 meters 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 
 (0.46) (0.37) (0.51) (0.38) (0.53) (0.35) 
Share of social housing 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.11 
within the same census tract (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) 
# observations 18,437 33,546 12,435 23,686 11,408 20,426 
 
Note: The sample is restricted to the sales between private households for the sets of columns (1) and 
(2). Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the 
IRIS (tract) level. 
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Table 1.3. Cross sectional estimates of the effects of social housing on housing 
prices  
 
 Dependent variable: ln(price in 2005 euros) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vicinity of the sales, 
within: 500 meters 250 meters 150 meters 50 meters 
Census 
tract 
Panel A. Years 1995 to 2005 without flat’s controls 
Share of social housing  -1.404*** -0.883*** -0.474*** -0.066*** -0.667*** 
 
(0.101) (0.081) (0.078) (0.024) (0.069) 
Variation in the last 10 years -7.440*** -2.883*** -1.075*** -0.113** -1.574*** 
 (0.505) (0.359) (0.297) (0.045) (0.240) 
Variation in the next 5 years -7.092*** -2.282*** -1.105*** -0.263*** -0.922** 
 (0.742) (0.435) (0.309) (0.070) (0.375) 
Year times quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Flat’s controls No No No No No 
Panel B. Years 1995 to 2005 with flat’s controls 
  
 
Share of social housing -1.152*** -0.735*** -0.376*** -0.051*** -0.557*** 
 (0.058) (0.047) (0.053) (0.019) (0.038) 
Variation in the last 10 years -5.576*** -2.190*** -0.806*** -0.076** -1.165*** 
 (0.276) (0.224) (0.198) (0.031) (0.129) 
Variation in the next 5 years -5.168*** -1.959*** -0.894*** -0.143*** -0.887*** 
 (0.431) (0.255) (0.166) (0.034) (0.213) 
Year times quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Flat’s controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# observations 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 
# clusters 902 902 902 902 902 
 
Note: Each cell is from a different OLS regression. * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. 
Standard errors are clustered by census tract (IRIS). In panel B, a basic set of flat’s and sales’ controls 
is included in all the regressions. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, 
dummies by numbers of rooms interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a 
parking, a cellar, a lift interacted with the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction (see 
appendix table A2). The variation in the last ten years of this measure corresponds to the change 
between 1985 and 1995 for year 1995. The variation in the next five years of this measure corresponds 
to the change between 1995 and 2000 for year 1995. 
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level. The sample includes only the sales between private households occurring within building 
with repeated sales.  
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Table 1.4. Estimates of the effects of social housing on housing prices with alternative geographical controls 
 
 Dependent variable: ln (price in euros 2005) 
Vicinity of the sales, within:           500 meters 250 meters 150 meters 50 meters 
Panel A. Estimates without control for different price trends around the sales       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
         
Share of social 
-0.603*** -0.276*** 0.301* -0.307*** -0.113*** 0.107 -0.132*** -0.046*** 0.088 -0.016*** -0.003 0.064*** 
housing (0.044) (0.046) (0.177) (0.027) (0.018) (0.099) (0.019) (0.010) (0.057) (0.005) (0.002) (0.018) 
R-squared 0.863 0.871 0.911 0.862 0.871 0.911 0.861 0.871 0.911 0.860 0.871 0.911 
 
   
         
Fixed effects Quartier Tract Building Quartier Tract Building Quartier Tract Building Quartier Tract Building 
Quartiers trends No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Sales controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Estimates controlling for different price trends around the sales      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
         
Share of social 
-0.608*** -0.304*** 0.157 -0.308*** -0.116*** 0.097 -0.132*** -0.047*** 0.081** -0.016*** -0.003 0.058*** 
housing (0.044) (0.045) (0.139) (0.027) (0.018) (0.071) (0.019) (0.010) (0.041) (0.005) (0.002) (0.016) 
R-squared 0.864 0.872 0.912 0.863 0.872 0.912 0.862 0.872 0.912 0.862 0.872 0.912 
 
   
         
Fixed effects Quartier Tract Building Quartier Tract Building Quartier Tract Building Quartier Tract Building 
Quartiers trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sales controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# observations 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 
# clusters 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the census tract level. The sample includes only the sales between private 
households within buildings with repeated sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers of rooms interacted with unknown 
size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift interacted with the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly dummies for 
each quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 (see appendix table A2). 
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS (tract) level.  
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Table 1.5. Estimates of the effects of social housing on housing prices by distance 
to the sales 
 
  
Dependent variable: ln (price in euros 2005) 
 
Without control for different price 
trends around the sales 
Controlling for different price trends 
around the sales 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share of social housing within: 
Ring 350 to 500m -0.199*** -0.081*** 0.144 -0.202*** -0.094*** 0.005 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.122) (0.024) (0.023) (0.100) 
Ring 250 to 350m -0.137*** -0.080*** 0.098 -0.138*** -0.087*** 0.069 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.064) (0.017) (0.016) (0.055) 
Ring 150 to 250m -0.156*** -0.086*** 0.015 -0.157*** -0.091*** 0.025 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.061) (0.017) (0.013) (0.049) 
Ring 50 to 150m -0.080*** -0.055*** 0.037 -0.080*** -0.057*** 0.040 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.045) (0.012) (0.009) (0.034) 
Circle of 50m -0.010*** -0.008*** 0.062*** -0.010*** -0.008*** 0.056*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (0.016) 
R-squared 0.863 0.871 0.911 0.864 0.872 0.912 
       
Fixed effects Quartier Tract Building Quartier Tract Building 
Quartiers trends No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Sales controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# observations 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 
# clusters 902 902 902 902 902 902 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the census 
tract level. The sample includes only the sales between private households within buildings with 
repeated sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers 
of rooms interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift 
interacted with the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly 
dummies for each quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 (see appendix table A2). 
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Table 1.6. Estimate of the effects of social housing on the probability to sell a flat 
to a private buyer and the number of transactions 
 
Panel A. Estimation Linear Probability Model 
Dependent variable 1 if sold to a private household / 0 otherwise 
Sample All buildings Buildings built before 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vicinity 500m 50m 500m 50m 
Share of social 
-0.066 0.006 -0.104 0.002 
housing (0.110) (0.008) (0.114) (0.012) 
R-squared 0.272 0.272 0.253 0.253 
     
# observations 310,184 310,182 273,757 273,757 
# Buildings 66,023 66,023 54,949 54,949 
# clusters 924 924 903 903 
Fixed effects building building building building 
Quartier trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sales controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Estimation Linear Count data Model 
Dependent variable Number of sales in the building / 0 if no sale 
Sample All buildings Buildings built before 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vicinity 500m 50m 500m 50m 
Share of social 
-0.290 -0.016 -0.258 -0.015 
housing (0.259) (0.017) (0.280) (0.019) 
R-squared 0.396 0.396 0.405 0.405 
     
# observations 732,499 732,499 618,541 618,541 
# Buildings 67,325 67,325 56,231 56,231 
# clusters 926 926 904 904 
Fixed effects building building building building 
Quartier trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard errors are clustered by census tract 
(IRIS). The sample includes all the sales in Paris. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for 
unknown size, dummies by numbers of rooms interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a 
bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift interacted with the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of 
construction (see appendix table A2). Columns (3) and (4) exclude observation from sales occurring in 
buildings built after 1992 (1,757) and in buildings of unknown age (9,748). 
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
 
 
 46 
 
Table 1.7. Heterogeneity of the effects of social housing on housing prices by 
neighborhood characteristics (circle of 50 meters) 
 
 Dependent variable: ln (price in euros 2005) 
Panel A. Initial price level in the neighborhood (quartier) in 1995 
 
Lowest quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile Highest quartile 
Share of social housing 0.091*** 0.037 0.034 0.041 
within 50 meters (0.027) (0.031) (0.022) (0.096) 
R-squared 0.889 0.898 0.909 0.916 
     
# Observations 77,201 56,714 46,850 27,038 
# Clusters 297 239 211 152 
Panel B. Initial social housing share in the neighborhood (quartier) in 1995 
 
Highest quartile 3rd quartile 2nd quartile Lowest quartile 
Share of social housing 0.073*** 0.047** 0.052 0.035 
within 50 meters (0.026) (0.022) (0.041) (0.075) 
R-squared 0.900 0.911 0.903 0.916 
     
# Observations 72,781 78,181 32,931 23,910 
# Clusters 326 290 135 148 
     
Fixed effects Building Building Building Building 
Quartiers trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sales controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the census 
tract level. The sample includes only the sales between private households within buildings with 
repeated sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers 
of rooms interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift 
interacted with the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly 
dummies for each quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 (see appendix table A2). 
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
 47 
 
Table 1.8. Heterogeneity of the effects of social housing on housing prices by 
neighborhood characteristics (circle of 500 meters) 
 
 Dependent variable: ln (price in euros 2005) 
Panel A. Initial price level in the neighborhood (quartier) in 1995 
 
Lowest quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile Highest quartile 
Share of social housing 0.202 0.089 0.000 -0.120 
within 500 meters (0.263) (0.233) (0.194) (0.871) 
R-squared 0.889 0.898 0.909 0.916 
     
# Observations 77,201 56,714 46,850 27,038 
# Clusters 297 239 211 152 
Panel B. Initial social housing share in the neighborhood (quartier) in 1995 
 
Highest quartile 3rd quartile 2nd quartile Lowest quartile 
Share of social housing 0.026 -0.030 1.417*** -1.331 
within 500 meters (0.192) (0.193) (0.535) (0.993) 
R-squared 0.900 0.911 0.903 0.916 
     
# Observations 72,781 78,181 32,931 23,910 
# Clusters 326 290 135 148 
     
Fixed effects Building Building Building Building 
Quartiers trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sales controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the census 
tract level. The sample includes only the sales between private households within buildings with 
repeated sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers 
of rooms interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift 
interacted with the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly 
dummies for each quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 (see appendix table A2). 
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Table 1.9. Heterogeneity of the effects of social housing on housing prices by 
flats’ characteristics (circles of 500 and 50 meters) 
 
 Dependent variable: ln (price in euros 2005) 
Share of social housing within 500 meters within 50 meters 
Interacted with: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
No variable  0.600***  0.082*** 
  (0.136)  (0.019) 
Number of rooms is 1 or 2 0.299**  0.065***  
 (0.136)  (0.016)  
Number of rooms is 3 or 4 
-0.022  0.051***  
 (0.140)  (0.016)  
Number of rooms is greater than 4 
-0.417***  0.008  
 (0.142)  (0.018)  
Number of rooms 
 -0.190***  -0.010** 
 
 (0.012)  (0.005) 
Number of rooms is unknown 0.362* -0.245** 0.060 -0.022 
 (0.190) (0.123) (0.053) (0.053) 
R-squared 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 
     
Fixed effects Building Building Building Building 
Quartiers trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sales controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations 208,918 208,918 208,918 208,918 
# Clusters 902 902 902 902 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the census 
tract level. The sample includes only the sales between private households within buildings with 
repeated sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers 
of rooms interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift 
interacted with the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction and a series of quarterly 
dummies for each quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q4 (see appendix table A2). 
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Table 1.10. Estimates of the effects of the conversion projects on housing prices 
 
 Dependent variable: ln(price in 2005 euros) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vicinity of the sales, 
within: 500 meters 250 meters 150 meters 50 meters 
Panel A. Effect of the conversion projects 
Share of conversion projects -0.314 -0.055 0.023 0.032 
 (0.340) (0.135) (0.066) (0.033) 
R-squared 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 
     
# observations 116,105 116,105 116,105 116,105 
# clusters 892 892 892 892 
Panel B. Controlling for the share of other social housing projects 
Share of conversion projects -0.510 -0.122 -0.062 0.017 
 
(0.354) (0.142) (0.074) (0.034) 
Share of other projects 0.500** 0.186 0.201** 0.055* 
 
(0.232) (0.115) (0.080) (0.030) 
R-squared 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 
     
# observations 116,105 116,105 116,105 116,105 
# clusters 892 892 892 892 
Fixed effects Building Building Building Building 
Quartiers trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sales controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard errors are clustered by census tract 
(IRIS). The sample includes only the sales between private households occurring within building with 
repeated sales. Sales’ controls include: a cubic in size, dummy for unknown size, dummies by numbers 
of rooms interacted with unknown size, dummies for having a bathroom, a parking, a cellar, a lift 
interacted with the floor of the flat, dummies by periods of construction (see appendix table A2).  
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
 
 
 
Appendix.1.A. Data appendix
1.A.1. Social housing stock from EPLS surveys
The EPLS data-set distinguishes between several types of social housing subsidies which
were available during different time periods. Differences over time are due to two main reforms
in 1977 and in 1997. From 1977, new social housing projects are subject to a formal agreement
between the State and the HLM companies called conventionnement. This agreement is a
condition to the subsidies. The existing stock created before 1977 has been subject to various
agreements in 1979, 1985 and 1995. In exchange for these subsidies, the HLM companies agree
to have regulated rents and a limited choice of tenants. The agreement holds in most cases
over the whole period of the subsidized loans and is tacitly re-approved. The agreement of the
dwellings is the main condition for future tenants to be eligible to means tested benefits, APL.
I have regrouped this different categories into four main groups according to their level of rents:
• Very low income tenants: PLA-I and PLA d’inte´gration (10), PLA social (12).
• Low income tenants: PLUS (13) created in October 1999 to replace the PLA-LM/PLA-
TS/PLAI (11).
• Middle/low income tenants: PLS and PLS/PPLS/PLA-CFF (14), ILM (53), ILN (54).
• Stock before 1977: Other financing sources before 1977 (99), HBM (50), ”Ordinary” HLM
or HLM-O (52).
• ANAH subsidies (18).
The EPLS surveys take into account various form of subsidies to middle income tenants
that are not considered as social housing by the 2000 law. I discard all the projects financed
through a PLI (16), PAP-locatif (15), PCL (17) or other financing sources after 1976 (49).
None of these subsidies is subject to a conventionnement.
In Paris, HBM buildings have been renovated from 1984. As substantial improvements were
done to the buildings new agreements between the State and the HLM companies took place.
In this paper, all the HBM units are considered entering in the social housing stock when they
are built.
1.A.2. Estimation of the share of social housing at the local level
To estimate the number of dwellings in a circle of radius d around sale i, Nd, I use the
French 1999 census. For each census tract, I know the number Nj of dwellings. Denoting the
census tract polygons by (Tj) and the circle around the sale by Cd, I use the area operator, a(),
to define:
Nd =
∑
j
a(Tj
⋂
Cd)
a(Tj)
×Nj .
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Appendices 
 
Figure 1.B. Housing prices per square meters in Paris in 1995 by quartiers 
 
Note: The sample includes only the sales between private households in 1995 with information about 
price and surface. Thick lines represent the boundaries of the 20 arrondissements.  
Source: BIEN dataset. 
 
Figure 1.C. Social housing share in Paris in 1995 by quartiers 
 
Note: Thick lines represent the boundaries of the 20 arrondissements.  
Source: DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007 and 1999 census. 
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Table 1.D. Summary statistics. Social housing share for the sample of sales 1995-
2005 by circles and belts 
 
Year 1995 2005 1995-2005  1995 2005 
1995-
2005 
 
Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean 
 
(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)  (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) 
Vicinity Within circles Vicinity Within belts 
500 m 0.10 0.13 0.11 350-500 m 0.10 0.13 0.12 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)  (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) 
350 m 0.09 0.12 0.11 250-350 m 0.10 0.13 0.12 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.12)  (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) 
250 m 0.09 0.12 0.10 150-250 m 0.09 0.12 0.11 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)  (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) 
150 m 0.08 0.11 0.09 50-150 m 0.08 0.11 0.10 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)  (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) 
50 m 0.07 0.09 0.08 50 m 0.07 0.09 0.08 
 (0.53) (0.35) (0.49)  (0.53) (0.35) (0.49) 
Within census 0.08 0.11 0.09 Within census 0.08 0.11 0.09 
tract (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) tract (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) 
# observations 11,408 20,426 208,918  11,408 20,426 208,918 
 
Note: The sample is restricted to the sales between private households within buildings with repeated 
sales.  
Source: BIEN dataset, DREIF EPLS surveys 1998-2007, City of Paris records. 1999 census at the IRIS 
(tract) level.  
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Table 1.E. Summary statistics. Characteristics of the repeated sales within 
buildings 
 
Variable Mean 
  (Std. Dev.) 
Price (euros 2005) 173,650.9 
  (173,133.1) 
Log (price) 11.743 
  (0.784) 
1 room  0.236 
2 rooms 0.367 
3 rooms 0.219 
4 rooms 0.101 
5 rooms or more 0.060 
Number of rooms unknown 0.017 
1 room and unknown flat size 0.054 
2 rooms and unknown flat size 0.084 
3 rooms and unknown flat size 0.050 
4 rooms and unknown flat size 0.024 
5 rooms or more and unknown flat size 0.016 
Rooms and flat size unknown 0.007 
Flat size (0 if unknown) 38.274 
  (35.445) 
Flat size squared/100 27.212 
  (58.153) 
Flat size cubed/10000 27.941 
  (147.307) 
Flat size unknown 0.235 
At least one bathroom 0.825 
Number of bathrooms unknown 0.032 
At least one parking space 0.126 
Number of parking spaces unknown 0.140 
Having a lift 0.458 
Having a cellar 0.715 
Ground floor 0.079 
1st floor 0.152 
2nd floor 0.161 
3rd floor 0.157 
4th floor or higher 0.435 
Floor unknown 0.016 
1st floor and lift 0.059 
2nd floor and lift 0.063 
3rd floor and lift 0.063 
4th floor or higher and lift 0.060 
Floor unknown and lift 0.007 
Period of construction   
1850 or before 0.053 
1850 / 1913 0.454 
1914 / 1947 0.157 
1948 / 1969 0.136 
1970 / 1980 0.123 
1981 / 1991 0.018 
1992 / 2000 0.008 
After 2001 0.001 
Unknown 0.050 
# observations 208,918 
 
Note: The sample is restricted to the sales between private households within buildings with repeated 
sales. Source: BIEN dataset. 
 
Chapter 2
Social housing location, and labor
market outcomes
1 Introduction
Economists and policymakers have shown increasing interest in the importance of neighbor-
hood effects in a variety of contexts, including schooling, labor market outcomes and crime1.
There is now a large and expanding literature investigating the impact of the characteristics of
one’s neighborhood on individual outcomes. A pervasive problem in the literature on neigh-
borhood and peer effects is identification. Households may choose their location according to
partly unobservable characteristics related to educational and labor market outcomes. Thus
the measured effects are likely to be biased (Oreopoulos, 2008).
This chapter examines the impact of neighborhood quality on welfare recipients’ labor mar-
ket outcomes in Paris between 2001 and 2007. I take advantage of the quasi-random assignment
of households to social housing units through a known administrative process. In Paris, social
housing applicants are allocated on the basis of their preferences among twenty large areas,
the arrondissements, together with several observable variables. I present evidence that condi-
tional on these observable characteristics and the preferred arrondissements, new social housing
tenants are randomly assigned to neighborhoods. I use the variation in neighborhood quality
obtained through this natural experiment to compare the medium-run labor market outcomes
of tenants allocated to different social housing units.
The effect of social housing location on the labor market outcomes of its tenants is of interest
for several reasons. From a policy perspective, considerable effort has been made to improve
the location of the public housing units (see Currie, 2006, for the USA, Cheshire et al., 2008,
for the UK and Laferre`re and le Blanc, 2006, for France). These mixed communities’ policies
are based on the underlying belief that peer effects or the proximity to jobs could influence the
labor market outcomes of social housing tenants. The relocation of welfare recipients to social
housing units may allow households to move to lower-poverty areas. This could impact their
1See among recent examples: Oreopoulos, 2003, Kling et al., 2007, Currie et al., 2010, Kling et al., 2005, the
review of Oreopoulos, 2008, and references therein.
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labor market outcomes through four main mechanisms. First, peers and social networks may
influence the individual outcomes on the labor market through contagion effects (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2000, Crane, 1991) or informational effects (Granovetter, 2005, Montgomery, 1991).
Second, the new location may avoid the discrimination against the initial neighborhood of res-
idence (Kain, 1968, Zenou, 2002). Third, some local public goods such as local unemployment
agencies or greater access to social services (e.g. pre-school childcare) and transport networks
may have positive impacts on welfare recipients’ labor market outcomes. Fourth, for new social
housing tenants, the move itself may have an adverse impact due to the mobility costs or if the
new households have characteristics that are not adapted to their new neighborhoods or suffer
from higher level of discrimination.
In order to investigate the extent of these neighborhood effects, I combine information about
welfare recipients’ residential location and employment with information on neighborhood char-
acteristics. As I do not observe the households’ applications to social housing, I identify the
timing of their moves from private accommodation to the social sector. To the extent that
the allocation to a particular social housing unit is unrelated to unobservable household char-
acteristics, one can use the natural experiment created by the application process to measure
the impact of neighborhood on the labor market outcomes of welfare recipients. I find that
welfare recipients who obtain a social housing unit are located close to their previous neigh-
borhoods. Welfare recipients that get allocated to better neighborhoods experience slightly
higher job finding rates. My estimates indicate that a decrease of one standard-deviation of
the allocated neighborhoods’ unemployment rate (5 percentage points) increases the exit from
welfare by around 1.5 percentage points after 18 months and that this increase in welfare exits is
associated with an increase in the job finding rate by around 3 percentage points. These figures
represent substantial effects for welfare recipients, whose baseline transition rates are fairly low.
In particular, they represent an increase of 8% and 17% in their average exit rate from welfare
and in their job finding rate, respectively. However, there is no significant improvement in wages
or in the long-term exits from the welfare program. The main neighborhood effects seem to be
driven by an increase in the turn-over between the welfare program and temporary part-time
contracts. Moreover, the impact of neighborhoods appears highly heterogeneous among indi-
viduals. Women experience significant positive impacts on their job finding rates. The welfare
exits of women increases by around 3 percentage points after 18 months if the unemployment
rate of their allocated neighborhoods decrease by one-standard-deviation. This effect is twice
as large as the average effect in the population and I do not find any significant impacts of
neighborhood characteristics on men labor market outcomes.
This chapter builds on the existing studies of the impact of neighborhood on labor mar-
ket outcomes. The main empirical evidence is based on the Moving To Opportunity program
(MTO). The MTO program was authorized by the US congress in 1992 and took place between
1994 and 1998. The program randomly allocates housing vouchers to around 4, 600 volunteer
poor households living in public housing projects. Households were divided into three groups.
The experimental group was given vouchers only for relocation in census tracts with fewer than
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10% of households below the poverty line, while the control group was not offered any voucher
and a third group was offered vouchers without any constraints. Kling et al. (2007), Katz and
Kling (2004) find no significant neighborhood effects of the MTO program on economic self-
sufficiency or physical health but significant benefits on mental health. They also point out
that female youths are more affected than men by neighborhood quality. Kling et al. (2005)
investigate the impact of neighborhood on criminal behaviors and find also that female youth
relocated to better neighborhoods tend to commit less violent crime and property crime while
for males the reduction of crimes concerns only violent crimes in the short-run.
A second stream of the empirical literature uses social housing as a source of quasi-experimental
variation in neighborhood quality. Jacob (2004) observes the consequences of the closure of
high-rise public housing units in Chicago’s low-income neighborhoods on children’s outcomes.
Households living in public housing projects set for demolition were offered housing vouchers to
move. Children affected by the demolitions did not better than their peers on a wide variety of
achievement measures. In France, Goux and Maurin (2007) use the distribution of the dates of
birth in the group of the individual’s young close neighbors to predict the average rate of early
school success of the neighbors of the individual, they find some evidence of strong positive
peer effects. Their estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of
young neighbors being held back at the age of 15 would raise the probability of being held back
by 11% at the age of 16. Goux and Maurin (2007) also use the stock of social housing tenants
in order to identify aggregated neighborhood and peer effects. The local share of high-school
dropouts and the proportion of unemployed households appear strongly related to the proba-
bility of being held back a grade at the age of 16. On the contrary, Oreopoulos (2003) finds no
relationship between childhood neighborhood quality and future earnings, unemployment likeli-
hood or welfare participation in Toronto. He uses the allocation to public housing projects as a
source of quasi experimental variation in childhood neighborhoods. He tracks children assigned
to different neighborhoods, but he does not find any significant impact on long-run labor market
outcomes for various metrics of neighborhood quality: local levels of parental education, share
of single parents and welfare recipients.
My approach differs from that of these papers along two main dimensions. First, the re-
sults of my quasi-experimental identification strategy are complementary to the Gautreaux and
Moving To Opportunity findings (Kling et al. 2007, Rosenbaum 1995). I study the impact of
social housing location as opposed to the effect of housing vouchers. The social housing policy
is likely to generate more important variation in neighborhood quality than housing vouchers.
The location choices of the households have no impact on their budget constraints as the rent
of social housing flats is regulated for the whole municipality. Moreover, households’ location
are not restrained by any possible discrimination in the private housing market. The natural
experiment takes also place in a different part of the economic cycle as the MTO experiment.
Second, as Oreopoulos (2003), I focus on neighborhood variation created by the location of
social housing units and this strategy identifies the effect of social housing policies that aim at
creating or maintaining mixed communities. However I do not focus on the childhood neigh-
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borhood, I investigate the neighborhood impacts on medium run labor market outcomes up to
two years after the households moved in social housing.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the se-
lection process of social housing applicants and the data. Section 3 discusses the empirical
framework and econometric concerns. Section 4 describes the main results and discusses the
heterogeneity of neighborhood effects across welfare recipients. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional background and summary statistics
2.1 Allocation to social housing units
The Parisian social housing system is based on rental units subsidized by low interests loans
and tax deductions. The social housing stock represents 15.4% of the occupied housing stock in
Paris (APUR, 2008). Housing units are owned by private local companies, HLM 2. Despite their
private status, these companies are closely monitored by the central government and the mu-
nicipality, that sometimes contributes to rehabilitation, maintenance or demolition of buildings.
Moreover, in Paris, the municipality is the main joint owner of the largest HLM companies.
Project-based assistance is used by HLM companies to create new social units either through
subsidized construction, rehabilitation or conversion of private buildings. The allocation pro-
cess of the dwellings and social housing (voluntary) applicants is complex. As a results of their
financing part in the different social projects, each financing institution gets some rights on the
social housing stock (Laferre`re and le Blanc, 2006). About the half of the Parisian social rented
housing stock is allocated to working people by their firms through the private workers’ housing
scheme (1% logement). Concerning the other half of the social housing stock, the reservation
rights are shared by two main administrative entities: the municipality and the Pre´fecture of
Paris. The Pre´fecture of Paris proposes around 18% of the candidates and the municipality
around 32% of the candidates. The two administrative entities partly use their nomination
rights to provide affordable accommodations to civil servants3.
The eligibility of the households to social housing in Paris is a function of the family struc-
ture and the total household income during the penultimate year. All the applicants for social
housing have to submit a unique application form. This application form can be downloaded
on municipality website and it is also available in each of the twenty arrondissement city halls.
The applicants have to give information on: income, handicap, the healthfulness and crowding
of the actual accommodation, age (a priority is given to young household) and actual rent.
Households can rank their preferred locations at the arrondissement level4. Once the form is
2Habitations a` loyer mode´re´. Several French administrative bodies use slightly different definitions of the
social housing stock (Pre´fecture de Paris, 2007, CNIS, 2001 and Briant et al., 2010)
3The local administrative process of allocation is determined by law since 1986. The goal of the allocation
process and the composition of the allocation commissions at the municipality level changed marginally in 1996
and 2005. Furthermore, for the municipality of Paris, one half of the available units are allocated by the central
authority, while the other half is allocated through arrondissement authorities.
4The application form is reproduced in appendix, figure 2.A1. The application form was changed in 2008.
The default answer is now being indifferent between all the arrondissements.
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completed the household is registered on the waiting list. In 2005, there were around 100, 000
applicants and 4, 000 social dwellings were allocated.
As soon as a social unit becomes available, local commissions determine the nominated
applicants. Commissions use only information from the application form. For each available
dwelling, the commissions rank three eligible households and submit this list to the social land-
lord in charge of the dwelling. The first successful applicant is contacted by the social landlord
who checks the eligibility of the applicant. If the social landlord agrees with the commission,
the household can move in or refuse the dwelling to re-enter the waiting list5. In case of refusal
by the first applicant, the second applicant is offered the dwelling and the first applicant goes
down in the priority list6.
The final neighborhood allocation is driven by the first two steps of this administrative pro-
cess. Due to the scarcity of available lettings, the commissions have little control on the final
location of the households. Moreover, welfare recipients meet always the income conditions,
so that eligibility and allocation are determined by the family structure and the interplay of
households’ location choices and available dwellings. Most of the choices of the households cor-
respond to their current locations or central arrondissements. Due to the length of the waiting
list and the relative low rent of the social units7, the compliance to the assigned social housing
units is near perfect for low income households. Table 2.1 presents the rate of refusal of social
housing units according to the French Housing Surveys in 1996 and 2002. In average, the rate of
refusal of welfare recipients is 0% and around 2.6% for low-income households. Unfortunately,
the sample sizes are small but this provides suggestive evidence that households’ non compliance
to the assigned social units is unlikely to be a severe source of bias.
The administrative process and the high demand of social dwellings help identify the impact
of location on labor market outcomes. Under perfect compliance to the administrative alloca-
tion process, the location choice of the households is fully determined by the characteristics in
the application form. As the social housing stock is spatially unbalanced, this process generates
large variation in the allocated neighborhoods. Most of the high-rise and medium-rise social
housing developments conducted in the sixties and in the seventies were built in the periphery
of the municipality to take advantage of affordable land prices and new public equipments.
However, after the election of a new mayor, Bertrand Delanoe¨, in March 2001, the municipality
accepted numerous financial efforts in order to create mixed-income neighborhoods and increase
the social rented stock. The goal is to reach the 20% of public housing in every of the twenty
arrondissements of Paris before 2020. The challenge is important as social housing units rep-
resented only 13.4% of the primary residences at the beginning of 2001. The municipality took
5At this stage, a main reason for the landlords’ refusals are potentially too high incomes for a particular type
of public housing, but this does not apply to welfare recipients.
6Information leaflets associated to the application form explain that a non-motivated refusal would either
downgrade the priority of the application or place the household in the last position of the waiting list.
7The rent in the private sector is twice as high as in the public sector. In Paris, there are three rent levels
according to the financing system of the housing unit. In 2006, they are 5.25 euros/m2, 5.90 euros/m2 and 8.85
euros/m2 while the rent on the private sector is on average 20.70 euros/m2 (commission of Parisian notaries).
As a result, the supply of social dwellings is dried by a very low turnover rate (5% in Paris in 2006 against 10%
at the national level, and 18% in the private sector).
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two main actions. First, the agencies in charge of social housing in Paris have been mobilized
to produce more new accommodations, using state or city properties. Second, an inclusion-
ary zoning was partially implemented since 2001 and voted in 2006. Every new large housing
project should present a level of 25% social housing units8. As a result of these policies, the
number of social housing residences has increased by 13, 079 units between January 2001 and
2005 while the stock of public housing represented 167, 393 primary residences the 1st January
2005 or 15.4% of all the dwellings (APUR 2008). Thus the supply of available social dwellings
is driven by both significant inflows of new projects and the existing stock. This guaranties
large variation in neighborhoods.
2.2 Data and summary statistics
To measure the impact of public housing location on the labor market outcomes of the poor-
est households in Paris, I combine a unique exhaustive French administrative data set which
contains the variables used in the administrative process of social housing allocation and neigh-
borhood level information.
The empirical analysis is based on the welfare recipients of the French minimum income, the
RMI. The RMI was the French guaranteed minimum income until 2009 (Bourguignon, 2009).
This welfare program is accessible to any individual aged 25 and over, provided that the sum
of all resources available to his or her household is below a threshold that depends on family
composition. The administrative data is collected by the French Institute in charge of payment
of welfare, family and housing benefits and its local agency (the CNAF and the CAF of Paris).
The sample covers all the RMI recipients from June 2001 to December 2005 in the municipality
of Paris. The employment history of this sample of households is observed until June 2007.
The longitudinal data set is constructed using the cross-sectional administrative information on
employment and welfare status collected every 6 months from June 2001 to December 2004 and
every 3 months from December 2004 to June 2007.
Each observation corresponds to a household’s situation either during a welfare spell or
during the subsidies period when one member of the household finds a job, or is working in a
subsidized job9. I observe the moves from private accommodation to social housing from cross-
section to cross-section. As social housing benefits are paid directly to the social landlords,
I define a move to the social housing sector as a change from a private sector dwelling to a
dwelling rented by a social landlord. I identify social housing as the rental social units which
give right to housing subsidies for the tenants and belong to or are administrated by social
landlords. This definition does not include student halls, temporary accommodations for young
and poor workers or elderly halls which have different allocation rules.
My explanatory variable of interest is the quality of neighborhoods. Each year the data
are localized at the census tract level. I use two external measures of neighborhood quality:
8New housing projects including social housing can have higher density than private developements. Three
historical areas are excluded of this new zoning regulation: the Se´nat, Panthe´on and Marais.
9The subsidy period is known as Inte´ressement. Subsidized contracts include the part-time CI-RMA in the
private sector and the CAV in the non-profit sector.
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the unemployment rate from the 1999 census and the median income that are available at the
census tract level from 2001 to 200510. These measures of neighborhood quality includes all the
households of the neighborhood. I decide first to focus on the unemployment rate in the census
1999. The quality of this indicator depends on the persistence of spatial inequalities over time
in particular for the last cohorts of observations in 2004 and 2005.
Table 2.2 investigates the linear and rank correlations between the unemployment rate,
the long-term unemployment in 1999 and the median taxable incomes in 2001 and 2005. The
unemployment rate in 1999 is strongly linearly correlated with all these measures, the lowest
linear correlations being of order 0.8. Comparing the linear correlations to the rank correlations
(in backets), there is no evidence of non-linear relationships between the different measures of
neighborhood quality11. There is also no significant changes in the correlations when I compare
the income measures in 2001 and 2005. The correlation between the neighborhood unemploy-
ment rate in 1999 and the median income in 2001 is 0.77 and 0.76 when the median income
is measured in 2005. These correlations suggest that the unemployment rate is a stable scalar
index of neighborhood quality which is linearly related to the overall neighborhood quality. A
similar method is used by Kling et al. (2007). They summarize the quality of neighborhoods
using the poverty rate. Under a unique metric of neighborhood quality, a change in the value of
this metric, the neighborhood unemployment rate, may imply a change of other non-orthogonal
neighborhood characteristics that may be important for the job search process of the individual
such as job accessibility or the education of close neighbors. Thus the results can not be inter-
preted as the effect of the unemployment rate on labor market outcomes holding every other
neighborhood characteristics constant. An alternative technique would be to create a weighted
index of neighborhood quality but these metrics have two disadvantages. First, they have no
clear scale. Second, they are not comparable over different studies. I prefer to introduce only
the neighborhood unemployment rate as it is a directly interpretable indicator. However, this
may cause a loss of power to discriminate ”good” and ”bad” neighborhoods if the underlying
assumption of correlation of this indicator with an underlying linear neighborhood quality index
is violated.
My potential control variables include virtually all the characteristics asked in the applica-
tion form: age, number of children, marital status, past income level, some past labor market
outcomes and the current housing rent12. However I do not observe the location preferences of
the households and I do not know if the final allocation to a given arrondissement corresponds
to the choice expressed in the application form. Alternatively I choose to control for the ar-
rondissement of the social housing unit and the past location of the household.
Table 2.3 provides broad descriptive features of the data on welfare recipients. The first col-
10Income data at the census tract level are not available before 2001. Income data in year n is coded at the
census tract of residence on the 1st January of year n+ 1.
11Other non-reported correlations with the neighborhood social housing share, the education of the neighbors
or the quality of the housing stock present similar patterns.
12The quality of the current accommodation of the households is defined by several proxies rent and location
- while the public housing application form contains more precise information on the current housing conditions
of the applicants.
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umn presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample while columns (2) and (3) focus on
single women and single men. I observe 2, 178 adult individuals in 1, 686 households relocated to
social housing units in 407 different census tracts over the period 2001 to 2005. Panel A presents
the descriptive characteristics of these individuals. Single women are overrepresented among
the individuals allocated to social housing units and represents nearly 37% of the sample. This
is explained by the priority given to single family households in the social housing application
process. 63% of the single women live with children and 21% of them have children of less than
six years old. Couples with children represent also a large share of the sample. Overall 56% of
the individuals live with children when they move to a social housing units. A large fraction of
individuals are from Non-European countries (41%) while the fraction of European individuals
is marginal (2%). New social tenants are in average 44.5 years old, single men being older than
the other successful applicants by nearly two years. The past unemployment history of these
households is important. The average duration of a welfare spell is 4.5 years at the time of
entry into social housing. The inflows of social housing tenants are stable over the period 2001
to 2005, each cohort represents nearly 10% of my final sample.
Panel B of table 2.3 describes the observed past labor market outcomes before the alloca-
tion to a social housing unit. 10% of the new public tenants had some form of employment
six months before their allocation to a social unit. A large part of them, 53%, did not have
any taxable income in the penultimate year before the social housing allocation. Their average
yearly income is low below 3, 000 euros. This matches the long duration of the welfare spells.
Panel C presents the past housing conditions of the new social housing tenants. Only a small
fraction of them paid some form of rent. The observed rents are low in average 370 euros per
month and slightly higher for couple and single women than for single men.
Finally, Panel D of table 2.3 presents the variation in the explanatory variable of interest,
the unemployment rate of the census tract in 1999. In average, welfare recipients are allocated
to neighborhoods where the unemployment rate was 16% in 1999. This is substantially larger
than the unemployment rate of the average Parisian census tract (12%). The standard devi-
ation of the neighborhood metric is 0.05. The distribution of the unemployment rate within
the allocated neighborhoods is nearly symmetric. The bottom 10th percentile of the allocations
corresponds to an unemployment rate of 9.5% while the 90th percentile represents an unem-
ployment rate of 23.4%. There is no noticeable difference between the neighborhoods allocated
to single women, men and couples. The last two rows compare the variation within the ar-
rondissements of allocation and within the households coming from the same and moving to
the same arrondissements. Nearly 60% of the unemployment rate variation occurs within the
arrondissements of allocation. Even controlling for both past and current arrondissements,
the variation in the neighborhood quality is still substantial and represents more than 50% of
the overall variation in local unemployment rates. This is partly due to the low mobility of
the households between arrondissements. In my sample, 59% of the individuals get allocated
a social unit in their current arrondissement. Interestingly, this proportion is smaller (32%)
in the most deprived arrondissements, the 18, 19 and 20, which have the largest numbers of
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social housing units. This suggests that households’ preferences play indeed a substantial role
in the final allocation. As my metric of neighborhood quality is likely to be subject to some
kind of measurement error, it is reassuring that my results will not be driven by small changes
in neighborhood characteristics and attenuation bias when I control for the arrondissements of
allocation.
I focus on three main labor market outcomes of the successful social housing applicants after
their relocation to social housing units: the exit of welfare, the job finding rate and the wage
of the individuals who find a job. The transitions from the minimum income program, RMI, to
the program designed for new single parent of children of less than three years old (API ), are
aggregated into the same welfare spell. As the households receive some extra transfer when they
find a job, I identify both their welfare exits and the timing of their job findings in their admin-
istrative records. Unfortunately, some individuals may quit the welfare programs for reasons
not related to employment: change of household structure, geographic mobility or because they
do not fill the required quarterly forms. I construct three main dependent variables: dummy
variables for not receiving welfare benefits after n months, dummy variables for having found a
job before n months and an earnings variable. The exit of welfare and the employment variables
are defined 6, 12, 18 and 24 months after the relocation. The employment measure aggregates
all the possible employment spells of the individuals13. I consider that this measure is subject
to attrition when the individuals are not in any welfare program after n months but they did
not benefit from any period of cumulative wage and welfare benefits. Finally, there is no direct
measure of the wage in the dataset but it contains a variable for the monthly earnings. For the
employed people, this is very close to their wages. When the individual are in couple, I know
the identity of the individual working and I impute him the full amount of earnings. If the two
adults of the same household are working at the same time, I impute half of the earnings to
each of them (this occurs only for 3 households in my sample). I assume that the job finding
hazard rate is constant and I convert this variable into an expected monthly wage when the
individuals find a job by multiplying it by 2/3.
Table 2.4 presents the welfare exits and employment transitions after the allocation to a
social housing unit for the different categories of welfare recipients. Panel A, after 24 months,
32% of the individuals did quit the welfare programs. This aggregates exits due to employment,
geographic mobility, change of family structure and non reporting of their quarterly income to
their local agencies. In panel B, the share of welfare recipients who took a job raises quickly
after the allocation to social housing, 9% after 6 months, and doubles one year later to reach
18% after 18 months. Panel C displays the attrition rate for this measure. There is a substan-
tial fraction of individuals who quits the welfare program without employment reasons. This
attrition rate is probably overstated as a large fraction of these individuals receive again the
minimum income program a few months later. This suggests that this number are mainly due to
administrative reasons and the suspension of the eligibility to the benefits when the households
do not fit their quarterly income forms.
13They are identified through different form of earnings top-ups and directly subsidised contracts
(Inte´ressement, temporary job bonuses, RMA and CAV).
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Panel D of table 2.4 shows the wages of the individuals during their first employment spells
at the time they enter the minimum income top-up program. The average earnings appear
below the full-time minimum wage. This is consistent with part-time employment contracts
concentrated around the minimum wage and corresponds to the large fraction of subsidized
part-time contracts of the welfare recipients (Gurgand and Margolis, 2008).
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Main specification
In order to identify the causal relationship between the quality of a neighborhood and job
search outcomes of welfare recipients, I exploit the quasi-experimental variation created by the
social housing allocation process. Once I control for the information in the public housing
application forms, the allocation to a particular public housing unit is arguably exogenous with
respect to the future labor market outcomes of the welfare recipients. This empirical strategy
can be seen as a reduced form equation from the linear-in-means model of Manski (1993) under
some additional assumptions.
My main specification relates the labor market outcomes Yijt of household i allocated to a
social dwelling in neighborhood j at time t to the unemployment rate of this neighborhood, Uj ,
measured in 1999:
Yijt = β1 + γUj +Xijtβ2 + Lijtβ3 + Eijtβ4 + εijt , (2.1)
where γ is the parameter of interest. γ summarizes the reduced form effect of neighborhood
characteristics on the labor market outcomes. It allows to test if labor market outcomes of
new social housing tenants are influenced by the location of public housing units. Xijt, Lijt
and Eijt denote three different categories of control variables that are needed to focus on quasi-
experimental variation of Uj and consistently estimate γ. Specifically, Xijt contains individuals
characteristics, age at the time of entry into social housing, nationality of the head of the house-
hold (French, European, other and unknown nationalities), gender14, marital status (in couple
or not), number of children, the fact to have young children, a cubic in the monthly duration
of the welfare spell interacted with the year and semester of entry into social housing. These
cohort controls are important as welfare recipients’ employment is highly dependent on publicly
subsidized jobs (Rioux, 2001, Gurgand and Margolis, 2008) and the supply of subsidized jobs
is correlated with the national elections occurring in 2002. I include the interaction with the
duration of the welfare spells as the eligibility to some subsidized contracts is conditional on
the welfare duration. For example, a new subsidized private job program, the RMA, created in
December 2003 was only available to welfare recipients who spent more than 24 months with the
RMI. Lijt contains information about the past and new arrondissements of residence of house-
14The gender of the spouse is unknown and coded as spouse of a male or spouse of a female. The rules to choose
the household head are discussed in Jacquot (2001). In my sample, the women is the head of the household for
nearly half of the couples.
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hold i. In my most constrained specification, Lijt is a set of 182 interacted dummy variables
for the past and current arrondissements of location. Given these controls, the causal effect of
neighborhood is identified by variation in neighborhood allocation between households from the
same arrondissement moving to the same arrondissement. Eijt is a vector of past employment,
housing and income characteristics that may be used as additional controls. When the full set
of controls is included all the information of the application form is taken into account.
Under my identification strategy, the unobserved factors affecting the labor market out-
comes, εijt, have to be unrelated to the allocated neighborhood characteristics conditional on
my control variables:
E[εijt|Uj , Xijt, Lijt, Eijt] = E[εijt|Xijt, Lijt, Eijt] . (2.2)
The variation of the local unemployment rate is as good as randomly assigned once I control for
Xijt, Lijt, and Eijt. This assumption is valid if I am able to control for all the characteristics
that may influence the allocation of a public housing applicant to a particular neighborhood and
there is perfect compliance to the administrative process. This type of assumption and reduced
form strategy have been used in a wide variety of contexts to estimate the effect of peers or
neighborhood: student achievement with respect to their college roommates (Sacerdote, 2001),
immigrants’ outcomes and first location (Edin et al., 2003) and the consequences of living in a
poor neighborhood (Oreopoulos, 2003). To evaluate the robustness of my findings, I introduce
sequentially these controls in my regressions. My baseline specification controls only for basic
household characteristics, Xijt. Then I introduce the arrondissement variables that may affect
the selection process of social housing applicants, Lijt. Finally, I also control for the observable
past labor market outcomes and housing conditions, Eijt. This last specification is close to a
lag-dependent variable model.
3.2 Falsification exercise and robustness checks
My identifying assumption (2.2) could be violated in two main cases. First, the social
housing commissions could allocate dwellings and households in the waiting list according to
characteristics that are not presented in the application form and these characteristics may be
correlated to unobserved determinants of labor market outcomes. Second, welfare recipients
could manipulate the allocation process through strategic non compliance. If assumption (2.2)
is not met, the coefficient γ in specification (2.1) does not consistently estimate the causal im-
pact of social housing location on the labor market outcomes of welfare recipients. If (2.2) holds,
I should not observe any specific relationship between past outcomes of the welfare recipients
and the current quality of their allocated neighborhoods. Thus, I assess the relevance of this as-
sumption by comparing some past outcomes of the new tenants to the quality of their allocated
neighborhoods. Specifically, I regress previous labor market outcome such as past employment
and earnings on all the right-hand side variables of equation (1). These variables are present in
the application form. However, the fact that, conditional on households’ characteristics, they
are not correlated with the current local unemployment rate suggests that other unobservables
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driving labor market outcomes would also be uncorrelated with the allocated neighborhoods.
An additional concern arises from the fact that some labor market outcomes are not ob-
served for the whole sample due to sample attrition. I only observe welfare recipients in Paris
and I do not know the whole labor market history of each household during their employment
or unemployment spells. Thus, welfare recipients moving to other cities disappear from the
data set. This geographic mobility is unlikely to bias the main results because once a household
has moved in a social housing dwelling, there is a very low turn-over of public accommodations
in Paris (5% in 2006). However, changes in family structure and non response to the quarterly
income inquiries also impact the eligibility to the minimum income program. If this sample
attrition is correlated with unobservable determinants of labor market outcomes and the local
unemployment rate, Uj , it may bias the estimates of the impact of neighborhood quality on
labor market outcomes. The following assumption is required to rule out differential attrition
rates by neighborhood quality:
E[εijt.Mijt(Yijt)|Uj , Xijt, Lijt, Eijt] = E[εijt.Mijt(Yijt)|Xijt, Lijt, Eijt] , (2.3)
where Mijt(Yijt) denotes a dummy variable taking value 1 if the information on Yijt, the la-
bor market outcome is missing. I test the missing at random assumption (2.3) by estimating
regression (1) with a new dependent variable Mijt(Yijt). If, conditional on Xijt, Lijt, Eijt, the
characteristics of the neighborhood have no significant effect on the transitions out of the sample,
the labor market outcomes estimates are not biased by selective sample attrition15.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Falsification exercise and quasi-random allocation to social housing
First, I directly assess the relevance of the identifying assumption (2). Table 2.5 presents
the results of falsification tests for the new social housing tenants. Panel A displays the results
of a linear probability model of the probability of having a positive previous taxable income
in the penultimate year prior to the social housing allocation16. In column (1), I control only
for observable households characteristics. The estimate indicates that a 5 percentage points
increase in the unemployment rate of the allocated neighborhood (approximately one standard-
deviation) is correlated with a decrease of the probability of having a positive income by 1.4
percentage points. However this point estimate is not significant at the 10% significance level.
The negative association between the unemployment rate of the allocated neighborhoods and
past income disappears once I control more precisely for the arrondissements of allocation in
columns (2) and (3). In column (2), I control only for the arrondissement of the allocated
social unit. The absolute value of the point estimate is divided by six while the standard-error
increases by only one third. A 5 percentage points increase in the unemployment rate of the
allocated neighborhood would is now associated with a 0.2 percentage points increase in the
15DiNardo et al. (2006) detail the same issue for the MTO experiment.
16This corresponds to the last available yearly income tax form.
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probability of having a positive income. When I introduce further control for both the past
and current arrondissements of residence in column (3), the point estimate changes sign but
remains of same magnitude in absolute value.
Panel B displays the results of the same falsification tests for the previous taxable income
in the penultimate year prior to the social housing allocation. In all the specifications, the co-
efficient of the allocated unemployment rate indicates a weak relationship between this variable
and the allocated unemployment rate. A 5 percentage points increase in the allocated unem-
ployment rate is associated with an increase in previous income by 115 to 170 euros, less than
3% of the standard-deviation of this measure. Moreover these estimates are all insignificant at
the 10%, and would indicate that households with higher income get allocated to neighborhoods
with higher unemployment rate.
Finally, panel C presents the association between previous employment measured as the
fact to receive some wage deduction six months before the allocation to social housing and the
unemployment rate of the allocated neighborhoods. In column (1) when only the individual the
individual controls are included, the estimate indicates that a one-standard deviation decrease
in the local unemployment rate would imply an increase of 0.7 percentage points of the prob-
ability to have some form of employment. However, this positive correlation between the past
employment status and the quality of the allocated neighborhood disappears once I control for
the arrondissements of allocation in columns (2) and (3). The point estimates have the same
magnitude in absolute value, but change of sign and remains non-significant at the 10% signif-
icance level. In summary, the impacts of the allocated unemployment rate on the past labor
market outcomes are never economically or statistically significant. This is not the case when
I estimate the same specifications for the new private tenants (estimates not reported). In the
private rental sector, households tend to present past labor market outcomes that are directly
correlated with the current quality of their neighborhoods.
4.2 Neighborhood effects on labor market outcomes
Table 2.6 shows the effects of public housing location described by the local unemployment
rate at the census tract level on the welfare exits and employment 12 months, 18 months and
24 months after the initial relocation of the new social tenants17.
Table 2.6 panel A presents the estimates of the impact of the local unemployment rate on
the welfare exits. In column (1), a decrease of one standard deviation of the local unemployment
rate (5%) increase the likelihood to find a job within 12 months by 0.3 percentage points. The
included control have little impact on this point estimates. In all the specifications, the point
estimates remain of same sign and magnitude. In column (4), when fixed effects for each pair
of arrondissements are included, the estimated effect drops to 0.2%. All these impacts are
non-significant at the 10% level. The point estimates at 18 months are much larger. In columns
(6) to (8), they indicate that an increase of one standard-deviation of the neighborhood quality
17The estimates after 6 are similar to the estimates after 12 months and not reported.
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would increase the probability to exit the welfare programs by 1.6 percentage points. However,
these estimates remain insignificant at the 10% level and the point estimates drops in magnitude
when I consider the exits of welfare at 24 months in columns (9) to (12). This may correspond to
the high turn-over of the welfare recipients between short-term part-time contracts and welfare
spells or to short periods of administrative non-eligibility.
Panel B of table 2.6 investigates further the reasons of this time pattern. The dependent
variable is now a dummy variable for being observed during an employment spell before leaving
the welfare program. In this second panel, all the point estimates have the expected negative
sign that indicates that lower local unemployment rates increase the likelihood of finding a job.
The point estimates are all between 0.2 and 0.6 which indicate that a one standard deviation
decrease in the local unemployment rate would increase the likelihood of finding a job by 1 to 3
percentage points. All the point estimates after 18 months are significant at the 5% level which
would indicate that the observed increase in the welfare exits was indeed due to employment
spells. Panel C examines the attrition of this measure. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable taking value one when the individual left the welfare program without starting an
employment spell beforehand. None of these estimates is significant at the 10% significance
level.
Finally, Table 2.7 shows the estimated impact of neighborhood unemployment of the wages
of the welfare recipients when they find a job. Much of the variation in the wage measure
is driven by the difference between part-time and full-time jobs and my data do not allow
distinguishing the effect of the working hours and the hourly wage. Panel A. displays the
results from the regressions of the unemployment rate on the wage of the individuals (in level)
for the individuals starting an employment spell. The estimates are small and insignificant at
the 10% level. The largest point estimate in column (3) indicates that a one standard deviation
decrease in the neighborhood unemployment rate would imply a 50 euros increase (1/10 standard
deviation of the earnings’ measure). The panel B of table 6 controls for the self-selection of
the new employees using a two-step selection model. I use the children variables as exclusion
restriction in the selection equation. The estimates for the wage equation are even smaller while
the standard-errors significantly increase. In the selection equation, as in table 6, a positive
correlation appears between the probability to take a job and neighborhood quality. However
these point estimates are insignificant at the 10% level when I control for the arrondissements
of allocation.
These results are consistent with the MTO literature (Kling et al., 2007). However, the
absence of clear effects for the whole sample could be due to two main reasons. First, if the
neighborhood effects are heterogeneous across welfare recipients, it is possible to observe stronger
results for some subgroups. I examine this possibility in the next sub-section. Second, as there
is no clear difference in job accessibility inside Paris, this does not rule out the possibility that
at another spatial scale the redevelopment of the public housing system could have a positive
effect on the search outcomes of the welfare recipients. This could be the case at the scale of the
Paris region if the spatial mismatch hypothesis of Kain (1968) holds. However, this partly rules
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out the assumption that relocation to better neighborhoods can improve the job related social
networks of the welfare recipients (at least on the short and medium run) and the assumption
that the residence in areas exposed to crime or in low-skilled minorities’ neighborhoods inhibit
the job access of welfare recipients.
4.3 Heterogeneous neighborhood effects by individual characteristics
While the quality of public housing location appears to have small positive effects on the
job finding rate and welfare exits of welfare recipients, these low average impacts could be the
result of heterogeneous treatment effects. Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 reproduce the results of Table
2.6 on the subsamples of women and single women.
For the whole sample of women in table 2.8, the impacts of the neighborhood unemploy-
ment rate on the exit of welfare is always negative and as in the whole population the effects
become larger at 18 months and decrease in absolute value at 24 months (panel A). The point
estimates at 12 and 18 months imply that a decrease of one standard-deviation if the allocated
unemployment rate would raise the exits from welfare by 1.5 at 12 months to 3 percentage
points after 18 months. Panel B of table 8 indicates that this increase in the exits from the
welfare program is mostly due to employment spells which increase in the same proportion at
12 and 18 months. However, the estimates of panel B should be interpreted carefully. A large
fraction of women is observed leaving the welfare programs without starting an employment
spell and this proportion of women appear related to the quality of neighborhoods in panel C.
In table 2.9, the estimates for the subsample of single women have the same pattern. The
sample size drops from 1, 257 to 815 observations and the standard-errors become more impre-
cise. The impact of neighborhood of welfare exits appear stronger at 12 months and decrease
at 18 and 24 months. On the contrary, the estimate for the job finding rate of the welfare
recipients are constant over time and indicate that a decrease of one standard-deviation of the
unemployment rate increase the overall transition to work by 0.5 percentage points in column
(11) to 3.8 percentage points in column (4). This again indicates that the quality of neighbor-
hood has a positive impact on the job finding rate of single women but that these effects are
not strong enough to allow durable exits from the welfare programs.
Table 2.10 displays the estimates of neighborhood effect on the welfare exits and employ-
ment of men. The estimates have no well-defined sign as in the previous tables 8 and 9. Their
absolute values is in average nearly twice below the corresponding estimates for women and all
the point estimates are insignificant at the 10% level. Despite the large standard-errors, this
provides suggestive evidence that neighborhood effects are very weak for men. The non-reported
estimates for the smaller subsample of the 479 single men point out towards an even stronger
negative answer. The estimate for the impact of the unemployment rate on welfare exits is
positive and around 0.4 in all the specifications. Similarly, nearly all the point estimates for the
effects of neighborhood on the probability to find a job have the opposite sign as those on the
subsample of women and are positive.
Finally, Table 2.11 reports the estimates of the neighborhood effects on the welfare exits and
68
employment of individuals below 40 years old18.Younger welfare recipients may be more em-
ployable and concentrate most of the employment spells, thus the neighborhood effects should
be easier to detect for this sub-population. In panel A, the estimates for the impact of the
welfare exits are all negative as expected and larger than the corresponding estimates for the
whole population reported in table 2.6 but they remain insignificant at the 10% significance
level. In panel B, the estimated impact on the job finding rates are even larger than for the
subsample of single women in table 9. They suggest that a one standard-deviation decrease
in the allocated unemployment rate would increase the transitions to work by 4.4 percentage
points 18 or 24 months after the allocation to social housing. As the average rate of transition
to work is 24
4.4 Discussion
The allocated local unemployment rate impacts welfare recipients’ employment and their
temporary exits from the welfare program. These estimates are mainly driven by women and
individuals below 40 years old. On the contrary, neighborhood quality has no positive impact
on the employment probability of men and more particularly single men. The different esti-
mates by gender are consistent with the MTO findings on crime and mental health Kling et al.,
2005, 2007. Kling et al. develop three alternative explanations to the observed gender differ-
ences: peer sorting, if new male and female tenants tend to resort or not into the same type of
peer groups in their new and old neighborhoods (Jencks and Mayer, 1990), search strategies,
if females tend to rely more on interpersonal relationships for their job search than men, and
comparative advantages, if females have human capital that made them more able to exploit the
job opportunities in good neighborhoods. In absence of other external evidence, it is difficult
to distinguish the role of these three factors in my results. The results for the welfare recipients
below 40 year old suggest that the most employable individuals may be able to take advantage
of better location. Moreover, the time pattern of the estimates could also be consistent with
this explanation. Once the individuals with adapted human capital have been able to find a
job, the effect of better location on the job finding rate does not increase over time after one
year spent in social housing.
5 Conclusion
This chapter examines the effect of the location of public housing on the labor market
outcomes of welfare recipients in Paris. Using the social housing allocation process as a quasi-
natural experiment, I take into account the endogeneity of the location process and study an
important policy: the location of public housing units. I find that welfare recipients allocated
to better neighborhoods have slightly higher job finding rates, but I do not find any evidence
18The results are not sensitive to this age cut-off. Additional results for different sub-sambles, individuals with
and without children, long term and short-term welfare recipients or by age group, do not have a clear pattern.
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that neighborhoods have any impact on the wages or strong effects on the long-term exits
from the welfare program. The higher job finding rate is mostly driven by women and seems
related to low paid and temporary employment contracts. These estimates shed some light on
the impact of the redevelopment of the French social housing system taking place in wealthy
neighborhoods due to a recent change in the French legislation. The results confirm the weak
effect of location on the economic self-sufficiency of poor households obtained in the USA with
the MTO experiment. They suggest that creating new social housing units to relocate welfare
recipients into better neighborhoods will not improve their economic self-sufficiency19.
However it is possible that the redevelopment of social housing units across cities may
have an impact on the economic self-sufficiency of the welfare recipients if they are located
in deprived cities where the job offers are scarce (Olof et al., 2010). The development of
social housing units in better neighborhoods within Paris could be desirable for other reasons
than economic self-sufficiency. Location could have higher impacts on children educational and
long-term outcomes. For example, Goux and Maurin (2007) obtained complementary evidence
that children educational outcomes are influenced by the outcomes of their close neighbors in
France. New social housing buildings could also improve the quality and healthfulness of the
lettings of the poor households or influence the criminal activity and exposure to crime. Finally,
the effects of social housing developments on construction, overall neighborhood composition,
housing prices and crime in a given neighborhood have received little attention. The potential
detrimental or positive effects of public housing redevelopment on the existing neighborhood
are mostly unknown. Recent US evidence (Baum-Snow and Marion, 2009) suggest that the
impact in good neighborhoods is in general weak. Further research is needed to determine the
overall efficiency of social housing policies.
19Welfare recipients represent only a small share of the social housing tenants.
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Table 2.1. Compliance to the social housing allocation among low-income 
applicants 
 
 
Welfare recipients (1) Low income Households (2) 
  
Non weighted Weighted Non weighted Weighted 
Refused a dwelling in:    
1996 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 1 1,128 
Applicants in:       
1996 3 2,665 29 27,136 
2002 10 10,139 18 16,986 
Refusal rate 0.00% 0.00% 2.10% 2.60% 
 
Note: (1) Welfare recipients are households for whom at least one individual received the RMI during 
the last year. (2) Households whose income by OECD consumption unit is below the second national 
decile. Source: French Housing Surveys 1996 and 2002. Households who live in Paris and declare 
having applied to social housing. 
 
Table 2.2. Linear and non-linear correlations between different metrics of 
neighborhood quality 
 
 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
(1999) 
Long term 
Unemployment 
rate (1999) 
Median Income 
by UC 
in 2001 
Median Income 
by UC 
in 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation 
 
(Rank 
correlation) 
(Rank 
correlation) 
(Rank 
correlation) 
(Rank 
correlation) 
Unemployment rate in 1999 1.00    (1.00)    
Long term unemployment 
rate in 1999 (1) 
0.83 1.00   
(0.91) (1.00)   
Median Income by UC  -0.77 -0.76 1.00  
in 2001 (2) (-0.81) (-0.79) (1.00)  
Median Income by UC -0.76 -0.74 0.99 1.00 
in 2005 (-0.79) (-0.77) (0.99) (1.00) 
 
Note: The computations are based on 968 census tracts for the 1999 census data and 915 census tract 
for the other indicators. (1) Long term unemployed workers have been unemployed for more than one 
year. (2) UC are Eurostat consumption units: the first adult (individual of more than 14 y.o.) has weight 
1, other adults have weight 0.5 and children have weight 0.3. Source: French census in 1999, Taxable 
income at the census tract level in 2001 and 2005 (INSEE, DGI). 
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Table 2.3. Characteristics of the welfare recipients allocated to social housing 
 
 
 
 
 
Whole 
sample 
Single 
women 
Single 
men 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
A. Individual characteristics 
Single female  0.37  1.00 
Single male 0.22 1.00  
Head female 0.11   
Head Male 0.10   
French (1) 0.47 0.48 0.55 
European 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Non-European 0.41 0.39 0.29 
Unknown nationality 0.11 0.10 0.14 
Age 43.44 43.62 45.49 
 (10.20) (9.88) (9.63) 
RMI Months at the entry 54.56 54.06 56.59 
into social housing (45.25) (46.32) (46.84) 
Children of less than 3 y.o. 0.13 0.02 0.00 
Children of 3 to 6 y.o. 0.21 0.19 0.01 
Children 0.56 0.63 0.05 
Number of children 1.19 1.05 0.08 
 (1.48) (1.14) (0.39) 
Cohort 06/2001 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Cohort 12/2001 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Cohort 06/2002 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Cohort 12/2002 0.12 0.12 0.10 
Cohort 06/2003 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Cohort 12/2003 0.10 0.11 0.09 
Cohort 06/2004 0.13 0.12 0.15 
Cohort 12/2004 0.11 0.10 0.14 
Cohort 06/2005 0.15 0.13 0.14 
Cohort 12/2005 0.10 0.10 0.10 
B. Past labor market outcomes 
Employment at t-6 months  0.10 0.13 0.09 
Income>0 in year t-2 0.47 0.43 0.43 
Income of year t-2 2,943.49 2,137.17 2,494.91 
(2005 euros) (5,355.63) (3,934.09) (4,275.51) 
C. Past housing conditions 
Monthly rent at t-6 months  371.07 357.17 260.09 
if known and >0 (2005 euros) (261.87) (209.17) (183.63) 
Rent is 0 at t-6 months if known 0.55 0.53 0.63 
Unknown rent at t-6 months 0.15 0.13 0.14 
D. Neighborhood allocation  
Unemployment rate in 1999 0.16 0.16 0.16 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Variance intra arrondissement (2) 
[share] 
3.44 1.21 0.89 
[0.58] [0.59] [0.62] 
Variance intra pair of 3.16 1.04 0.81 
arrondissements (3) [share] [0.53] [0.51] [0.56] 
# Observations 2,178 815 479 
# Allocated census tracts 407 312 236 
 
 
 
 
Note: (1) Nationality of the head of the household. (2) Arrondissement of the social unit. (3) Interaction 
between the past arrondissement of residence and the arrondissement where the social housing unit is 
located. Source: CNAF and CAF welfare recipients’ registry 2001-2007 and census in 1999. 
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Table 2.4. Labor market outcomes of the welfare recipients: descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Whole 
sample 
Single 
women 
Single 
men 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
A. Exit of welfare (1) at:     
6 months 0.06 0.05 0.06 
12 months 0.14 0.12 0.12 
18 months 0.18 0.15 0.18 
24 months 0.32 0.28 0.32 
B. Employment (2) at:    
6 months 0.09 0.11 0.11 
12 months 0.14 0.15 0.16 
18 months 0.18 0.20 0.20 
24 months 0.20 0.22 0.23 
C. Attrition of the employment measure (3) at: 
6 months 0.06 0.05 0.06 
12 months 0.11 0.09 0.10 
18 months 0.14 0.11 0.14 
24 months 0.24 0.20 0.23 
# Observations 2,178 815 479 
# Allocated census tracts 407 312 236 
 
   
D. monthly wage during the first employment spell (4): 
 
Wage (2005 euros) 901.83 821.52 804.67 
 (584.49) (534.17) (576.66) 
# Observations 240 106 53 
# Allocated census tracts 149 83 47 
 
Note: (1) This dummy variable takes value 1 if the individuals is no longer at RMI or API or in a 
related subsidized job. (2) The employment measure is cumulative and take into account any 
employment spell observed after the allocation to social housing. It is measured for the subsample (3) 
The attrition for the employment measure corresponds to the number of individuals who are not in 
welfare at n months but did not take a job before the end of their welfare spell. (4) The sample contains 
all the individuals who find employment after their allocations to social housing. The wage is 
computed from the quarterly income forms when the individual enters the top-up program associated 
with the guaranteed minimum income. All wages are converted in 2005 euros using the INSEE 
purchasing power time series. This average amount is close to the (net employee) full-time minimum 
wage (933 euros in 2005). Source: CNAF and CAF welfare recipients’ registry 2001-2007. 
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Table 2.5. Falsification tests. Impact of the allocated neighborhoods on past 
labor market outcomes 
 
 
   
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
A. Dependent variable: Having a positive income in year t-2 
Unemployment rate -0.282 0.044 -0.058 
 (0.212) (0.309) (0.312) 
    
B. Dependent variable: Income in year t-2 
Unemployment rate 2,599.338 3,078.780 3,520.347 
 (2,366.716) (3,619.749) (3,898.799) 
    
C. Dependent variable: Employment 6 months before allocation 
Unemployment rate -0.142 0.120 0.165 
 (0.133) (0.163) (0.176) 
    
Individual controls (1) Yes Yes Yes 
Arrondissements fixed 
effects (2) No Yes Yes 
Pair of arrondissements 
fixed effects (3) No No Yes 
# Observations 2,178 2,178 2,178 
# Clusters 407 407 407 
 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard-errors are clustered at the census 
tract level. (1) Individual controls include: age, age squarred, dummy variables for single women, 
single women with children, single men, male head of couple, female head of a couple, spouse of a 
male, spouse of a female, nationality of the household head (French, European, Non European), having 
children of less than 3 years old, having children between 3 and 6 years old, number of children and a 
full set of cohort (year interacted with semester) dummies interacted with a cubic in the previous 
duration of the welfare spell. (2) The arrondissements fixed effects are defined at the location of the 
allocated social dwelling. (3) A pair of arrondissement is defined as the interaction between the past 
arrondissement of residence and the arrondissement where the social housing unit is located. Source: 
CNAF and CAF welfare recipients’ registry 2001-2007 and census in 1999. 
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Table 2.6. Impact of the allocated neighborhoods on welfare exits and employment, whole population 
 
             
A. Welfare exit at 12 months Welfare exit at 18 months Welfare exit at 24 months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Unemployment rate -0.062 -0.098 -0.013 -0.044 -0.090 -0.336 -0.280 -0.325 0.031 -0.091 0.036 -0.014 
 (0.167) (0.203) (0.210) (0.199) (0.205) (0.238) (0.251) (0.244) (0.230) (0.290) (0.292) (0.292) 
# Observations 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 
# Clusters 407 407 407 407 407 407 407 407 381 381 381 381 
B. Employment at 12 months Employment at 18 months Employment at 24 months 
Unemployment rate -0.233 -0.271 -0.304 -0.343 -0.379** -0.486** -0.511** -0.595** -0.246 -0.238 -0.166 -0.267 
 (0.168) (0.206) (0.215) (0.211) (0.187) (0.229) (0.252) (0.246) (0.230) (0.300) (0.320) (0.335) 
# Observations 1,934 1,934 1,934 1,934 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 
# Clusters 395 395 395 395 400 400 400 400 367 367 367 367 
C. Attrition at 12 months Attrition at 18 months Attrition at 24 months 
Unemployment rate -0.034 -0.120 -0.049 -0.075 -0.021 -0.312 -0.288 -0.320 0.073 -0.147 -0.101 -0.131 
 (0.156) (0.181) (0.189) (0.182) (0.175) (0.216) (0.230) (0.226) (0.180) (0.237) (0.232) (0.232) 
# Observations 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 2,178 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 
# Clusters 407 407 407 407 407 407 407 407 381 381 381 381 
Controls             
Individual controls (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arrondts FE (2) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Pair of arrondts FE (3) No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Additional controls (4) No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard-errors are clustered at the census tract level. (1) Individual controls include: age, age squarred, dummy 
variables for single women, single women with children, single men, male head of couple, female head of a couple, spouse of a male, spouse of a female, nationality of the 
household head (French, European, Non European), having children of less than 3 years old, having children between 3 and 6 years old, number of children and a full set of 
cohort (year interacted with semester) dummies interacted with a cubic in the previous duration of the welfare spell. (2) The arrondissements fixed effects are defined at the 
location of the allocated social dwelling. (3) A pair of arrondissement is defined as the interaction between the past arrondissement of residence and the arrondissement where 
the social housing unit is located. (4) Additional controls include: having a job six month before the allocation to social housing, income during the penultimate year, dummy 
for no income, dummy for unknown income, the rent six month before the allocation and dummies for not paying any rent and unknown rent six month before the allocation. 
Source: CNAF and CAF welfare recipients’ registry 2001-2007 and census in 1999. 
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Table 2.7. Impact of the allocated neighborhoods on wages, whole population 
 
          
A. OLS: wage of the 1st employment spell 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment rate 246.882 874.332 1,045.491 849.819 
 (701.029) (1,120.438) (1,051.495) (1,023.947) 
# Observations 240 240 240 240 
# Clusters 149 149 149 149 
Controls 
    
Individual controls (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arrondts FE (2) No Yes Yes Yes 
Pair of arrondts FE (3) No No Yes Yes 
Additional controls (4) No No No Yes 
B. Heckman: wage of the 1st employment spell 
Wage equation 
    
Unemployment rate 
-96.232 306.913 -482.009  
 (1,372.755) (1,511.059) (2,580.927)  
Selection equation (5) 
    
Unemployment rate -1.296* -0.775 -0.936 
 
 (0.749) (0.975) (0.997) 
 
# Observations 2,178 2,178 2,178 
 
# Clusters 407 407 407 
  
Controls 
    
Individual controls (1) Yes Yes Yes 
 
Arrondts FE (2) No Yes Yes 
 
Additional controls (4) No No Yes 
  
 
 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard-errors are clustered at the census 
tract level. (1) Individual controls include: age, age squarred, dummy variables for single women, 
single women with children, single men, male head of couple, female head of a couple, spouse of a 
male, spouse of a female, nationality of the household head (French, European, Non European), having 
children of less than 3 years old and a full set of cohort (year interacted with semester) dummies 
interacted with a cubic in the previous duration of the welfare spell. (2) The arrondissements fixed 
effects are defined at the location of the allocated social dwelling. (3) A pair of arrondissement is 
defined as the interaction between the past arrondissement of residence and the arrondissement where 
the social housing unit is located. (4) Additional controls include: having a job six month before the 
allocation to social housing, income during the penultimate year, dummy for no income, dummy for 
unknown income, the rent six month before the allocation and dummies for not paying any rent and 
unknown rent six month before the allocation. (5) I use the children variables as exclusion restriction: 
having children between 3 and 6 years old, number of children. The model is fitted by the two-step 
procedure. Source: CNAF and CAF welfare recipients’ registry 2001-2007 and census in 1999. 
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Table 2.8. Impact of the allocated neighborhoods on welfare exits and employment, women 
 
             
A. Welfare exit at 12 months Welfare exit at 18 months Welfare exit at 24 months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Unemployment rate -0.215 -0.351 -0.317 -0.344 -0.255 -0.542* -0.527* -0.591** -0.000 -0.230 -0.106 -0.157 
 (0.179) (0.245) (0.277) (0.259) (0.215) (0.281) (0.308) (0.284) (0.217) (0.278) (0.312) (0.307) 
# Observations 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 
# Clusters 363 363 363 363 363 363 363 363 349 349 349 349 
B. Employment at 12 months Employment at 18 months Employment at 24 months 
Unemployment rate -0.477** -0.497* -0.426 -0.449* -0.520** -0.587* -0.487 -0.508 -0.428 -0.363 -0.141 -0.165 
 (0.210) (0.270) (0.281) (0.265) (0.233) (0.299) (0.332) (0.322) (0.262) (0.336) (0.363) (0.362) 
# Observations 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079 
# Clusters 362 362 362 362 361 361 361 361 338 338 338 338 
C. Attrition at 12 months Attrition at 18 months Attrition at 24 months 
Unemployment rate -0.128 -0.309 -0.281 -0.287 -0.061 -0.419* -0.458* -0.493* 0.143 -0.166 -0.120 -0.148 
 (0.175) (0.223) (0.251) (0.243) (0.178) (0.246) (0.277) (0.265) (0.182) (0.264) (0.285) (0.284) 
# Observations 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 
# Clusters 363 363 363 363 363 363 363 363 349 349 349 349 
Controls             
Individual controls (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arrondts FE (2) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Pair of arrondts FE (3) No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Additional controls (4) No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard-errors are clustered at the census tract level. (1) Individual controls include: age, age squarred, dummy 
variables for single women, single women with children, single men, male head of couple, female head of a couple, spouse of a male, spouse of a female, nationality of the 
household head (French, European, Non European), having children of less than 3 years old, having children between 3 and 6 years old, number of children and a full set of 
cohort (year interacted with semester) dummies interacted with a cubic in the previous duration of the welfare spell. (2) The arrondissements fixed effects are defined at the 
location of the allocated social dwelling. (3) A pair of arrondissement is defined as the interaction between the past arrondissement of residence and the arrondissement where 
the social housing unit is located. (4) Additional controls include: having a job six month before the allocation to social housing, income during the penultimate year, dummy 
for no income, dummy for unknown income, the rent six month before the allocation and dummies for not paying any rent and unknown rent six month before the allocation. 
Source: CNAF and CAF welfare recipients’ registry 2001-2007 and census in 1999. 
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Table 2.9. Impact of the allocated neighborhoods on welfare exits and employment, single women 
 
             
A. Welfare exit at 12 months Welfare exit at 18 months Welfare exit at 24 months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Unemployment rate -0.245 -0.477* -0.484 -0.556* -0.185 -0.394 -0.382 -0.500 0.288 -0.005 0.089 0.009 
 (0.216) (0.284) (0.345) (0.334) (0.258) (0.327) (0.373) (0.362) (0.263) (0.316) (0.397) (0.403) 
# Observations 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 709 709 709 709 
# Clusters 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 289 289 289 289 
B. Employment at 12 months Employment at 18 months Employment at 24 months 
Unemployment rate 
-0.611** -0.668** -0.615* -0.769** -0.543* -0.566 -0.386 -0.509 -0.408 -0.482 -0.112 -0.214 
 (0.276) (0.339) (0.348) (0.334) (0.299) (0.381) (0.422) (0.424) (0.337) (0.418) (0.445) (0.438) 
# Observations 739 739 739 739 726 726 726 726 627 627 627 627 
# Clusters 300 300 300 300 297 297 297 297 276 276 276 276 
C. Attrition at 12 months Attrition at 18 months Attrition at 24 months 
Unemployment rate -0.204 -0.444* -0.421 -0.456 -0.034 -0.297 -0.298 -0.395 0.142 -0.210 -0.092 -0.157 
 (0.195) (0.255) (0.304) (0.300) (0.198) (0.283) (0.326) (0.319) (0.222) (0.307) (0.364) (0.364) 
# Observations 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 709 709 709 709 
# Clusters 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 289 289 289 289 
Controls             
Individual controls (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arrondts FE (2) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Pair of arrondts FE (3) No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Additional controls (4) No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard-errors are clustered at the census tract level. (1) Individual controls include: age, age squarred, dummy 
variables for single women, single women with children, single men, male head of couple, female head of a couple, spouse of a male, spouse of a female, nationality of the 
household head (French, European, Non European), having children of less than 3 years old, having children between 3 and 6 years old, number of children and a full set of 
cohort (year interacted with semester) dummies interacted with a cubic in the previous duration of the welfare spell. (2) The arrondissements fixed effects are defined at the 
location of the allocated social dwelling. (3) A pair of arrondissement is defined as the interaction between the past arrondissement of residence and the arrondissement where 
the social housing unit is located. (4) Additional controls include: having a job six month before the allocation to social housing, income during the penultimate year, dummy 
for no income, dummy for unknown income, the rent six month before the allocation and dummies for not paying any rent and unknown rent six month before the allocation. 
Source: CNAF and CAF welfare recipients’ registry 2001-2007 and census in 1999.  
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Table 2.10. Impact of the allocated neighborhoods on welfare exits and employment, men 
 
             
A. Welfare exit at 12 months Welfare exit at 18 months Welfare exit at 24 months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Unemployment rate 0.072 0.153 0.230 0.227 0.084 -0.153 -0.107 -0.136 0.038 0.050 0.070 0.054 
 (0.225) (0.253) (0.261) (0.258) (0.265) (0.302) (0.335) (0.337) (0.271) (0.342) (0.359) (0.362) 
# Observations 921 921 921 921 921 921 921 921 856 856 856 856 
# Clusters 326 326 326 326 326 326 326 326 316 316 316 316 
B. Employment at 12 months Employment at 18 months Employment at 24 months 
Unemployment rate 0.053 -0.003 -0.090 -0.103 -0.157 -0.231 -0.313 -0.336 -0.133 -0.095 -0.030 -0.063 
 (0.226) (0.288) (0.321) (0.324) (0.246) (0.300) (0.343) (0.353) (0.326) (0.443) (0.488) (0.514) 
# Observations 887 887 887 887 878 878 878 878 797 797 797 797 
# Clusters 320 320 320 320 322 322 322 322 306 306 306 306 
C. Attrition at 12 months Attrition at 18 months Attrition at 24 months 
Unemployment rate 0.055 0.086 0.161 0.165 0.023 -0.225 -0.192 -0.216 0.111 -0.062 -0.092 -0.100 
 (0.208) (0.225) (0.237) (0.239) (0.253) (0.294) (0.326) (0.328) (0.242) (0.302) (0.321) (0.324) 
# Observations 921 921 921 921 921 921 921 921 856 856 856 856 
# Clusters 326 326 326 326 326 326 326 326 316 316 316 316 
Controls             
Individual controls (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arrondts FE (2) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Pair of arrondts FE (3) No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Additional controls (4) No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard-errors are clustered at the census tract level. (1) Individual controls include: age, age squarred, dummy 
variables for single women, single women with children, single men, male head of couple, female head of a couple, spouse of a male, spouse of a female, nationality of the 
household head (French, European, Non European), having children of less than 3 years old, having children between 3 and 6 years old, number of children and a full set of 
cohort (year interacted with semester) dummies interacted with a cubic in the previous duration of the welfare spell. (2) The arrondissements fixed effects are defined at the 
location of the allocated social dwelling. (3) A pair of arrondissement is defined as the interaction between the past arrondissement of residence and the arrondissement where 
the social housing unit is located. (4) Additional controls include: having a job six month before the allocation to social housing, income during the penultimate year, dummy 
for no income, dummy for unknown income, the rent six month before the allocation and dummies for not paying any rent and unknown rent six month before the allocation. 
Source: CNAF and CAF welfare recipients’ registry 2001-2007 and census in 1999. 
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Table 2.11. Impact of the allocated neighborhoods on welfare exits and employment, below 40 years old 
 
             
A. Welfare exit at 12 months Welfare exit at 18 months Welfare exit at 24 months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Unemployment rate -0.402 -0.264 -0.124 -0.267 -0.283 -0.224 0.019 -0.086 -0.175 -0.305 -0.283 -0.372 
 (0.310) (0.350) (0.390) (0.375) (0.331) (0.353) (0.401) (0.401) (0.344) (0.406) (0.481) (0.483) 
# Observations 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 706 706 706 706 
# Clusters 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 267 267 267 267 
B. Employment at 12 months Employment at 18 months Employment at 24 months 
Unemployment rate -0.334 -0.601 -0.613 -0.757* -0.529 -0.826* -0.770 -0.937* -0.310 -0.713 -0.722 -0.881 
 (0.312) (0.382) (0.447) (0.416) (0.359) (0.448) (0.560) (0.531) (0.404) (0.532) (0.653) (0.622) 
# Observations 728 728 728 728 711 711 711 711 599 599 599 599 
# Clusters 279 279 279 279 278 278 278 278 247 247 247 247 
C. Attrition at 12 months Attrition at 18 months Attrition at 24 months 
Unemployment rate -0.478* -0.473* -0.369 -0.460 -0.309 -0.344 -0.162 -0.218 -0.331 -0.514 -0.484 -0.523 
 (0.271) (0.281) (0.321) (0.317) (0.282) (0.276) (0.346) (0.350) (0.262) (0.325) (0.394) (0.400) 
# Observations 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 834 706 706 706 706 
# Clusters 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 267 267 267 267 
Controls             
Individual controls (1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arrondts FE (2) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Pair of arrondts FE (3) No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Additional controls (4) No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
 
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Standard-errors are clustered at the census tract level. (1) Individual controls include: age, age squarred, dummy 
variables for single women, single women with children, single men, male head of couple, female head of a couple, spouse of a male, spouse of a female, nationality of the 
household head (French, European, Non European), having children of less than 3 years old, having children between 3 and 6 years old, number of children and a full set of 
cohort (year interacted with semester) dummies interacted with a cubic in the previous duration of the welfare spell. (2) The arrondissements fixed effects are defined at the 
location of the allocated social dwelling. (3) A pair of arrondissement is defined as the interaction between the past arrondissement of residence and the arrondissement where 
the social housing unit is located. (4) Additional controls include: having a job six month before the allocation to social housing, income during the penultimate year, dummy 
for no income, dummy for unknown income, the rent six month before the allocation and dummies for not paying any rent and unknown rent six month before the allocation. 
Source: CNAF and CAF welfare recipients’ registry 2001-2007 and census in 1999. 
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Appendix figure 2.A. Application form  
 
 
Source: Municipality of Paris. 
 
Chapter 3
Migration and unemployment
duration
1 Introduction
High unemployment and wage differentials between European regions and urban areas em-
phasize the role of mobility as a potential adjustment mechanism. Blanchard and Katz (1992)
and Oswald (1996, 1997) argue that the low labor migration rates in Europe can partly explain
its high unemployment rate compared to the United States. Therefore, low migration rates
are a growing policy concern in Europe (Decressin and Fatas, 1995, OECD, 2005, Ga´kova´ and
Dijkstra, 2008), and investigating the internal migrations of unemployed workers is a natural
way of understanding the dynamics of European labor markets, and the persistence of regional
unemployment imbalances.
This chapter examines the impact of migration on the labor market outcomes of French
unemployed workers over the 1995-2004 period. I take advantage of a unique longitudinal ad-
ministrative dataset recording each month the place of residence of unemployed workers. I
compare the job search prospects of migrant and non-migrant unemployed workers using the
changes in place of residence over the same unemployment spell. I ask how migrations and job
search are related. Migrations appear associated with higher job finding rates, and long-term
unemployed workers appear to have higher returns to migration. Furthermore, the migration
effects do not appear systematically correlated with individual unobserved heterogeneity, and
regional unemployment differentials do not explain the higher job finding rates of the migrants.
Migration is as an important human capital investment decision (Sjaastad, 1962). Spatial
mismatches between job offers and unemployed workers are a possible cause of unemployment
and poverty (Kain, 1968). Negative peer effects may also lead to poor labor market outcomes in
residential areas with high long-term unemployment rates (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997 and Zenou,
2009). Therefore, geographic inequalities appear not only as a result of individual labor market
outcomes but also as one of their determinants. Unemployed workers migrate if they can obtain
higher wages, more job offers, or if there are sufficient local amenities to compensate lower job
market prospects in high unemployment regions (Moretti, 2011). However, unemployed work-
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ers’ migrations may also be due to market imperfections. Gregg et al. (2004) provide evidence
that liquidity constraints may force constrained workers to leave high living cost regions, rather
than take advantage of higher job search opportunities in the United Kingdom. Therefore, the
effect of migration on unemployment duration is ultimately an empirical question.
This chapter builds on two main strands of literature. First, macroeconomic studies have
focused on regional mobility as an adjustment mechanism that may reduce wage differentials
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), unemployment disparities and mismatches between employers
and workers (Blanchard and Katz, 1992). These studies use aggregate migration rates and
differences in unemployment across geographic areas to identify the role of migrations on re-
gional labor markets. Pissarides and McMaster (1990) find that regional migrants in the United
Kingdom respond to regional unemployment differentials and wages differentials, but that the
difference between the private benefits and the social benefits of migration lead to an inefficient
adjustment process. This partly explains the persistence of regional unemployment disparities.
In continental Europe, Crozet (2004) also finds that mobility costs were too high to significantly
reduce wage differentials over the 1980 − 90 period. Second, microeconomic evidence has fo-
cused on the drivers of residential mobility, such as the employment status and homeownership
(Garner et al., 2001, Gobillon, 2001), and the potential wage gains of migration (Borjas et al.,
1992, Ham et al., 2004). However, while this strand of literature underlines that unemployed
workers are more mobile than employed workers, it mostly ignores the importance of migration
for the job search process of unemployed workers1.
This chapter investigates the effect of migration decisions on the job search process of un-
employed workers in continental Europe. This question has two aspects. First, do migrations
affect the probability of getting a job after different unemployment durations? Second, are
the measured effects of migration due to the migration itself or to the difference in local labor
market conditions? I measure the effect of regional migration on unemployment duration using
a sample of French unemployed workers. France has high regional unemployment disparities
and relatively high gross and net regional migration rates in Europe (OECD, 2005). Further-
more, many French policies are dedicated to reduce regional unemployment differentials and
provide subsidies aimed at reducing the cost of geographical mobility of labor2. I first suggest
a simple job-search model with migrations that allows discussing the potential effects of migra-
tion on unemployment duration. I start the empirical analysis by presenting several estimates
of the effect of unemployment assuming that the decision to migrate and future labor market
outcomes are independent conditional on large set of observable characteristics. I document
that unemployed workers’ migrations are associated with large increase in their job finding
rates. 18 months after a migration, job finding rates appear 10 percentage points higher than
those of non-movers. These estimates are large, especially for long-term unemployed workers
whose baseline job finding rates are fairly low. Consistent with job search theory, increases in
1Gobillon and Le Blanc (2003) survey the recent microeconomic evidence and provide additional evidence of
the wage gains associated to regional migrations in Europe.
2The laws of July 1st, 2001 and of January 1st, 2002 define new subsidies for unemployed workers who find a
job outside their residential region. The law of July 1st, 2005 introduces a negative income tax for all unemployed
worker who migrates to accept a job offer located more than 200 kilometers away from her home.
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job finding rates appear also larger for long-distance migrations between French re´gions than
short-distance migrations between French de´partements. Accounting for unobserved individual
heterogeneity using repeated unemployment spells does not change the main point estimates,
though the results become less precise. Finally, the estimated effects of migration should be
compared with the average job finding rate of the migrants if the two regions had similar labor
market conditions. I use semi-parametric duration models to adjust for the change in local labor
market conditions and isolate the effect of mobility on unemployment duration from the effect
of regional unemployment differentials. The unemployment rates in the initial region and in the
region of destination have similar impact on unemployment duration. Migrants do not appear
to have higher job finding rates because they move towards low unemployment rate regions.
Regional mobility itself seems to explain the effect of migration on their job finding rates.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a stylized model
of job search and migrations, and discusses the economic parameters of interest. Section 3
discusses the sample of French unemployed workers, and provides some descriptive evidence
on the regional migration patterns of unemployed workers. Section 4 describes the empirical
strategies. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 A stylized model of regional migration and job search
Since Sjaastad (1962), migrations are considered as a self selection process related to human
capital investment3. In this human capital framework, migrations are analyzed in relation to
net utility change. Migrations are justified if local labor markets are heterogeneous and provide
job seekers with different employment opportunities, if workers have skills that are valuated
differently between geographic areas, or if, for example, the housing market or the living costs
are more attractive in another region (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989, Gobillon, 2001).
I incorporate the migration decision in a stylized partial-equilibrium job search model. Un-
employed workers can engage in two methods of job search: stay and search or migrate and
search4. This assumes that local labor markets are segmented and that job seekers apply pre-
dominantly to local job offers. This is consistent with the empirical part that uses migrations
between French de´partements and re´gions that are in average distant of around 43 and 89 kilo-
meters, respectively. Manning and Petrongolo (2011) find that most unemployed workers tend
to limit their job search to local vacancies and that the attractiveness of a job falls by about
4.5 times if one pulls the job 5 km further away. The workers know perfectly the transition
probabilities between the different states and their environment is overall stationary. U0 and U1
are the stationary values of unemployment for a non migrant and a migrant, W (w) is the payoff
of employment at wage w, and r is the constant discount factor. In a discrete time setting, the
3Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro (1970) and Mincer (1974) also provide early economic models of the
migration decisions.
4This set-up is not specific to migration. Pissarides (1979) uses the same discrete time setting model with a
fixed wage to examine the relative efficiency of several job search methods.
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payoffs of the different states of the labor market are:
U0 = b+
p0
1 + r
∫
(U0 +max(W (w)− U0, 0))dF0(w) + (1− p0)
1 + r
U0 ,
U1 = b− c+ p1
1 + r
∫
(U1 +max(W (w)− U1, 0))dF1(w) + (1− p1)
1 + r
U1 ,
W (w) = w +
W (w)
1 + r
, (3.1)
where p0 and p1 represent the probabilities to receive a job offer and b the unemployment
benefits. F0 and F1 are the cumulative density functions of the wage distributions in the two
regions. I assume that migrations have a constant cost, c, which summarizes all the non labor-
market costs and benefits due to the change of geographic area and may vary with distance
and other factors. c takes not only into account accommodation and borrowing costs, but local
amenities and local unemployment benefits that varies across municipalities in France (L’Horty
et al., 2002). Hence, c may be negative if low living costs in one region compensate moving costs.
In particular, short distance migrations may be less related to employment reasons (Gobillon
and Le Blanc, 2003). For instance, the prospect of saving money by living with one’s parents
might drive some short-distance migrations of young unemployed workers. By making the time
interval tend to zero, I obtain the following three Bellman equations:
r.U0 = b+ λ0.
∫
max(W (w)− U0, 0)dF0(w) ,
r.U1 = b− c+ λ1.
∫
max(W (w)− U1, 0)dF1(w) ,
r.W (w) = w . (3.2)
Non-migrants accept a job offer if W (w) ≥ U0 and migrants accept a job offer if W (w) ≥ U1.
Assuming that the expected value of the wage under F0 and F1 are finite, the reservation wages
are:
wR0 = b+
λ0
r
∫
w≥wR0
(1− F0(w))dw = b+ λ0
r
∫
w≥wR0
(w − wR0)dF0(w) ,
wR1 = b− c+ λ1
r
∫
w≥wR1
(1− F1(w))dw = b− c+ λ1
r
∫
w≥wR1
(w − wR1)dF1(w) . (3.3)
Migrants and non migrants coexist if U0 = U1. Therefore, the reservation wages in the two
regions are equal to wR, and migration costs have to satisfy the condition:
λ1(1− F1(wR))EF1(w − wR|w ≥ wR)− λ0(1− F0(wR))EF0(w − wR|w ≥ wR) = r.c (3.4)
The right hand side of equation 3.4 is the difference in the expected labor market earnings
of migrants and non-migrants. This difference depends both on the job arrival rates and the
wage offers distributions in the two regions. By contrast, the left hand side of equation 3.4
represents the discounted moving costs. This expression simplifies when the two regions have
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the same wage distribution, F :
(λ1 − λ0)(1− F (wR))EF (w − wR|w ≥ wR) = r.c . (3.5)
There are two parts in the expected gains of migrations. First, the difference between
the hazard rate from unemployment to employment of the migrants and the one of the non
migrants is (λ1 − λ0)(1 − F (wR)). Second, the expected wage when the workers accept a job
offer is EF (w − wR|w ≥ wR). Hence, high moving costs, c, may justify the persistence of large
regional differences in employment prospects, λ1 − λ0 6= 0. As the gains of migrations depend
on the expected wage, the model also explains that low skilled workers may be less mobile.
By contrast, migrations may be motivated by other reasons than labor market outcomes if
there are sufficient compensating differentials (c ≤ 0) to justify lower labor market outcomes,
(λ1 − λ0) < 0 in equation 3.5.
I estimate the first part of the returns to migration, the difference in unemployment duration
of migrants and non-migrants. More precisely, if an unemployed worker decides to move at a
given elapsed unemployment duration, t, I compare her probability to exit unemployment at
time t + n with the probability to exit unemployment she would have had by staying in her
previous region of residence. In the model described above, the average effect of the decision to
migrate at time t on the likelihood to find a job of the migrants is:
ATTt,n = exp(
∫ t+n
t
{−λ0(1− F0(wR))(s)}ds)− exp(
∫ t+n
t
{−λ1(1− F1(wR))(s)}ds) . (3.6)
The Average Treatment effect on the Treated, ATT, is the difference between the survival
function that migrants would have had if they did not have moved and their actual survival
function. I assume that the average effect of migration on job search outcomes may be du-
ration dependent, and I introduce the unemployment duration at the time of migration, t, in
the empirical specifications. Unemployment benefits, human capital and the rate of arrival of
job offers may change over the duration of an unemployment spell. Moreover, recent empirical
evidence suggests that the effects of local labor markets on unemployment exits are duration
dependent (Gobillon et al., 2011).
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Unemployed workers and migrations
The empirical analysis is based on a unique 1/12th nationally representative sample of French
unemployed workers registered to the French employment agency, the ANPE 5. The registra-
tion to the ANPE is mandatory to receive unemployment benefits. Therefore, the data cover
nearly all unemployed workers between January 1995 and December 2004. Chardon and Goux
5This longitudinal dataset, known as Super Fichier Historique Statistique, is maintained by three French
institutions: the ANPE, the DARES and the INSEE.
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(2003) estimate that 90% of the job-seekers are registered with the ANPE 6. Other versions
of this dataset have been used to study the efficieny of Active Labor Market Policies (Cre´pon
et al., 2007) or the extent of regional disparities in unemployment duration (Duguet et al.,
2009, Gobillon et al., 2011). Each unemployment spell is identified by the day of registration
to the French employment agency and the day of the end of the unemployment spell. The data
allow controlling for important characteristics of the unemployed workers such as gender, age,
qualification, education, nationality, marital status, children, the reasons of the unemployment
spell (dismissal, labor market entry, etc.), and the types of unemployment or welfare benefits.
The two main variables of interest are the migrations between French regions and the exits of
unemployment7.
Regional migrations are observed through the places of residence that are recorded each
month by the local unemployment agencies. Places of residence are de´partement. This adminis-
trative zoning divides the French metropolitan territory into 95 areas. It is a natural zoning as
most of local employment policies are designed along these administrative boundaries (Boissard,
2008). Over the 1995-2004 period, I observe 9, 206 migrations that affect 2.4% of the unem-
ployment spells. Given the small number of migrants, I consider migration as a binary variable
taking value 1 when workers change region, 0 otherwise. This definition of the migration of
unemployed workers is subject to measurement error. Some migrations may be misreported
and considered as ends of unemployment spells for unknown reason. This may occur when
a job seeker does not address her monthly form to the local employment agency. This issue
seems to have weak consequences: the average number of migrations per unemployed work-
ers is consistent with previous empirical works (Appendix 3.A and Gobillon, 2001, Bacca¨ıni,
2005). Furthermore, the administrative areas defined as de´partement are not homogenous. For
example, the Paris region is divided into small geographic areas and represents around 17% of
the migrations. Therefore, I use an alternative definition of migrations, between larger French
regions, known as re´gions, to check the robustness of my results. Each of the 22 French re´gions
corresponds to a group of de´partements8. With this more restrictive definition of migration, I
observe only 6, 644 residential moves that affect 1.7% of the unemployment spells. Second, some
residential moves during and unemployment spells may be due to the acceptance of a job offer
in another region. This phenomenon seems residual in the data and I drop every unemployment
spells ending less than 15 days after a migration to limit its possible extent.
The outcome variable of interest is the exit out of unemployment. If the exits of the unem-
ployment registry are perfectly observed, the reasons of the ends of the unemployment spells
are only partially known. The end of an unemployment spell can occur for other reasons than
employment, such as starting a training program, leaving the labor force, suffering from long
time illness, or unknown reasons. When the exits of unemployment do not correspond to an
6This estimate is based on the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition.
7The 2005 dataset is the only ANPE dataset which records the places of residence of unemployed workers over
time. This sample was drawn to assess the sensitivity of public unemployment statistics to regional migrations.
Earlier and later datasets record only the place where the unemployment spell starts or ends.
8The dataset does not distinguish the two de´partements of Corsica. Thus, in the empirical analysis, Corsica
is both a de´partement and a re´gion.
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employment spell, I dropped the corresponding unemployment spells from the sample. However,
the exits motivated by unknown reasons represents nearly one third the sample9). Most of the
exits for unknown reasons correspond to unemployed workers who do not send their monthly
form to the ANPE so that the reason of the end of their unemployment spells is unobserved.
Using additional survey data, Chazal et al. (2003) estimate that about half of these exits are
towards employment. Although there are no significant differences in the composition of the
outflows between migrants and non-migrants, I use two alternative definitions of the exit of
unemployment to confirm the robustness of my empirical results. First, I adopt a strategy
comparable to right censoring to keep in the sample a large number of migrations. I treat
unknown exits as postponed outflows. I take them into account not as instantaneous outflows
but as outflows two months later (Duguet et al., 2009). Second, I consider the unknown exits as
missing as random and I drop all the uncertain observations (Cre´pon et al., 2007 and Appendix
3.B for details). The results in the main text correspond to the first definition and the results
relative to the second definition are reported in Appendix 3.D.
3.2 Descriptive analysis
Figure 3.1 displays the average migration rates of unemployed workers between de´partements,
re´gions, and the share of the migrations between re´gions. It shows a clear increase in regional
migrations. The yearly migration rate is about 2.8% in 1995 and is about 5% in 2004. More-
over, the share of long-distance migrations between re´gions is steadily increasing from 73.5% of
the migrations between de´partements in 1995 to 77.0% in 2004. These results are very similar
to the results obtained for the residential mobility of the whole population (Bacca¨ıni, 2005).
They confirm a general increase in residential mobility in France. The destinations of the mi-
grations of the unemployed workers tend also to be comparable to the destinations of the whole
population. Hence, de´partements from the South East of France or the Atlantic coast have
the largest positive unemployed migration rates (Appendix 3.A). Furthermore, contrary to the
pattern of migrations in the United Kingdom observed by Gregg et al. (2004), there is no clear
association between variation in the French mobility rates and the aggregate business cycle over
the 1995-2004 period.
Table 3.1 reports some simple correlations between regional migration rates, regional costs
of living and labor market conditions, which were predicted to affect the migrations and job
finding rates of the unemployed workers in the stylized model of Section 2. Migration outflows
and inflows appear strongly positively correlated (0.73). Areas where there are high outflow
rates to other de´partements tend also to have high inflow rates of unemployed workers, and net
migration rates are small10. Second, Column 3, migration rates appear negatively correlated
with local rent levels in public housing and local costs of living (-0.28). This correlation is
mainly driven by outflows of unemployed workers out of regions with high rent levels (0.52),
9The decomposition of the outflows out of unemployment is given in Appendix 3.B.
10Appendix 3.A reports additional descriptive statistics by de´partement.
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while inflows are relatively smaller in regions with high renting costs (0.31). Finally, the cor-
relation between the unemployment rate and the migration rate in 2002 is positive and stands
at 0.16. Unemployed workers do not appear to move particularly to low unemployment areas.
Nevertheless, the correlation between the migration rate and the increase of the unemployment
rate which is also quite low has the expected negative sign (-0.09). The inflows of migrants are
high in regions where the unemployment rates are decreasing (-0.36). Hence, at the aggregate
level, there is no clear evidence that migrations have a positive impact on unemployment dura-
tion, or that unemployed workers in depressed regions are motivated to move to look for work
in other regions where the employment possibilities are better.
I now investigate the migration at the individual level. In order to provide a descriptive
analysis of the timing of the migration and the unemployment exits, I consider a particular
cohort of unemployed workers who registered to the unemployment agency between January
2001 and June 2002. I restrict the sample to individuals between 18 and 55 years old who are
immediately available to work11. I follow this cohort of 377, 317 individuals from the moment
they register to the ANPE until the end of December 2004. As Cre´pon et al. (2007), if the
workers have repeated unemployment spells, I retain only the first spell to avoid correlation of
unobservable variables over consecutive spells. Figure 3.2 reports the monthly empirical hazard
rates of transition into a new place of residence from the start of an unemployment spell up to
18 month unemployment. These transition rates are between 0.2 and 0.4% per month and pick
between the 2nd and 10th months of unemployment. By contrast, 2.4% of the unemployment
spells are associated with a migration, and these migrations are realized at specific durations
of unemployment. Unemployed workers appear unlikely to migrate during the first two months
of an unemployment spell and after one year unemployment. Figure 3.3 displays the quarterly
empirical hazard rates from unemployment to employment for migrants and non migrants and
the hazard rates from unemployment to employment of the migrants after their migration deci-
sion. The Kaplan-Meier estimates illustrate the importance to take the timing of the migration
into account. The migrants present the lowest rates of outflow out of unemployment, but after
the change of region, the level of their hazard rates is similar to those of non migrants while
they stayed longer in unemployment.
Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics of the characteristics of migrants and non-migrants
over the duration of an unemployment spell. I focus on three previously elapsed unemployment
durations: 2 months, 6 months and 10 months. I obtain three sub-samples of 258, 179 unem-
ployed workers after 2 months of unemployment, 214, 577 after 6 months, and 151, 118 after
10 months. After each of the three unemployment periods, I consider two groups: the unem-
ployed workers who migrated during the previous two months and the unemployed who did
not. The migrants always represent less than 1% of the unemployed workers. Moreover, there
are significant differences in the observable characteristics of the migrants and non-migrants.
Migrants appear in average younger than non-migrants. Unemployed workers without children
or in single households are more likely to move than those living in couple or having children.
11This is coherent with the ILO definition of unemployment. Furthermore, I exclude the unemployed moving
to and living in the French overseas territories (DOM-TOM) from the sample.
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The nationality of the unemployed workers seems also to matter. While non French unemployed
appear more likely to migrate at the beginning of an unemployment spell, this is not the case
once the duration of unemployment is greater than 6 months. Expected labor market outcomes
are also tightly related to the migration decision. More qualified unemployed workers, looking
for full time permanent contracts, and without recurrent unemployment history appear the
most likely to migrate. Therefore, the identification of the effect of migration on unemployment
duration faces two issues. First, migrants are not a random sample of the unemployed workers.
Second, the timing of the migration matters. Unemployed workers take the decision to migrate
at any point in time during their unemployment spell and the previously elapsed unemploy-
ment duration is likely to affect both their outcomes on the labor market and their decision to
migrate.
4 Empirical strategies
It is impossible to observe the outflow rates of the same individual under two mutually
exclusive states and to estimate equation 3.6 from the sample of unemployed workers without
additional assumptions. Previous studies about the wage gains of migration have used three
main alternative methods: instrumental variables (Raphael and Riker, 1999), matching estima-
tors (Ham et al., 2004) and panel data (Gobillon and Le Blanc, 2003). Private costs, such as
the number of children, have been used as instruments for the migration of employed workers.
The number of children is arguably correlated with the likelihood to migrate and uncorrelated
with future wages. However, this is not the case for unemployed workers whose private costs
both determine the propensity to move and the incentives to work. For example, in France,
the number of children was a key determinant of the replacement rate of the past minimum
program (RMI ). The presence of children also influences women labor market participation and
their likelihood to accept a job offer (Hyslop, 1999). Moreover, the low proportion of migrants is
likely to lead to weak instruments’ problems in instrumental variables’ models. In the absence
of a feasible instrumental variables strategy, comparing unemployed who are very similar and
likely to migrate for similar reasons, should approximate the estimates of the effect of migration
on unemployment duration. My first estimator relies on a conditional on observables indepen-
dence assumption. Under this assumption, the observable characteristics of the non migrants
can be used to recover a valid counterfactual outcome for the migrants. Second, I use repeated
unemployment spells and individual fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved het-
erogeneity that may be correlated with the migration decision. Finally, I extend the conditional
on unobservable assumption and I control for the change in labor market conditions associated
to migration process in duration models to isolate the migration effect from the change in labor
market conditions.
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4.1 Conditional on observable assumption and matching estimators
I focus on the same sample of unemployment spells described in Section 3.2. I estimate
the difference of outflow out of unemployment due to the decision to migrate after 2, 6 and 10
month unemployment. The research design is closely related to the studies of Sianesi (2004) or
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003). After t month unemployment, I compare the labor market
outcomes of migrants and non-migrants who are still unemployed. I define a migration variable,
Dt, if the unemployed worker migrated between month t− 2 and t. I then relate this migration
variable to later unemployment exits from t+ 3 months, until t+ 18 months. Yt+n denotes this
series of dummy variables, n being equal to 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, or 18 months. Yt+n takes value
one if the unemployed left unemployment before time t+ n, 0 otherwise. In potential outcome
notations, Y 1t+n and Y
0
t+n are the employment status of the same invidual if he migrated between
t − 2 and t (Dt = 1) or if he stayed in the same region (Dt = 0). Then the average treatment
effect of the migration is given by:
ATTt,n = E(Y
1
t+n − Y 0t+n|Dt = 1) . (3.7)
I focus on the migration effect on the migrants rather than on the average treatment effect
(ATE) because I am primarily interested in the returns of migrations for the migrants. More-
over, computing the ATE would require to make inference about the unconditional effect of the
migrations and this raises two main issues. First, many unemployed workers may already be in
a location with high employment opportunities, so the average effect of the migrations may be
null or negative. Second, the gains immobile workers would have experienced if they had moved.
This requires finding a valid counterfactual for a large number of non migrants in a small sam-
ple of migrants (Ham et al., 2004). Therefore, the computation appeared uninformative when
I used the matching estimators. Matching estimators are often implemented to assess policy
evaluation issues (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009, Smith and Todd, 2005). The identification of
the treatment effect is based on the conditional independence assumption (CIA):
E(Y 0t+n|Xt, Dt = 1) = E(Y 0t+n|Xt, Dt = 0) , (3.8)
where Xt is a vector of observable characteristics of the unemployed worker at time t. This as-
sumption leads to a semi parametric estimator which involves pairing migrants and non migrants
who are similar in terms of observed characteristics that could influence both unemployment
duration and the selection process. This leads to a computable formula for the ATT:
ATTt,n = E(Y
1
t+n|Dt = 1)− E{E(Y 0t+n|Xt, Dt = 0)} . (3.9)
An important practical issue is the dimension of the vector of the control variables, Xt.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that the CIA with respect to observables could be
rephrased as a conditional independence assumption with respect to the propensity score. The
propensity score is the probability to migrate conditional on a vector of relevant observable
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variables, s(Xt) = P (Dt = 1|Xt). This reduces the dimensionality of the matching problem:
ATTt,n = E(Y
1
t+n|Dt = 1)− E{E(Y 0t+n|s(Xt))} . (3.10)
To estimate the average treatment effect on the treated, I construct an empirical analogue of
equation 3.10. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed Inverse Propensity score Weighted (IPW)
estimators, while Heckman et al. (1997, 1998) suggested Kernel estimators. The IPW estimator
is consistent and asymptotic normality if the propensity score is estimated non parametrically
(Hirano et al., 2003). The IPW estimator of equation 3.10 is:
ÂTTt,n =
1∑
kDkt
∑
i
[Yi,t+n.{Dit − (1−Dit). sˆ(Xit)
1− sˆ(Xit)}] , (3.11)
where i and k are indices for unemployed workers, t for unemployment duration at the time
of migration, and n for the time spent in the new region of residence. sˆ(Xit) is a consistent
estimator of the propensity score of migration (Wooldridge, 2010). This estimator associates to
each non-migrant unemployed worker a weight determined to correct the selection bias. Non-
migrants with low propensity to migrate have less weight than the other non-migrants in the
counterfactual group.
Kernel estimators also intend to construct a counterfactual to deal with the selection problem
but these estimators are based on individual counterfactuals. For each moving unemployed
worker, i, the estimator attributes particular weights, wij , to the non-migrants, j. The weights
are function of the difference between the propensity score of the migrant unemployed worker
and the propensity score of the non-migrants:
ÂTTt,n =
1∑
kDkt
∑
i
[Yi,t+n.Dit −
∑
j
{Yj,t+nwij(1−Djt)}] ,
with wij =
K([sˆ(Xit)− sˆ(Xjt)]/hj)∑
l(1−Dlt).K([sˆ(Xit)− sˆ(Xlt)]/hj)
,
and K(u) = (1− u2).1|u|≤1 . (3.12)
I use an Epanechnikov Kernel, K, with a constant Silverman window, hj , to determine
the weight of each non-migrants12. Kernel estimators are asymptotically normal and consistent
(Heckman et al., 1998). IPW and Kernel estimators differs as the former defines a counterfactual
at the group level, while the latter defines a counterfactual for each migrant. Moreover, since
the propensity score is estimated, there is no closed form for the Kernel estimators’ variance,
while an asymptotic approximations exist for IPW estimators (Cre´pon and Iung, 1999, Hirano
et al., 2003)13. Eichler and Lechner (2002) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest that,
12The bandwidth is fixed according to Silverman rule-of-thumb (Silverman, 1986). There is a trade-off between
the precision of the estimation which depends positively on the number of individuals included in the control
group and the bias. The bandwidth is computed using: hj = 1.364.15
1/5.σˆ[sˆ(Xjt)].N
−1/5
0t . N0t is the number of
non migrants at duration t.
13Appendix 3.C describes the asymptotic approximation used in the empirical section.
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in large samples, the uncertainty in the estimated propensity scores is negligible and that the
variance of the Kernel estimator can be computed considering the weights of the counterfactual
as fixed. I use this method to compute the standard-errors of the Kernel estimates14.
I also consider Linear Probability Models (LPM), and logit and probit models. In these
specifications, I include migration as a dummy variable, Dit, and the same individual control
variables, Xit, as in the previous IPW and Kernel estimators. For example, the probability to
exit unemployment before time t+ n is approximated by a Linear Probability Model:
Yit+n = γDit +Xitβ + εit , (3.13)
where Dit takes value 1 if the unemployed changed region between t − 2 and t. γ requires
stronger identifying assumptions than the matching estimator to estimate consistently the ATT
of migration. In particular, the LPM would lead to inconsistent estimators in the presence of
heterogeneous returns to migrations. As shown by Blundell et al. (2005), matching estimators
would be consistent if there is observable or unobservable heterogeneity in migration returns.
For example, migration returns may depend not only on observable educational attainment, but
also, on unobservable variables, such as family ties or unobserved ability. Matching estimators
would be consistent in both cases, while the LPM would fail to estimate consistently the ATT
even if idiosyncratic migration gains are uncorrelated with the unobservable variables that
determine the non-migrants’ outcome. However, if unobservable variables determine the non-
migrants’ outcomes, both LPM and matching estimators would be inconsistent. In order to
assess the magnitude of the selection process of the migrants with respect to observable variables,
I also compute the mean difference in the labor market outcomes of the migrant and non-
migrant workers. This estimator would be justified if the migrations were randomly assigned to
unemployed workers, and give the order of magnitude of the selection of the migrants conditional
on the observables.
4.2 Individual unobserved characteristics and regional unemployment differ-
entials
There are two main issues with respect to the estimates based on the conditional inde-
pendence assumption 3.8. First, the migration decision may be correlated to unobservable
characteristics of the unemployed workers. Second, the estimates based on equations 3.11 and
3.12 do not distinguish the returns to migration from the change in labor market conditions.
For example, workers’ mobility decisions may be strongly affected by local unemployment and
wages. In this case, unemployed workers’ mobility decisions may be a relative indicator of local
labor market conditions.
In order to assess the plausibility of the assumption 3.8, I construct a different sample of
unemployment spells. This sample contains only repeated unemployment spells and allow com-
paring the labor market outcomes of the same unemployed worker for an unemployment spell
14A simple comparison of the asymptotic variance of the IPW estimator and the one of the same estimator
considering the propensity score as fixed suggests that this approximation is valid given the large sample size.
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with a migration, and an unemployment spell that was spent in a unique region, de´partement
or re´gion. More precisely, the assumption underlying this approach is that the decision to move
depends only on observable variables and an individual fixed effect. For migration at t months of
unemployment, the specification compares an unemployment spell with a migration to another
unemployment spell without migration15:
Yist+n = γDist +Xisβ + αi + δs + εist . (3.14)
where s is an index for the unemployment spells of the unemployed worker i. αi is an unobserv-
able individual fixed effect, and δs a common shock to all unemployed workers with s repeated
spells. As before, Dist is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the unemployed changed region
between month t and t− 2 of unemployment spell s. The key point is that the individual unob-
served transitory shocks, εist, are mean independent of the mobility decision, conditional on the
observable variables and the individual fixed effect. Thus, the included time varying observable
variables, Xis, are important to control for observable shocks
16. While gender or diploma are
absorbed through the fixed effects, αi, I control for changes of age, marital status, reasons of en-
try into unemployment, number of children, the desired type of contract, and regional dummies
for each e´gion that may differ over unemployment spells. These observable variables proxy for
many individual transitory shocks that may affect the mobility decision (Garner et al., 2001,
Dixon, 2003). I estimate specification 3.14 using a fixed effect linear probability model.
Furthermore, the estimates of the effect of migration in specification 3.11 to 3.14 may be due
to the change in labor market conditions rather than the migration itself. Specification 3.14 con-
trols for the spell-invariant characteristics of the unemployed workers but not for the differential
of market conditions that occurs with the migration. I estimate semi-parametric Cox duration
models. I account for the unemployment rate of the region of origin, uio, and the time-varying
difference in unemployment rate between the region of origin and the region of destination,
∆uit. ∆uit is set to 0 for the non-migrants. The hazard rate of transition of unemployment to
employment, h, is given by:
h(t,Xid) = h0(t).exp(γDit +Xitβ + uioθ1 + ∆uitθ2) , (3.15)
h(t,Xit) = h0(td).exp(γDid + δTMit +Xitβ + uioθ1 + ∆uitθ2) , (3.16)
h(t,Xit) = h0(t).exp(γDit + δTMit + φTSMit +Xitβ + uioθ1 + ∆uitθ2) , (3.17)
where h0(t) is a fully flexible baseline hazard rate across the duration of unemployment t. Xit
is a vector of observable characteristics of worker i. Dit is a dummy variable taking value 1 if
the unemployed worker changed region before duration t, and 0 otherwise. The main additional
parameter of specifications 3.15 to 3.17 is θ2 that measures if the local unemployment rate has
a different effect on the migrants after their regional move. The baseline specification 3.15 as-
15The migration variable is defined for 2, 6, and 10 month unemployment. In each case, the sample is restricted
to unemployed spells lasting more than 2, 6, and 10 months, respectively.
16I measure Xis at the beginning of each unemployment spell.
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sumes that the returns to migration are not duration dependent. By contrast, specification 3.16
assumes that long-term unemployed workers may have different gains of migration from new
unemployed workers. TMid is the duration of the unemployment spell prior to the migration in
log months. TMid is set to 0 for non-migrants. Finally, specification 3.17 allow the return to
migration to differ with the time spent in the new region of residence, TSM . TSM is measured
in log months and set to 0 for non migrants.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Likelihood of migration
The precedent section emphasizes the central role of the propensity score. The identifying
assumption 3.10 states that the future employment trajectories are independent to migrations
conditional on this score. The control variables that are included in the selection equations
play a key role. I first control for the previously elapsed unemployment duration. On the one
hand, it could lead people to move less if they lose gradually employment likelihood (human
capital depreciation, motivation, stigma effects). On the other hand, it can also be viewed as
an incentive to move if an individual lose gradually his employability in a local labor market.
Moreover the design of the French unemployment benefits implies growing incentives to find
a job. The choice of the other control variables is based on the empirical literature on the
individual determinants of migrations (Gobillon, 2001, Boheim and Taylor, 1999, Kan, 1999).
I introduce four categories of variables that may influence both moving decision and future
employment status: demographic characteristics, education and qualification, labor market his-
tory, and cohort effects.
Table 3.3 reports the estimates of logistic model of migration (Wooldridge, 2010). The
three estimated models predicts well the migrations. In each case, the percentage of concordant
prediction is around 59%17. The estimates for the effect of demographic characteristics on the
likelihood of migration have the expected signs. The likelihood of regional migrations decreases
with age and the number of children. This is consistent with the life-cycle and human capital
theories, because older job seekers have less time to benefit from their investment in migration.
The effect of having a foreign citizenship is also positive but seems to decrease with the elapsed
unemployment duartion. Men in couple appear more likely to move than single men and women
for an elapsed duration of 2 months. After 6 month unemployment, single men appear the less
mobile individuals, while for an elapsed duration of 10 months estimates are not significant at
the 10% level. Education and qualification also play a role. Education and occupation represent
prior investments that influence both the likelihood of moving and the economic returns from
mobility. Furthermore, the quality and the quantity of the information as well as the potential
returns to migration are increased with higher education and qualification (Greenwood, 1975).
17This is obtained by using the usual threshold of 0.5. This may underestimate the predictive power of the
model, as the number of migrants is much lower than the number of non migrants (Cramer, 1999).
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Indeed, educated and qualified job seekers appear significantly more mobile.
Finally, the individual labor market history since 1995 is a powerful predictor of migration.
After 2 and 6 months unemployment, fired people and new labor market entrants are more mo-
bile than people who are unemployed because they ended a temporary contract. Moreover, the
unemployed workers, who have known a lot of unemployment spells or long-term unemployment
since 1995, are also more mobile. Intensive job seekers who are looking for permanent and full
time employment are also more mobile than the unemployed workers who register at the ANPE
to look for a part time or/and a non permanent contract. Similarly, job seekers already in part
time jobs are less likely to migrate than those who are not. This is consistent with the fact that
they have fewer incentives to find a job and that their job search is likely to be less intensive.
Finally, welfare recipients and handicapped workers are less mobile, perhaps because they are
less likely to find a ”good” job or more constrained in their housing choices.
5.2 Migration effect and matching estimators
I now turn to the estimate of the effect of migration on unemployment duration using the
propensity scores estimated in Section 5.1. The distributions overlap well and their common
support is large given the small number of migrants18. I limit the comparison of migrants and
non-migrants to individuals having similar propensity to migrate. I trim the 1% highest and
lowest values of the propensity score.
Table 3.4 reports the estimates of the effect of migration on the job finding rate of the
migrants. Column 1 displays the difference in means, while Columns 2 to 6 report the estimates
of the IPW and Kernel estimators, the LPM, and the average marginal effects of the logit and
probit models. Columns 2 to 6, the control variables are those used in Table 3.3. The esti-
mates can be interpreted as the component inherent to migration in the probability of leaving
unemployment at different time horizons until 18 months beyond the decision to migrate. For
instance, the IPW estimate for the decision to migrate after 2 months unemployment and 18
months in the new place of residence is 7.8 percentage points (Column 2). This means that, in
average (over the different types of a migration and individual returns), the unemployed who
decided to migrate during the first two months of their unemployment spell had 7.8 percentage
points higher likelihood to find a job 18 months later, than if they had stayed in their initial re-
gion of residence. Overall the results of the Kernel and IPW and traditional estimators are very
similar. In particular, the LPM estimates give us a good approximation of the ATT obtained
with the logit and probit models which are themselves comparable to the matching estimates.
For the five estimators, the estimates show a positive effect of moving for all previously
elapsed unemployment durations19. The estimates are large and in general significant at the
1% level, except for the decision to migrate at 6 months. Table 3.4 also displays some hetero-
18The distributions of the estimated propensity scores are reported in Appendix 3.D.
19The results of the alternative definition of the unemployment exits are even higher and reported in Appendix
3.E. This suggests that the estimates of the mobility-effects provided in Table 3.4 may be a lower bound of the
migration-effects if the conditional independence assumption is satisfied.
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geneous effects with respect to the timing of the migrations. Unemployed workers who move
during the first two months of their unemployment spell, have lower returns to migration than
those moving during their 5th and 6th months or 9th and 10th months of unemployment. Fur-
thermore, the effects of the decision to migrate after the three previously elapsed unemployment
durations evolve differently with the time spent in the new region of residence. After 2 month
unemployment, the decision to move yields immediate and constant over time returns, while
the returns to migration after 6 and 10 months unemployment are not immediately significant
but now present a growing concave shape with the time spent in the new place of residence
and the highest rates of returns after 18 months. One interpretation could be that local op-
portunities become scarcer for people who are staying without finding a job, arguably because
of a mismatch between their skills and the local labor demand while movers not only extend
their search horizons but also seem to be able to find more favorable labor markets. The time
pattern of the effect is also difficult to reconcile with unemployed finding a job before moving
and suggests that the observed effects of migration capture the effect of geographic mobility on
the job search process of the unemployed.
These general results remain valid for the long-distance migrations between French re´gions.
Table 3.5 reports the estimated returns of migrations on the job finfing rates of unemployed
workers. The average distance of migration increases by a factor 2 between the two defini-
tions of migrations20. The estimated effects are systematically higher than the estimates for
the migrations between de´partments reported in Table 3.4. This is consistent with the stylized
model of Section 2. For example, migrations after 10 month unemployment between re´gions
are found to increase the job finding rate of unemployed workers by 12.9 percentage points after
18 months spent in the new region of residence, Column 2. By contrast, a similar migration
between de´partements would increase the likelihood of finding a job by 11.0 percentage points.
Finally, Tables 3.4 and Tables 3.5 reports magnitude of the estimated effects using Kernel
or IPW estimators that are significantly lower than the magnitude of the difference between
the average outcomes of the migrants and non-migrants, Column 1. This suggests that mi-
gration and labor market outcomes are partly driven by those observable variables. Moreover,
the similarity between matching and the usual estimators indicates that both observable and
unobservable comparative advantages are negligible for the selection process. In other words,
migrants do not seem to be selected with respect to unobservable relative gains to migra-
tion, though unobservable relative outcomes in the original regions of residence may explain
the migrations. In the potential outcome notation of Section 3, the potential outcome in the
original region, Y 0t+n, may drive the decision of migration. In this case, linear models provide
an accurate approximation of the true effect of migration on the job finding rate of the migrants.
20The average distances are 43 and 89 kilometers, respectively.
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5.3 Repeated unemployment spells
Up to this point, I measured the effect of mobility using a single unemployment spell for
each individual and considering both the time elapsed since the entry into unemployment and
the time elapsed since the decision to migrate. The evidence indicates a clear positive effect of
mobility on unemployment duration. I now use specification 3.14 and repeated unemployment
spells to control for possible biases caused by worker specific unobserved heterogeneity. I select
all the unemployment spells starting from January 2001 to August 2002. I observe 570, 800
unemployment spells. There is an important selection of unemployed workers when I use speci-
fication 3.14. Around 22% of those observations are repeated unemployment spells. Among the
repeated spells, I observe 4, 208 migrations (3.4%). This unbalanced panel dataset oversamples
repeated short spells. Hence, a concern is that time varying individual unobservable shocks
that characterize the likelihood to exit unemployment and determine the number of repeated
spells may be correlated with the decision to change region. Nevertheless, it seems feasible that
these time varying individual unobservable shocks are uncorrelated with the decision to migrate
conditional on observable variables. In this case, fixed effects allow estimating consistently the
impact of the migration decision. In addition to individual fixed effects, I control for spell fixed
effects and the individual characteristics as they appear at the beginning of the unemployment
spell. These variables are: age, marital status, number of children, type of desired contract,
reason of entry into unemployment, the type of unemployment benefits and regional dummies21.
These variables controls for many transitory shocks that may affect the job search behavior of
the unemployed workers.
Table 3.6 reports the estimated effects of migration according to specification 3.14. In ad-
dition to the estimates of the fixed-effect specifications in Columns 1 and 3, Table 3.6 displays
the results of pooled OLS in Columns 2 and 4. The exits out of unemployment and the ex-
planatory variable of interest (the decision to migrate) are constructed as in Section 5.3. The
coefficients in columns 1 and 3 suggest a positive impact of migration on the probability to exit
unemployment. Each estimate is either positive and significant or insignificant. The estimates
in convention 1 appear this time sensibly higher than in convention 2, for which given the low
number of migrations the estimates are more erratic. Nevertheless the main features of the es-
timates seem to confirm the previous results. There are substantial mobility effects particularly
for the unemployed who decide to migrate after a long period of unemployment.
5.4 Controlling for local labor market characteristics
While the previous results provide some evidence of a positive mobility effect on unemploy-
ment duration, they do distinguish the mobility effect and the effect of the new labor market.
Mobile workers are likely to leave depressed local labor market areas to find better search
prospects in a new labor market. In this case, the positive effects found above may mainly
reflect unemployment and wage differentials rather than the returns to migration.
21Appendix 3.F provides descriptive statistics for the different samples of repeated unemployment spells.
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To control for the change of local labor market conditions, I use the specifications 3.15 to
3.17 controlling for the time varying de´partement unemployment rate22. Table 3.7 reports the
estimates of the Cox duration models. In these specifications, the exponential of the estimate
of the migration effect can be interpreted as the multiplicative effect of the decision to migrate
on the rate of exit out of unemployment. Panel A Column 1, I only include the dummy variable
migration. The estimated migration effect on the hazard rate out of unemployment is positive
but appears not statistically significant at the 10% level. Column 2, the introduction of the
local unemployment rates in specification 3.15 does not change significantly this result. As
expected, the specifications indicate the important role of unemployment differentials for the
job search process. The initial local unemployment rate appears with the expected negative
sign and significant at the 1% level, while the effect of the new local unemployment rates after
the migration has a similar sign and magnitude (-0.030 and -0.028). If the unemployed worker
moves to a region where the unemployment rate is higher (respectively lower) than in her initial
region, her probability to leave unemployment decreases (respectively increases). Columns 3
and 4 of panel A estimate specification 3.16 controlling for the timing of migration, TMid. As in
Section 5.2, the estimated effects of migration on unemployment duration appear to depend on
the timing of the migrations. The estimates for the dummy variable migration, that indicates
the effect of a migration at the beginning of an unemployment spell, are now clearly positive.
By contrast, the positive effect of migration appears decreasing with the duration of unemploy-
ment. The impact of the migration on the hazard rate is positive if the migration takes place
before 6 month unemployment.
In all the specifications of Table 3.5, Panel B, when included, the local unemployment rates
are again highly significant, but have small negative effects on the hazard rate. The inclusion of
local unemployment rates does not affect the estimates obtained for the migration effects. The
estimated effects of workers’mobility appear primarily driven by the migrations rather than the
changes in regional labor market conditions. Columns 1 and 2 of panel B estimate specification
3.17 controlling for the timing of migration, TMid, and the time spent in the new region of
residence, TSMid. Finally, Columns 3 and 4 allow for interactive effects between the timing of
migration and the time spent in the new region of residence. This last specification confirms the
concave shape of the effect of migration on the probability to exit unemployment with respect
to the time in the new region of residence observed in section 5.2. The migration effect on the
hazard rate remains significant until 10 months after the migration. This is a rather intuitive
result if the unemployed move to search for work in a new location. Though the residential
moves may have disruptive effects, their positive effects on unemployment exits may only last
a few months. The estimates suggest that, if after a few months in the new region of residence
- here around 10 months -, the unemployed do not find a job, they have exhausted most of the
new local opportunities. Then, the residential moves have been unsuccessful and do not have
any more impact on the hazard rates out of unemployment.
22Hachid and Vallon (2006) describe this dataset.
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6 Conclusion
I have documented the effect of regional migrations on unemployment duration. Migrations
play an important and increasing role in the search process among unemployed workers. The
gross migration rates of French unemployed workers increased from 2.9 percents to 5.1 percents
over the 1995-2004 period. Job search theory predicts that migrations may provide high returns
for unemployed in terms of exit out of unemployment. I rely on several identifying assumptions
to approximate the effect of migration on future labor market outcomes. The empirical evidence
suggests a significant positive effect of migration on the exits out of unemployment.
Controlling for numerous observable characteristics using matching estimators reduces the
estimated returns to migration, but the estimated returns remain high. I do not find significant
differences between the matching estimates and the LPM estimates. Therefore, the main selec-
tion process of migrant unemployed workers may be with respect to their potential labor market
outcomes in their region of residence rather than on the expected gains of migration to another
region. Accounting for unemployed unobservable heterogeneity using repeated unemployment
spells and individual fixed effects, my estimates are more erratic but still positive. Finally, I
use duration models to disentangle the change in the local labor market conditions from the
migration process. The inclusion of time varying local unemployment rates does not appear to
reduce the estimated returns to migration.
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Figure 3.1. Residential mobility of Unemployed Workers, 1995-2004 
 
 
 
Note: The right and left axes are in percentage. The yearly migration rates are the total of migrations during the 
year t divided by the number of unemployed workers registered at the beginning of the year t. The sample is 
restricted to unemployed workers who are immediately available to work, between 18 and 55 years. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Monthly empirical hazard rate of migration by months of unemployment 
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Note: First entering spells per individual between January 2001 and June 2002. Unemployment spells without 
migration are considered as right censored. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE. 
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Figure 3.3. Monthly empirical hazard rates out of unemployment by months of 
unemployment 
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Note: First entering spells per individual between January 2001 and June 2002. Unemployment spells without 
migration decision are considered as right censored. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1. Correlations between migration rates and regional variables in 2002 
 
Entry 
rate (a) 
Exit 
rate (b) 
Net migration 
rate (c) 
Public rent 
level (d) 
Unemployment 
rate (e) 
Entry rate 1     
Exit rate  0.73 1    
Net migration rate 0.40 -0.33 1   
Public rent level 0.31 0.52 -0.28 1  
Unemployment rate 2002 0.04 -0.07 0.16 0.23 1 
∆ unemployment rate (2002-2001)  -0.36 -0.30 -0.09 -0.26 0.02 
 
Note: (a) All the local variables are at the “département” level. The entry rates are the inflows in “département” i 
during the year 2002 divided by the number of unemployed workers registered at the beginning of the year. (b) 
The exit rates are the outflows out of “département” i during the year 2002 divided by the number of 
unemployed workers registered at the beginning of the year. (c) The net migration rates are the net migrations in 
“département” i during the year 2002 divided by the number of unemployed workers registered at the beginning 
of the year. (d) The public rent level corresponds to the local average rent per square meter in 2005 (EPLS 
survey, French Ministry of Housing). (e) INSEE statistics in 2002, see Hachid and Vallon (2006). 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE. French Census 1999, INSEE. 
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Table 3.2. Unemployment duration and migration 
 
 
Unemployment duration 2 months 6 months 10 months 
Migration : Non movers Movers Non movers Movers Non movers Movers 
Houaehold characteristics      (a) 
      
Male and single 29.66 33.06 27.97 28.40 26.57 29.77 
Female and single 27.64 31.55 26.77 31.21 26.20 30.65 
Male and in couple 16.68 12.02 17.44 14.25 18.16 15.06 
Female and in couple 26.02 23.37 27.82 26.14 29.07 24.52 
Number of Children 
      
No Child 59.38 69.48 56.59 66.35 54.74 62.88 
One Child 16.59 14.12 17.69 18.44 18.34 19.96 
Two children or more 24.03 16.40 25.72 15.21 26.92 17.16 
Age 
      
Less than 25 years old 25.22 32.03 21.27 28.06 18.37 24.87 
25 to 35 years old 34.45 40.84 34.28 41.96 33.62 42.73 
35 to 45 years old 24.04 17.52 25.72 19.14 27.00 21.02 
45 to 55 years old 16.29 9.61 18.73 10.84 21.01 11.38 
Nationality 
      
French 91.04 83.47 90.91 91.08 90.92 93.35 
Not French 8.96 16.53 9.09 8.92 9.08 6.65 
Education 
      
Left school before high school 35.60 28.55 37.18 25.09 37.93 21.19 
End of high School diploma 16.17 17.74 15.60 17.57 15.26 19.79 
Secondary education 18.93 24.58 18.04 27.10 17.68 24.69 
Others 29.30 29.13 29.18 30.24 29.13 34.33 
Qualification 
      
Unskilled workers 19.53 20.28 20.02 16.96 10.68 13.83 
Skilled workers 19.87 13.81 20.19 11.36 20.32 11.56 
Employees 43.35 41.87 44.27 47.38 54.80 51.84 
Executives and managers 10.44 11.53 11.00 16.00 11.65 14.36 
Unknown 6.81 12.51 4.52 8.30 2.55 8.41 
Desired Contract (duration and type) 
     
Full time and permanent 77.90 83.96 75.72 81.56 73.49 81.44 
Others 22.10 16.04 24.28 18.44 26.51 18.56 
Labor market characteristics 
      
No part time job 47.00 48.44 41.25 45.98 38.31 39.40 
Part time job 53.00 51.56 58.75 54.02 61.69 60.60 
Minimum Income Program 10.68 8.53 11.11 8.22 11.24 7.53 
Disabled 6.28 2.86 7.09 3.23 7.71 3.15 
Reason of entry into unemployment 
     
End of contract 7.61 5.05 8.72 7.26 9.66 9.63 
Dismissal 22.39 24.04 24.15 26.57 25.66 30.30 
Demission 37.65 34.05 36.17 36.10 34.54 30.65 
First entry on the labour market 5.60 10.50 4.32 6.82 3.58 4.38 
Others 26.75 26.36 26.64 23.25 26.56 25.04 
Unemployment history since 1995 
      
Less than 2 unemployment spells 38.12 31.10 38.08 35.31 38.48 32.57 
More than 2 unemployment spells 61.88 68.90 61.92 64.69 61.52 67.43 
No previous unemployment duration 36.28 30.56 35.12 32.00 35.09 31.87 
1 to 6 months unemployment  18.03 20.51 18.04 19.14 18.20 23.12 
More than 6 months 45.69 48.93 46.84 48.86 46.71 45.01 
Total 256 381 1 798 213 443 1 144 150 147 571 
Percentage 99.30 0.70 99.47 0.53 99.62 0.38 
 
 
Note: (a) The numbers refer to the column percentages. The sample includes the first unemployment spell of 
each worker between January 2001 and June 2002. For each unemployment duration, t, the movers are the 
unemployed workers who changed region during month t-2 and t. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE.  
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Table 3.3. Logistic estimation of the propensity score by previously elapsed duration 
 
Previously elapsed  2 months (a) 6 months 10 months 
unemployment duration  
  Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Intercept -5.394*** -5.351*** -5.409*** 
 (0.138) (0.183) (0.248) 
Personal characteristics (male and single)(b) 
Female and single 0.010 0.125 -0.005 
 (0.056) (0.080) (0.113) 
Male and in couple -0.192*** 0.167 -0.016 
 (0.080) (0.108) (0.151) 
Female and in couple 0.002 0.235** -0.105 
 (0.069) (0.096) (0.138) 
Number of Children (No Child)  
One Child -0.219*** -0.118 0.062 
 (0.069) (0.088) (0.123) 
Two children or more -0.343*** -0.562*** -0.307** 
 (0.072) (0.101) (0.140) 
Age (Less than 25 years old) 
 
25 to 35 years old -0.094* -0.134* -0.101 
 (0.057) (0.081) (0.116) 
35 to 45 years old -0.411*** -0.434*** -0.397*** 
 (0.074) (0.101) (0.142) 
45 to 55 years old -0.544*** -0.725*** -0.744*** 
 (0.087) (0.117) (0.164) 
Nationality (French) 
  
Not French 0.897*** 0.190* -0.098 
 (0.061) (0.107) (0.172) 
Education (Left school before high school) 
End of high School diploma 0.227*** 0.229** 0.576*** 
 (0.069) (0.098) (0.139) 
Secondary education 0.384*** 0.442*** 0.666*** 
 (0.072) (0.100) (0.146) 
Others 0.229*** 0.303*** 0.589*** 
 (0.058) (0.082) (0.119) 
Qualification (Unskilled workers) 
 
Skilled workers -0.317*** -0.325*** -0.397** 
 (0.077) (0.117) (0.164) 
Employees -0.088 0.145* 0.012 
 (0.061) (0.088) (0.122) 
Executives and managers 0.033 0.385*** 0.014 
 (0.093) (0.124) (0.176) 
Unknown 0.482*** 0.606*** 1.126*** 
 (0.080) (0.131) (0.185) 
Desired Contract (Permanent and full time) 
Others -0.237*** -0.202** -0.326*** 
 (0.060) (0.079) (0.111) 
 
 
Note: Standard-errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote estimates significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
(a) For each date, we model the probability to move during the first two months, the 5th and 6th months and the 
9th and 10th months conditionally to being still unemployed at the end of the 2nd, 6th and 10th months. (b) 
Reference category in parenthesis. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE.  
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Table 3.3. Logistic estimation of the propensity score by previously elapsed duration 
(continued) 
 
 
Previously elapsed  2 months (a) 6 months 10 months 
unemployment duration  
  Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Labor market characteristics 
 
Part time job -0.073* -0.283*** -0.141 
 (0.043) (0.062) (0.089) 
Minimum Income Program -0.333*** -0.326*** -0.442*** 
 (0.079) (0.113) (0.165) 
Disabled -0.653*** -0.588*** -0.708*** 
 (0.129) (0.171) (0.244) 
Reason of entry into unemployment (End of contract)(b) 
Dismissal 0.397*** 0.221*** 0.085*** 
 (0.104) (0.125) (0.156) 
Demission 0.096*** 0.129*** -0.260*** 
 (0.103) (0.125) (0.161) 
Entrants to the labor force 0.762*** 0.495*** -0.073*** 
 (0.122) (0.169) (0.257) 
Others 0.264*** 0.063*** -0.058*** 
 (0.105) (0.130) (0.164) 
Unemployment history since 1995 
More than 2 unemp. Spells 0.199*** 0.010* 0.094 
 (0.074) (0.100) (0.143) 
1 to 6 months unemployment  0.330*** 0.204* 0.258* 
 (0.080) (0.112) (0.154) 
More than 6 months 0.383** 0.326*** 0.106 
 (0.073) (0.100) (0.141) 
Cohort Effect (First term 2001)  
Second term 2001 0.014 0.323*** -0.038 
 (0.077) (0.102) (0.150) 
Third term 2001 0.153** -0.295*** -0.330** 
 (0.071) (0.113) (0.157) 
Fourth term 2001 -0.224*** -0.214** 0.340*** 
 (0.081) (0.115) (0.141) 
First term 2002 -0.192** 0.065 -0.157 
 (0.092) (0.118) (0.173) 
Second term 2002 0.031 0.160 -0.091 
 (0.093) (0.122) (0.177) 
Model statistics 
  
Percentage Concordant 58.9 58.9 59.1 
Percentage Discordant 25.2 27.7 21.2 
Percentage Tied 15.9 13.4 19.6 
-2 Log L 25943.2 13856.8 7250.0 
Number of observations 258 179 214 577 151 118 
 
 
Note: Standard-errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote estimates significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
(a) For each date, we model the probability to move during the first two months, the 5th and 6th months and the 
9th and 10th months conditionally to being still unemployed at the end of the 2nd, 6th and 10th months.  
(b) Reference category in parenthesis. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE.  
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Table 3.4. Migration and exit from unemployment after 2, 6 and 10 months  
 
 
Naive Weighting (b) Kernel (c) LPM (d)  Logit (e) Probit (e) 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 2 months 
After 4 months (a) 0.079*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
After 7 months 0.104*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
After 10 months 0.109*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
After 13 months 0.102*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
After 16 months 0.112*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
After 19 months 0.110*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 258 179 258 179 258 179 258 179 258 179 258 179 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 6 months 
After 8 months 0.035*** 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) 
After 11 months 0.060*** 0.023** 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.024 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
After 14 months 0.092*** 0.052*** 0.052** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
After 17 months 0.098*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
After 20 months 0.104*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.023) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
After 23 months 0.107*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
Observations 214 577 214 577 214 577 214 577 214 577 214 577 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 10 months 
After 12 months 0.063*** 0.030*** 0.034* 0.031* 0.030 0.030 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) 
After 15 months 0.129*** 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
After 18 months 0.163*** 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.030) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
After 21 months 0.151*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
After 24 months 0.138*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.033) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
After 27 months 0.143*** 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.035) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
Observations 151 118 151 118 151 118 151 118 151 118 151 118 
 
 
Note: Standard-errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote estimates significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. (a) 
Duration of the unemployment spell in months. (b) Standard-errors are computed by delta-method. (d) Standard-
errors are computed assuming fixed weights. (e) LPM denotes Linear Probability Model. Huber-White standard-
errors. (f) Average marginal effect of migration on the treated. Standard-errors are computed by delta-method. 
The sample includes the first unemployment spell of each worker between January 2001 and June 2002. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE.  
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Table 3.5. Long-distance migration and exit from unemployment after 2, 6 and 10 
months  
 
 
Naive Weighting (c) Kernel (d) LPM (e)  Logit (f) Probit (f) 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 2 months (a) 
After 4 months (b) 0.093*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
After 7 months 0.128*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
After 10 months 0.126*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
After 13 months 0.123*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
After 16 months 0.127*** 0.089*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
After 19 months 0.121*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.084*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Observations 258 179 258 179 258 179 258 179 258 179 258 179 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 6 months 
After 8 months 0.036*** 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) 
After 11 months 0.065*** 0.030** 0.030 0.031* 0.030 0.031* 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
After 14 months 0.096*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
After 17 months 0.106*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
After 20 months 0.114*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.028) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
After 23 months 0.114*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.029) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
Observations 214 577 214 577 214 577 214 577 214 577 214 577 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 10 months 
After 12 months 0.085*** 0.052*** 0.055** 0.052*** 0.051** 0.051** 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) 
After 15 months 0.141*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 
 (0.024) (0.016) (0.031) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) 
After 18 months 0.180*** 0.131*** 0.134*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.035) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) 
After 21 months 0.166*** 0.118*** 0.120*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.037) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) 
After 24 months 0.154*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.038) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) 
After 27 months 0.162*** 0.129*** 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.041) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) 
Observations 151 118 151 118 151 118 151 118 151 118 151 118 
 
Note: Standard-errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote estimates significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. (a) 
Duration of the unemployment spell in months. (b) Standard-errors are computed by delta-method. (d) Standard-
errors are computed assuming fixed weights. (e) LPM denotes Linear Probability Model. Huber-White standard-
errors. (f) Average marginal effect of migration on the treated. Standard-errors are computed by delta-method. 
The sample includes the first unemployment spell of each worker between January 2001 and June 2002. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE.  
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Table 3.6. Migration and exit from unemployment after 2, 6 and 10 months, repeated 
unemployment spells 
 
 
Convention 1 Convention 2 
  
Within  Pooled OLS (b) Within  Pooled OLS (b) 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 2 months 
After 4 months (a) 0.058 *** 0.068 *** 0.002 0.024 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.055) (0.018) 
After 7 months 0.028 0.062 *** 0.020 0.019 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.033) (0.013) 
After 10 months 0.028 ** 0.053 *** 0.004 0.014 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.028) (0.012) 
After 13 months 0.009 0.044 *** -0.003 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.024) (0.011) 
After 16 months 0.011 0.034 *** -0.009 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.020) (0.009) 
After 19 months 0.004 0.026 *** 0.007 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.016) (0.008) 
Observations (c) 238 626 537 506 80 611 195 616 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 6 months 
After 8 months 0.077 0.010 -0.009 0.006 
 (0.050) (0.011) (0.086) (0.017) 
After 11 months 0.012 0.016 0.047 0.002 
 (0.048) (0.013) (0.081) (0.018) 
After 14 months -0.005 0.024 0.057 0.017 
 (0.041) (0.013) (0.071) (0.017) 
After 17 months -0.022 0.015 -0.059 0.025 
 (0.034) (0.012) (0.061) (0.016) 
After 20 months 0.009 0.027 ** -0.006 0.036 
 (0.028) (0.011) (0.050) (0.013) 
After 23 months -0.012 0.024 ** 0.006 0.034 
 (0.023) (0.009) (0.039) (0.011) 
Observations 66 843 308 130 20 753 106 757 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 10 months 
After 12 months 0.309 0.056 *** 0.028 0.040*** 
 (0.210) (0.015) (0.165) (0.025) 
After 15 months 0.171 0.050 *** 0.058 0.082*** 
 (0.193) (0.018) (0.165) (0.027) 
After 18 months 0.065 0.058 *** 0.162 0.075*** 
 (0.164) (0.019) (0.144) (0.025) 
After 21 months 0.162 0.031 * 0.224** 0.058*** 
 (0.134) (0.017) (0.119) (0.023) 
After 24 months 0.065 0.013 0.126 0.024 
 (0.107) (0.015) (0.095) (0.021) 
After 27 months 0.029 0.016 -0.028 0.023 
  (0.072) (0.013) (0.073) (0.018) 
Observations 17 854 192 541 5 332 65 285 
 
Note: Standard-errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote estimates significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. (a) 
Duration of the unemployment spell in months. (b) Huber-White standard errors in parenthesis. (c) For the 
within estimator, observations are repeated unemployment spells. For the pooled OLS, observations are all 
unemployment spells. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE. 
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Table 3.7. Migration and unemployment duration controlling for regional 
unemployment differentials 
 
 
 
 
Cox semiparametric duration model 
Panel A. Controlling for the timing of migration 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Migration (b) 0.036 0.038 0.372*** 0.372*** 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.063) (0.063) 
Migration*ln(number of months 
before the migration, T) 
 
  
-0.212*** -0.211*** 
  
(0.034) (0.034) 
Unemployment rate at the beginning 
of the unemployment spell 
 
 -0.030***  -0.030*** 
 
(0.002)  (0.002) 
Migration*unemployment differential 
(c) 
 -0,028**  -0.025** 
  
(0.011)   (0.011) 
Number of observations 377 317 377 317 377 317 377 317 
Panel B. Controlling for the timing of migration and the time spent  
in the new region of residence 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Migration (b) 0.481*** 0.481*** 0.906*** 0.908*** 
 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.123) (0.129) 
Migration* ln(number of months 
before the migration, T) 
 
-0.207*** -0.206*** -0.494*** -0.495*** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.068) (0.068) 
Migration*ln(number of months after 
the migration, TA) 
 
-0.061 -0.061 -0.366*** -0.368*** 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.074) (0.074) 
Migration*ln(T)*ln(TA)   0.193*** 0.192*** 
 
  
(0.037) (0.037) 
Unemployment rate at the beginning 
of the unemployment spell 
 
 -0.030***  -0.030*** 
 
(0.002)  (0.002) 
Migration*unemployment differential 
(c) 
 -0,025**  -0,027** 
  
(0,011)   (0,011) 
Number of observations 377 317 377 317 377 317 377 317 
 
 
Note: (a) Standard-errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote estimates significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Each 
model incorporates the non time varying covariates described in table 2. (b) The migration variable is a time 
varying dummy variable taking value one after the migration. (c) The unemployment differential is the 
difference between the local unemployment rates before and after the migration. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE. 
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Appendix 3.A. Descriptive statistics  
 
Figure 3.A.1 Migrations rates in 2002 
 
Note: the migration rates are the net migrations in “département” i during the year 2002 divided by the number 
of unemployed workers registered at the beginning of the year. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE. 
 
Figure 3.A.2 Exit rates in 2002 
 
Note: the exit rates are the outflows out of “département” i during the year 2002 divided by the number of 
unemployed workers registered at the beginning of the year. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE. 
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Figure 3.A.3 Entry rates in 2002 
 
Note: the entry rates are the inflows in “department” i during the year 2002 divided by the number of 
unemployed workers registered at the beginning of the year. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE. 
 
Figure 3.A.4 Unemployment rates in 2002 
 
Source: INSEE unemployment rates (Hachid and Vallon, 2006). 
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Appendix 3.B. Outflows out of unemployment and status of observations 
 
 
Note: First spell entering into unemployment between January 2001 and June 2002.  
(a) A change of ASSEDIC corresponds to a migration but in this case the unemployed workers is considered has 
a new unemployed worker in his new place of residence.  
(b) I treat these observations as postponed outflows. I adopt a right censoring strategy and I take these 
observations into account not as instantaneous outflows out of unemployment but as outflows 2 months later. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE.  
 
 
 
 
Non movers Movers Definition 
 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Definition 1 Definition 2 
Destinations of outflow out of 
unemployment 
      
Employment 104565 28.41 2336 25.37 None None 
Training 33153 9.01 995 10.81 Censored (b) Dropped 
Health problems 19210 5.22 639 6.94 Dropped Dropped 
Exemption of job search 5275 1.43 179 1.94 Dropped Dropped 
Pension 91 0.02 0 0.00 Dropped Dropped 
Change of ASSEDIC (a) 3933 1.07 129 1.40 Censored Censored 
Military service 110 0.03 1 0.01 Dropped Dropped 
Other ends of job search 10821 2.94 219 2.38 Censored Dropped 
Unknown 124525 33.83 2478 26.92 Censored Dropped 
Administrative removals for missed 
appointment 9961 2.71 200 2.17 Censored Dropped 
Other administrative removals 18430 5.01 399 4.33 Censored Dropped 
Other motivations 18441 5.01 410 4.45 Censored Dropped 
Missed follow-up 969 0.26 22 0.24 Censored Dropped 
Right censored 18627 5.06 1199 13.02 None None 
Total 368111 9206 331986 111954 
Percentage 97.56 2.44 87.99 29.67 
Retained immobile workers   324 798 109467 
Retained mobile workers   7188 2487 
Appendix.3.C. Variance of the Inverse Propensity score Weighted
Estimator
The Inverse Propensity score Weighted (IPW) estimator of equation 3.10 is:
ÂTTt,n =
1∑
kDkt
∑
i
[Yi,t+n.{Dit − (1−Dit). sˆ(Xit)
1− sˆ(Xit)}] ,
where i and k are indices for unemployed workers, t for unemployment duration at the time of
migration, and n for the time spent in the new region of residence, and sˆ(Xit) is a consistent
estimator of the propensity score of migration (Wooldridge, 2010). I omit the t and n indices:
ÂTT =
N∑
kDk
1
N
∑
i
[Yi.Di]− N∑
kDk
1
N
∑
i
[Yi.(1−Di). sˆ(Xi)
1− sˆ(Xi) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Z
,
where N is the number of unemployed workers.
By a law of large numbers and Slutsky’s theorem, under standard regularity conditions (e.g.
Van Der Vaart, 1998):
N∑
kDk
1
N
∑
i
[Yi.Di] = E(Di)
−1E(Di.Yi) + op(1) = E(Yi|Di = 1) + op(1)
Similarly,
Z = (E(Di) + op(1))
−1.
1
N
∑
i
[Yi.(1−Di). sˆ(Xi)
1− sˆ(Xi) ] .
I estimate sˆ(Xit) with a flexible logit model so that:
Z = (E(Di) + op(1))
−1.
1
N
∑
i
[Yi.(1−Di).exp(Xiβˆ)]
Z = (E(Di) + op(1))
−1.
1
N
∑
i
[Yi.(1−Di).{exp(Xiβ) + exp(Xiβ)Xi(βˆ − β) + op(βˆ − β)}]
Z = (E(Di) + op(1))
−1.{E[Yi.(1−Di).exp(Xiβ)] + E[Yi.(1−Di)exp(Xiβ)Xi](βˆ − β) + op(1)}
Hence, as βˆ − β = Op(N−1/2), Z is asymptotically equivalent to:
Z = E(Di)
−1E[Yi.(1−Di).exp(Xiβ)] + op(1) .
If the propensity score is well specified, equation 3.8 implies:
Z = E(Di)
−1E[E(Y 0i .(1−Di)|Xi).exp(Xiβ)] + op(1)
Z = E(Di)
−1.E[E(Y 0i |Xi, Di = 0).E(Di|Xi)] + op(1) = E(Y 0i |Di = 1) + op(1)
Then, ÂTT = E(Y 1i − Y 0i |Di = 1) + op(1) = ATT + op(1).
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I now derive the asymptotic distribution of the estimator:
N1/2.(ÂTT −ATT ) = N1/2{E(Di)−1. 1
N
∑
i
[YiDi − exp(Xiβ)Yi(1−Di)]
−E(Di)−1E(Yi(1−Di)exp(Xiβ)Xi)(βˆ − β)−ATT}+ op(1)
using
∑
kDk
N
= E(Di) + Op(N
−1/2).
The first order condition of the estimation of the propensity score is:
1
N
.
∑
i
[(Di − sˆ(Xi))Xti ] = 0 .
Expending around the true value β:
1
N
.
∑
i
[(Di − sˆ(Xi))Xti ] =
1
N
.
∑
i
[(Di − s(Xi))Xti ] +
1
N
.
∂
∑
i[(Di − s(Xi))Xti ]
∂βt
)(βˆ − β) + op(N−1/2) = 0
=
1
N
.
∑
i
[(Di − s(Xi))Xti ]−
1
N
.
∑
i
[(1− s(Xi))s(Xi)XtiXi](βˆ − β) + op(N−1/2) = 0 .
This leads to the approximation of βˆ − β:
N1/2(βˆ − β) = { 1
N
.
∑
i
[(1− s(Xi))s(Xi)XtiXi]}−1
1
N
.
∑
i
[(Di − s(Xi))Xti ] + op(1)
= {E[(1− s(Xi))s(Xi)XtiXi]}−1
1
N
.
∑
i
[(Di − s(Xi))Xti ] + op(1) .
Therefore, N1/2.(ÂTT −ATT ) is also asymptotically equivalent to:
N1/2.(ÂTT −ATT ) = N1/2{E(Di)−1.
∑
i
[YiDi − exp(Xiβ)Yi(1−Di)]−
E(Di)
−1E(Yi(1−Di)exp(Xiβ)Xi){E[(1− s(Xi))s(Xi)XtiXi]}−1
× 1
N
∑
i
[(Di − s(Xi))Xti ]−ATT}+ op(1)
That is:
N1/2.(ÂTT −ATT ) = N1/2[ 1
N
.
∑
i
Ωi] + op(1)
And, by a central limit theorem, N1/2.(ÂTT −ATT ) N(0, Vas(ÂTT )).
Thus, I estimate:
Vˆas(ÂTT ) =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i
(Ωˆi − ¯ˆΩi)2 .
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Appendix 3.D. Histograms of estimated probability of migration after 2, 6 
and 10 month unemployment (convention 1) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE.  
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Appendix Table 3.E. Migration and exit from unemployment after 2, 6 and 
10 months, second definition of unemployment outflows 
 
 
Naive Weighting (c) Kernel (d) LPM (e)  Logit (f) Probit (f) 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 2 months (a) 
After 4 months (b) 0.098*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.044** 0.042** 0.043** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) 
After 7 months 0.171*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) 
After 10 months 0.186*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.031) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) 
After 13 months 0.197*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.033) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) 
After 16 months 0.230*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.142*** 
 (0.014) (0.027) (0.035) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
After 19 months 0.239*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.158*** 0.160*** 0.152*** 
 (0.012) (0.028) (0.036) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
Observations 126 953  126 953 126 953  126 953 126 953  126 953 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 6 months 
After 8 months 0.103*** 0.057*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.060** 0.063** 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) 
After 11 months 0.163*** 0.093*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.098*** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.036) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) 
After 14 months 0.245*** 0.162*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.042) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) 
After 17 months 0.288*** 0.198*** 0.202*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.203*** 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.045) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) 
After 20 months 0.325*** 0.233*** 0.237*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.238*** 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.048) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) 
After 23 months 0.336*** 0.244*** 0.248*** 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.247*** 
 (0.018) (0.034) (0.050) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) 
Observations 87 658 87 658 87 658 87 658 87 658 87 658 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated after 10 months 
After 12 months 0.127*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.085*** 0.081*** 0.083** 
 (0.033) (0.016) (0.039) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) 
After 15 months 0.287*** 0.213*** 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 
 (0.038) (0.026) (0.055) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) 
After 18 months 0.381*** 0.294*** 0.297*** 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.301*** 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.063) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) 
After 21 months 0.402*** 0.308*** 0.310*** 0.317*** 0.317*** 0.314*** 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.066) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) 
After 24 months 0.402*** 0.304*** 0.306*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.308*** 
 (0.029) (0.041) (0.069) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) 
After 27 months 0.392*** 0.324*** 0.326*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.333*** 
 (0.022) (0.046) (0.072) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations 67 880 67 880 67 880 67 880 67 880 67 880 
 
Note: Standard-errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote estimates significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. (a) 
Duration of the unemployment spell in months. (b) Standard-errors are computed by delta-method. (d) Standard-
errors are computed assuming fixed weights. (e) LPM denotes Linear Probability Model. Huber-White standard-
errors. (f) Average marginal effect of migration on the treated. Standard-errors are computed by delta-method. 
The sample includes the first unemployment spell of each worker between January 2001 and June 2002. 
Source: Super Fichier Historique Statistique, 1995-2004, ANPE-DARES-INSEE. 
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Appendix 3.F. Descriptive statistics, panel data samples 
 
Table 3.F.1. Descriptive statistics, convention 1, all unemployment spells 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.F.2. Descriptive statistics, convention 1, repeated unemployment spells 
 
Previously elapsed duration 2 months 6 months 10 months 
Personal characteristics 
   
Age 31.24 32.76 34.16 
Couple 0.37 0.40 0.43 
Number of children 0.70 0.81 0.90 
Desired contract 
      
Unspecified term (CDI) and full-time 0.83 0.81 0.79 
CDI and part-time 0.09 0.11 0.13 
Fixed term (CDD and other contracts) 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Reason of entry into Unemployment 
      
End of contract 0.45 0.43 0.39 
Firing 0.35 0.16 0.18 
Demission 0.05 0.05 0.05 
First entry on the labour market 0.05 0.04 0.03 
Others 0.10 0.32 0.35 
Unemployment benefits 
   
Minimum income RMI 0.10 0.10 0.12 
Minimum income ASS 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Insurance (AUD) 0.65 0.72 0.74 
Others 0.23 0.16 0.11 
Order of the unemployment spell 1.67 1.53 1.50 
Migration 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observations 238 626 66 843 17 856 
 
Previously elapsed duration 2 months 6 months 10 months 
Personal characteristics 
   
Age 31.69 32.67 33.47 
Couple 0.38 0.41 0.44 
Number of children 0.73 0.80 0.86 
Desired contract 
      
Unspecified term (CDI) and full-time 0.82 0.80 0.78 
CDI and part-time 0.10 0.12 0.14 
Fixed term (CDD and other contracts) 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Reason of entry into Unemployment  
End of contract 0.41 0.40 0.38 
Firing 0.17 0.19 0.21 
Demission 0.06 0.06 0.06 
First entry on the labour market 0.07 0.05 0.05 
Others 0.29 0.30 0.30 
Unemployment benefits 
   
Minimum income RMI 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Minimum income ASS 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Insurance (AUD) 0.64 0.71 0.75 
Others 0.26 0.18 0.13 
Order of the unemployment spell 1.30 1.11 1.05 
Migration 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observations 537 506 308 130 192 541 
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Table 3.F.3. Descriptive statistics, convention 2, all unemployment spells 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.F.4. Descriptive statistics, convention 2, repeated unemployment spells 
 
Previously elapsed duration 2 months 6 months 10 months 
Personal characteristics 
   
Age 32.30 33.99 35.04 
Couple 0.40 0.44 0.46 
Number of children 0.69 0.80 0.86 
Desired contract 
   
Unspecified term (CDI) and full-time 0.83 0.81 0.80 
CDI and part-time 0.08 0.10 0.12 
Fixed term (CDD and other contracts) 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Reason of entry into Unemployment 
      
End of contract 0.51 0.47 0.41 
Firing 0.14 0.17 0.21 
Demission 0.06 0.05 0.05 
First entry on the labour market 0.04 0.03 0.02 
Others 0.25 0.28 0.31 
Unemployment benefits 
   
Minimum income RMI 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Minimum income ASS 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Insurance (AUD) 0.75 0.78 0.78 
Others 0.15 0.11 0.09 
Order of the unemployment spell 1.67 1.54 1.51 
Migration 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observations 80 611 20 753 5 332 
 
Previously elapsed duration 2 months 6 months 10 months 
Personal characteristics    
Age 32.41 33.48 34.25 
Couple 0.41 0.44 0.46 
Number of children 0.70 0.78 0.85 
Desired contract 
      
Unspecified term (CDI) and full-time 0.83 0.81 0.79 
CDI and part-time 0.09 0.11 0.13 
Fixed term (CDD and other contracts) 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Reason of entry into Unemployment  
End of contract 0.46 0.42 0.38 
Firing 0.19 0.22 0.25 
Demission 0.06 0.06 0.06 
First entry on the labour market 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Others 0.24 0.25 0.27 
Unemployment benefits 
   
Minimum income RMI 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Minimum income ASS 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Insurance (AUD) 0.72 0.77 0.79 
Others 0.20 0.15 0.11 
Order of the unemployment spell 1.28 1.10 1.04 
Migration 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observations 195 616 106 757 65 285 
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